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AbstractThis thesis presents a connectionist theory of how innite languages may t within niteminds. Arguments are presented against the distinction between linguistic competenceand observable language performance. It is suggested that certain kinds of nite stateautomata|i.e., recurrent neural networks|are likely to have sucient computationalpower, and the necessary generalization capability, to serve as models for the processingand acquisition of linguistic structure. These arguments are further corroborated bya number of computer simulations, demonstrating that recurrent connectionist mod-els are able to learn complex recursive regularities and have powerful generalizationabilities. Importantly, the performance evinced by the networks are comparable withobserved human behavior on similar aspects of language. Moreover, an evolutionary ac-count is provided, advocating a learning and processing based explanation of the originand subsequent phylogenetic development of language. This view construes languageas a nonobligate symbiant, arguing that language has evolved to t human learningand processing mechanisms, rather than vice versa. As such, this perspective promisesto explain linguistic universals in functional terms, and motivates an account of lan-guage acquisition which incorporates innate, but not language-specic constraints onthe learning process. The purported poverty of the stimulus is re-appraised in this light,and it is concluded that linguistic structure may be learnable by bottom-up statisticallearning models, such as, connectionist neural networks.
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Chapter 1IntroductionImagine a world without language. What would be the fate of humanity, if languageas we know it suddenly ceased to exist? Would we end up as the ill-fated gruntinghominids in \Planet of the Apes"? Not likely, perhaps, but try to imagine the devas-tating consequences of language loss on a more personal scale. Language is so tightlyinterwoven into the very fabric of our everyday lives that losing even parts of it wouldhave far-reaching detrimental repercussions. Consider, for example, the problems fac-ing someone with agrammatic aphasia as evidenced in the following speech sample froma patient explaining that he has returned to the hospital for some dental work:Ah: : : Monday: : : ah, Dad and Paul Haney [referring to himself by hisfull name] and Dad: : : hospital. Two: : : ah, doctors: : : , and ah: : : thirtyminutes: : : and yes: : : ah: : : hospital. And, er, Wednesday: : : nineo'clock. And er Thursday, ten o'clock: : : doctors. Two doctors: : : andah: : : teeth. Yeah,: : : ne. (Ellis & Young, 1988: p. 242)Now, imagine an evolutionary scenario in which the hominids did not evolve a capabilityfor language. In such a picture, it is obvious that humankind would never have endedup where we are today. For example, instructing the young in new skills without theuse of language would have been dicult, once we get beyond a certain skill complexity.The development and spread of new technologies would therefore be severely impeded,and we might never have evolved beyond being hunters and gatherers.As should be clear, language is a very powerful means of communication, apparentlyunique to humans, allowing us to communicate about an unbounded number of dierentobjects, situations and events. Language permits us to transfer cultural informationreadily from generation to generation|originally, in terms of verbal instructions andenlightening tales; later, writing ensured a more constant source of storing information,making it easier to share knowledge across time; and most recently, computers have1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2allowed us to communicate rapidly over great distances (for instance, via the variousINTERNET facilities, such as, email and Mosaic). The main reason why language issuch a powerful means of communication is|as rst pointed out by Wilhelm von Hum-boldt (quoted in Chomsky, 1965: p. v)|that it \makes innite use of nite means".That is, we can use language to describe anything that is within the limits of our per-ceptual and intellectual capacities. In other words, despite the nite resources of thehuman mind, we are able to produce languages that are innite in nature.As one of the hallmarks of human cognition, language has received much atten-tion within the science dedicated to the study of the human mind: cognitive science.For many years this study was dominated by the `computer metaphor of the mind',proposing an analogy between the processing of symbols in a digital computer andthe workings of the mind. More recently, a dierent view of cognitive processing hasemerged, based on articial neural networks of inter-connected, very simple processingunits. The two dierent approaches are often construed as two dierent paradigms(e.g., Schneider, 1987), and|as was to be expected (cf. Kuhn, 1972)|the prolifer-ation of connectionism in the second half of the 80's led to much subsequent debate(e.g., Chalmers, 1990b; Chater & Oaksford, 1990; Christiansen & Chater, 1992, 1994;Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Fodor & McLaughlin, 1990; Hadley, 1994a, 1994b; Niklasson& Sharkey, 1992; Niklasson & van Gelder, 1994; Smolensky, 1987, 1988; van Gelder,1990). In this debate, language has been considered by many to be the largest stum-bling block for connectionism. Indeed, Pinker & Prince (1988) argue:From its inception, the study of language within the framework of genera-tive grammar has been a prototypical example of how fundamental proper-ties of a cognitive domain can be explained within the symbolic paradigm.: : :Language has been the domain most demanding of articulated symbolstructures governed by rules and principles and it is also the domain wheresuch structures have been explored in the greatest depth and sophistication: : :Many observers thus feel that connectionism, as a radical restructuringof cognitive theory, will stand or fall depending on its ability to account forhuman language. (p. 78)More recently, Chomsky (1993) has provided a rather negative assessment of con-nectionism's current contribution to our general understanding of cognition and, inparticular, of language.Connectionism is a radical abstraction from what's known about the brainand the brain sciences : : :There's no reason to believe you're abstracting theright thing. There's no evidence for it. In the case of language, the evidencefor connectionist models is, for the moment, about zero. The most trivial
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3problems that have been addressed|like learning a few hundred words|have been total failures." (p. 85{86)In this thesis, I take up the challenge posed by Pinker & Prince, showing how a con-nectionist picture might explain our innite use of language given our nite minds, andthereby rebut Chomsky's negative assessment of connectionism. My account involves aview of language processing, which appear to be more in line with psycholinguistic data,as well as a learning and processing based perspective on the acquisition and evolutionof language. But before outlining this theory, I will make some brief methodologicalremarks.1.1 Some Methodological PreliminariesIn discussions of symbolic and connectionist approaches to cognitive science, the his-torical predominance of the symbolic view has meant that, to some extent at least,the ground rules concerning what key cognitive phenomena must be explained andwhat counts as a good explanation, have been set in largely symbolic terms (vanGelder, 1991). Thus, if connectionism amounts to a genuinely new paradigm for theunderstanding of mind, there is a very real danger of falling into what I elsewhere(Christiansen & Chater, 1992) have called the `incommensurability trap'. That is, con-nectionist models may be unfairly judged either because they fail to t the classicalstandards or because when they are made to t, the resulting explanation looks forcedand unattractive. The danger is analogous to that of judging vegetarian food by thestandards of the butcher. After all, connectionism|construed as a new paradigm (e.g.,Schneider, 1987)|may involve a revolutionary reconstruction of the eld from new fun-damentals, leading to changes in methodology and basic theoretical assumptions. Sincerival paradigms prescribe dierent sets of standards and principles, connectionist andclassical approaches to cognitive science may also dier on what constitute meaningfuland legitimate scientic questions. Due to this incommensurability, discussions be-tween proponents of dierent paradigms on the issue of paradigm choice often becomecircular. Each group will tend to praise their own paradigm and criticize the other'swith arguments based on their own paradigm. In other words, when comparing andassessing the individual explanatory power of rival paradigms, the incommensurabil-ity trap constitutes a nontrivial methodological obstacle to negotiate since it involvesengaging in the process of radical translation (Quine, 1960). Or so, much philosophyof science would have us to believe (e.g., Kuhn, 1970). In any case, there are signsthat communication is becoming dicult, and hence it is imperative that the meritsof connectionism are judged from \within"|i.e., on its own terms|not through the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4looking glass of the classical paradigm1.The incommensurability trap might manifest itself in dierent ways. It is often pre-supposed that the level of explanation within cognitive science must necessarily be thatof the classical paradigm. This is, for example evident when Prince & Pinker (1989),in their criticism of the Rumelhart & McClelland (1986) model of the acquisition ofEnglish past tense, assert that \neuroscientists study ring rates, excitation, inhibition,plasticity; cognitive scientists study rules, representations, symbol systems" (p. 1: myemphasis). If cognition has to be couched in terms of `rules', `symbols', and so on, thenconnectionism is likely to fail as a genuine new approach to cognitive science. However,these terms are theoretical constructs belonging to the classical paradigm (at least, intheir most typical instantiations). As such, it is fallacious to assume that such classicalconstructs are a necessary part of cognitive explanations. That connectionist modelsmight not be able to embody rules and context-independent symbols should thereforenot be taken a priori as evidence of shortcomings. Instead, connectionism must bejudged on whether they can account for the (uninterpreted) data that originally let tothe postulation of those classical constructs.Another consequence of the incommensurability trap is the tendency to hold connec-tionist models to a higher standard than similar symbolic models. Often a particularconnectionist model is criticized for not reaching a certain level of performance|aswhen Hadley (1994a) criticizes connectionist models of language acquisition for not ac-commodating a certain kind of generalization (which humans appear to exhibit). Suchcriticisms might, indeed, be warranted (as in Hadley's case; see chapter 4), but it ismost often not acknowledged that symbolic models also suer from the same (or verysimilar) decits. This problem of `not seeing the splint in one's own eye' is further ag-gravated by the fact that most connectionists models are implemented as computationalmodels, whereas many of their symbolic counterparts are not, but remain conceptualmodels. This means that the empirical results of connectionist simulations are oftencompared directly with conceptual predictions from an unimplemented symbolic model(as it is, e.g., in the case of Pinker & Prince, 1988, and Prince & Pinker, 1989). Ofcourse, it is possible that the symbolic models when implemented would provide the1For example, much of the criticism of connectionism launched by Fodor & McLaughlin (1990)as well as Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) does not stem from inconsistencies or incoherence within thetheoretical framework of connectionism. Instead, it stems from the failure on behalf of Fodor andcollaborators to couch connectionism in the terminology of the classical processing paradigm (also cf.van Gelder, 1991). Similarly, another non-classical approach to cognition|situation theory|has alsobeen victim of the same kind of terminologically based criticism: \Fodor thinks that computation isformal. So when I argue that thought is not formal, he annoyingly charges me with claiming thatthought are not computational. I suppose Fodor is so caught up in his own identication of formal withcomputational as to be unable to maintain the distinction" (Barwise, 1989: p. 156{7).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5right empirical results; but in the absence of such implementations, the conceptualmodels should not be taken as existence proofs of classical solutions (given that theycan always be modied in some ad hoc fashion to accommodate problematic data).This leads to the last methodological point that I want to make before outlining thecontent of my thesis. The presupposition of classical theoretical constructs in cogni-tive explanation and the mismatched comparisons between connectionist and symbolicmodels, together, may lead to in principle arguments against connectionist modelssubserving certain (or all) cognitive functions. Consider, for instance, the followingsummary from Pinker & Prince (1988):we will conclude that the claim that parallel distributed processing net-works can eliminate the need for rules and rule induction mechanisms inthe explanation of human language is unwarranted. In particular, we ar-gue that the shortcomings are in many cases due to central features ofconnectionist ideology and irremediable; or if remediable, only by copyingtenets of the maligned symbolic theory. The implications for the promiseof connectionism in explicating language are, we think, profound. (p. 82)This is, perhaps, not an `in principle-argument', but it comes very close. In any event,the problem here is that the empirical shortcomings of a particular connectionist modelperforming some function is generalized to a principled argument against all connec-tionist models of that given function. However, only additional empirical research canestablish whether such shortcomings are endemic to connectionist networks, or merelyan artifact of a particular implementation. In closing these methodological preliminar-ies regarding the incommensurability trap, it is worth noting that the opposite dangeris equally real|symbolic models can look unattractive from a connectionist perspec-tive. This raises the danger of ignoring all that has been learned from the symbolicapproach, and simply starting the project of understanding the mind afresh. In thisthesis, I hope to keep clear of this danger.1.2 ContentOne of the dominating characteristics of much connectionist work is the combined em-phasis on learning and processing|in particular, when it comes to connectionist modelsof language. In contrast, much work within the classical approaches to language invokeChomsky's (e.g., 1980, 1986, 1988, 1993) notion of Universal Grammar (UG); that is,a massive body of innately specied, language specic knowledge. The main challengefor connectionism is thus to account for the variety of linguistic phenomena which tra-ditionally have been taken to support a nativist position on language. Recently, the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6general relation between connectionism and nativism has been the focus of some debate(e.g., Christiansen & Chater, 1992; Clark, 1993; Quartz, 1993), especially in connectionwith language acquisition (e.g., Bates & Elman, 1993; Elman, 1993; Karmilo-Smith,1992; Kirsh, 1992; Narayanan, 1992; Ramsey & Stich, 1991). One of the importantconclusions to be drawn from this debate is that connectionist models do not have tobe, and in most cases are not, tabula rasa models of learning. More specically, it isimportant to distinguish between domain-specic and more general innate constraintson connectionist learning. In this thesis, I present a connectionist theory of the use,acquisition and evolution of language, incorporating innate, but not language-specicconstraints on processing and learning. As such, the theory provides a learning andprocessing based alternative to UG approaches to language.First, in chapter 2, I address the issue of how much processing power is requiredto account for human language behavior. A distinction is made between what I calliterative recursion, which can be subserved by a nite-state automaton (FSA), andnon-iterative recursion, for which at least a push-down automaton (PDA) is needed.The existence of the latter kind of recursion has been used as evidence against FSAmodels of language. However, an unconstrained PDA can process sentences that are be-yond the abilities of humans|most notably, in English sentences with multiple center-embeddings. To solve this problem a distinction is typically made between a limitedlanguage performance and an innite linguistic competence. This distinction has gen-erally served as a major obstacle against processing based approaches to language, andagainst connectionist language models in particular. I therefore challenge the validityof the competence/performance distinction, stressing that it is impossible to distin-guish in a theory-neutral way between evidence pertaining to linguistic performanceand evidence pertinent to language competence. In addition, the distinction makes thegrammar functionally independent of processing, thus threatening to make linguistictheories immune to potentially falsifying empirical evidence.Having argued against the competence/performance distinction, I turn my attentionto the amount of recursion that can be observed in actual language behavior. Psycholin-guistic results show that only very limited instances of non-iterative recursion can befound in naturally occurring language. However, a possible objection is that perfor-mance on these kind of recursive structures|such as, center-embedded sentences|canbe improved given training and external memory aids. I rebut this objection, suggestingvia an analogy with the processing of garden path sentences (i.e., structurally ambigu-ous sentences) that such performance improvements are not rooted in an unboundedlinguistic competence, but in the conscious use of reasoning abilities that are not spe-cic to language. The underlying idea is that under normal circumstances we process
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7language without conscious eort, but when sentences of a certain complex nature aremet (such as, garden path and multiply center-embedded sentences), processing failsand higher level reasoning processes are recruited to complete the parse.From this I conclude that language models in general do not need to account forunlimited non-iterative recursion. Rather, the models only have to be able to dealwith a very limited amount of non-iterative recursion, but must also encompass asubstantial capacity for the processing of iterative recursive structures. Connectionistmodels seem to t this mold. Furthermore, they have no straightforward separation ofcompetence and performance, making them ideal models of language processing vis-a-vis the problems facing more traditional approaches. I therefore discuss in some detailthe nature of neural network processing and distributed representation as related to thelearning of linguistic structure, paving the way for the simulation experiments reportedin chapters 3 and 4.The existence of non-iterative recursive structure in natural language was one of theprincipal, and most telling, sources of diculty for associationist models of linguisticbehavior. It has, more recently, become a focus in the debate surrounding the generalityof neural network models of language, which many would regard as the natural heirs ofthe associationist legacy. Non-iterative recursive sentence constructions are dicult toprocess because it is necessary to keep track of arbitrarily many dierent dependenciesat once. This is not possible for associationist accounts, which assume that the languageprocessor is a (particular kind of) FSA. Similarly, assuming, as we must, that allparameters have nite precision, any nite neural network is also a nite state machine.The important question is, then, whether neural networks can learn to handle non-iterative recursive structures? If not, many would argue, neural networks can be ruledout as viable models of language processing. Chapter 3 therefore investigates to whatextent connectionist models are able to learn some degree of non-iterative recursion.Chomsky's (1956, 1957) original proof against FSA accounts of language was pre-sented in terms of three non-iterative recursive languages. In a number of simulationexperiments, I use slightly altered versions of these languages to test the ability of twokinds of recurrent neural networks to acquire non-iterative recursive regularities. Net-work performance is further measured against a simple statistical prediction methodbased on n-grams, strings of consecutive words. I outline a number of performanceexpectations given the complexity of the three test languages, and report the results oftwo experiments involving, respectively, a 2-word and an 8-word vocabulary. Finally,a comparison is made between network performance and human performance on thesame kind of structures, suggesting that both exhibit a similar break-down pattern inperformance as the level of embedding increases. I therefore conclude that the existence
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8of limited non-iterative recursion no longer can be used as a priori evidence againstconnectionist models of linguistic behavior.In chapter 4, I present simulation experiments which extend the results from theprevious chapter. That is, I investigate how a simple recurrent network deals with lim-ited non-iterative recursion in the context of a natural language grammar also incorpo-rating iterative recursion. Results from two experiments are reported: one simulationinvolving the combination of center-embedded structures with left- and right-branchingconstructs, and another combining cross-dependency sentence structures with left andright recursive structures. The results show that network behavior on cross-dependencyand center-embedded structures in these simulations is comparable with that reportedin chapter 3, and therefore with human behavior on similar sentence constructs. More-over, results pertaining to the model's behavior on the iterative structures is presented,making certain predictions regarding human behavior on such structures.If connectionist models are to be genuine candidates as mechanisms subservinghuman language acquisition, it is important that they be able to generalize from pastexperience to novel stimuli. In this connection, Hadley (1994a) has recently attackedconnectionist models of language learning for not aording a suciently powerful kindof generalization compared with humans. I discuss this challenge in the second half ofchapter 4, and recast it in a more formal and precise way. Then I report additionalresults from the above simulations, indicating that connectionist models can aord amore sophisticated type of generalization. It is therefore concluded that connectionistmodels may indeed have sucient computational power to serve as models for languagelearning.Having argued for a processing based view of our language ability and demonstratedthe computational adequacy of connectionist models of language, I sketch a theory ofthe evolution and acquisition of language in chapter 5. The theory distances itself fromthe dominating exaptationist (e.g., Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989) and adaptationist (e.g.,Pinker & Bloom, 1990) perspectives on language evolution by construing language asa nonobligate symbiant (that is, a kind of benecial parasite). As such, there hasbeen a much stronger pressure on language to adapt to the constraints imposed byhuman learning and processing mechanisms, than vice versa. This view promises toprovide functional explanations for apparently arbitrary linguistic principles|such as,subjacency|which appear to be universal to all human languages.I then speculate that language originated as a manual language of gestures, sub-served by evolutionary ancient implicit learning processes presumably seated some-where near Broca's area in the left hemisphere of the brain. Changes in the human
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9vocal tract are likely to have facilitated the shift from a manual language to a pre-dominately vocal language. The key to understanding subsequent linguistic change, Iargue, is vocabulary growth, forcing a gradually more regularized morphology in orderto accommodate the growing number of words in a nite memory system. This, inturn, lead to a more complex syntax to ensure reliable communication. Moreover, it iscontended that the Baldwin eect, which allows learned traits to become innate, doesnot apply in the case of language evolution.Since the evolutionary scenario suggests that learning still plays the dominatingrole in language acquisition, I close the chapter by outlining a maturationally basedtheory of language learning. Importantly, language has evolved to be learnable byhuman infants undergoing maturational changes. It is therefore not surprising thatchildren, despite their limited memory and perceptual abilities, are better languagelearners than adults. This explains the existence of a critical period of language acqui-sition. The maturational picture provides the basis for a re-appraisal of the poverty ofstimulus argument in all its instantiations; that is, the existence of arbitrary linguisticuniversals, noisy input, innite generalization from limited input, the early emergenceof many linguistic principles in child language, and the inadequacy of empirical learn-ing methods. After having shown that the primary linguistic stimulus may not be aspoor as assumed in theories of UG, I nally respond to possible objections based on,respectively, creolization and the purported existence of a `morphology gene'.The conclusion in chapter 6 sums up the main arguments presented in this thesisin favor of processing and learning based theory of the human language ability and itsevolutionary past. This theory has summoned evidence from not only connectionistmodeling and psycholinguistics, but also anthropology, implicit learning theory, evo-lutionary theory, and neuroscience. It makes a number of empirical predictions, someof which are presented in the conclusion along with proposals for their further investi-gation via connectionist simulations or psycholinguistic experiments. Obviously, muchstill needs to be said and done, but I believe that in this thesis I have taken us a fewsteps closer to a learning and processing based theory of language.
Chapter 2Grammars and LanguageProcessingSince the emergence of generative grammar, language has been construed predomi-nately as a paradigmatic example of the symbolic view of cognition (e.g., Fodor &Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988). However, the conception of cognition as sym-bol processing arguably grew out of Chomsky's (1959b) attack on Skinner's (1957)behavioristic account of language. Following this attack, the statistical approach tolanguage advocated by the behaviorists quickly became anathema. Instead, theories oflanguage couched in terms of symbols governed by recursive rules became the focus ofmainstream linguistics. This cleared the way for a general dismissal of behaviorism andthe subsequent dominance of the symbolic paradigm, leading to the birth of cognitivescience (and articial intelligence).Within the symbolic view of cognition, the apparently unbounded complexity anddiversity of natural language, contrasted with the nite character of our cognitiveresources, is often taken to warrant a recursive language processing mechanism. Nev-ertheless, it is important to consider whether it is necessary to postulate a recursivelanguage mechanism in order to account for language productivity. What seems to beneeded in the rst place is a mechanism which is able to generate, as well as parse,an innite number of natural language expressions using only nite means. Obviously,such a mechanism has to be of considerable computational power and, indeed, recursiverules provide a very elegant way of achieving this. Consequently, recursion has beenan intrinsic part of most accounts of natural language behavior|perhaps due to theessentially recursive character of most linguistic theories of grammar.11For example, in GB (e.g., Chomsky, 1981) the underlying principles of X-theory are recursive, as10
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 11The existence of recursion in natural language is often taken to be a major stumblingblock for connectionist models of linguistic processing|but this is, strictly speaking,not true. Neural networks (and other nite state automata) are able to process a certainkind of recursion which I will refer to as `iterative recursion (i-recursion)2. This kindof recursion permits the iteration of a given structure either by branching to the left(such as, the multiple prenominal genitives in `Anita's cat's tail') or to the right (as,for instance, the multiple sentential complements in `I thought Anders said he left').The real obstacle for connectionist language processing is therefore not recursion perse, but rather the complex forms of recursion that here will be referred to as `non-iterative recursion' (ni-recursion). One of the most important kinds of ni-recursion iscenter-embedding as exemplied in the doubly center-embedded sentence `the girl thatthe cat that the dog chased bit saw the boy'. As such, ni-recursion allows the generationof structures which cannot readily be redescribed in terms of iteration. This impliesthat no nite state automaton (FSA) can capture ni-recursion|at least, not withoutadditional memory structures. The same also seems to apply to connectionist models.But, does this mean that connectionist networks are not viable as models of languageprocessing? What does the empirical data tell us about the kind of computationalpower we may need to account for human language behavior?In this chapter, I address these questions by rst discussing the close relation be-tween recursion and linguistic grammars, illustrated by a detailed example involving theparsing of a ni-recursive sentence. An unrestricted parser of this kind can process sen-tences beyond any human capacity. A distinction is therefore typically made betweenthe nite observable performance of humans and the innite competence inherent in theparser's recursive grammar. Section 2 challenges this competence/performance distinc-tion on methodological grounds, suggesting that it be abandoned. Next, psycholinguis-tic results are presented which show that only a very limited amount of ni-recursionoccurs in natural language, whereas i-recursion seems to abundant. In this connec-tion, it is argued that performance improvements following training on ni-recursivesentences reect aspects of higher level cognitive reasoning, rather than unveiling anunderlying unbounded competence. Finally, connectionism is proposed as a processingframework which may permit the eschewal of the competence/performance distinction,while promising to have sucient computational power to deal with both i-recursionand a limited degree of ni-recursion.are the ID-rules of GPSG (Gazdar et al., 1985).2Note that I am not talking about the recursive languages of automata theory, but about recursivestructure in natural languages. Thus, the use of the adjective `recursive' throughout this thesis refersto the latter structural meaning. My use of `recursion' will be explicated below.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 122.1 Grammars and RecursionThe creative nature of natural language use|its productivity|has been assumed to besubserved by a system of rules for more than 150 years (cf. Chomsky, 1965). Yet, thegenerative aspect of grammar had to wait for the development of recursion theory in thefoundations of mathematics before it could be properly captured in mechanistic terms.In other words, \although it was well understood that linguistic processes are in somesense `creative', the technical devices for expressing a system of recursive processes weresimply not available until much more recently" (Chomsky, 1965: p. 8). Thus recursionhas been an intrinsic part of the generative grammar framework from its inception.The history of generative grammar dates back to Chomsky's (1956, 1957) demon-stration that language can in principle be characterized by a set of recursive phrasestructure rules, complemented by a set of transformational rules. There are three waysin which recursion can occur in a phrase structure rule. Suppose X is a (non-terminal)symbol and  and  non-empty strings of symbols and terminals3. A rule involves left-embedding when X ) X (i.e., there is a derivation from X to X), center-embeddingwhen X ) X, and right-embedding when X ) X . The mechanistic realizationof such recursive phrase structure grammars imposes certain demands regarding com-putational power. For example, Chomsky (1956, 1957) has argued that the languageprocessing mechanism cannot be realized by a nite state automaton (FSA). This isbecause the latter can only produce regular languages and these are not able to supportan unbounded depth of center-embedding. In contrast, the set of human languages isgenerally assumed to fall (mostly) within the broader class of languages, referred to as`context-free' within the Chomsky (1959a) hierarchy of languages.This hierarchy of languages is couched in terms of grammars comprising a numberof rewrite rules of the general form ! . Every class within the hierarchy is dened interms of the restrictions imposed on its rewrite rules. At each level a given class formsa proper subset of the less restrictive class(es) above it. Restricting  to be a singlesymbol and  either a single symbol followed by a (possibly empty) string of terminals,or vice versa, then we obtain the most narrow of the classes: the regular languageswhich can be generated by an FSA. For example, a right-linear rewrite rule takes theform A ! wB (assuming that A and B are symbols, and w a string of terminals,possibly empty), whereas a left-linear rule will have the format of A ! Bw4. Theless restrictive class of context-free languages5 allows  to be any (non-empty) string3Here, terminals correspond to words and symbols to variables ranging over the left handsides ofthe set of rewrite rules (including themselves).4Notice that if A = B then we get right and left recursion, respectively.5The classes of languages from context-free and upwards in the hierarchy all support ni-recursion,
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 13S ! NP VPNP ! N relNP ! NVP ! Vrel ! NP V(trans)Figure 2.1. The recursive set of phrase structure rules used to assign syntactic structure tosentences with object relative clauses.of symbols and terminals, making center-embedding possible, e.g., A ! w1Aw2. Apush-down automaton (i.e., an FSA augmented with a stack|see below) is needed toproduce the set of non-regular languages in this class. The context-sensitive languagesconstitute an even broader class, loosening the restriction on  and, thus, allowing morethan one symbol to occur on the lefthand-side (though still ensuring that  is at leastof the same length as ). As an example, consider the rewrite rule A1B1 ! A1A2B1B2which takes A1B1 and expands it such that the dependency between A1 and B1 crossesthat of A2 and B2. To generate the set of these languages that are not also context-free, we need a linear bounded automaton (that is, a Turing machine whose tape islinearly bounded by the length of the input sentences). Finally, the broadest classof unrestricted languages does not have any restrictions on  and , and can only beproduced in its entirety by a Turing machine with an arbitrarily long tape.2.1.1 A Parsing ExampleIf Chomsky (1956, 1957, 1959a) is right in that we need the power of context-freelanguages in order to account for English (and other natural languages), we mightask what kind of computational mechanism is warranted? As mentioned earlier, thenatural language processing mechanism has traditionally been construed as a symbolicprocessing device using recursion. As such, recursion entails that the non-terminalsymbol () on the lefthand side of a rule reappears (in the -string) on the righthandside of the same or another rule (as described above). In addition, recursion oftenoccurs as a consequence of the application of a set of rules, each of which by themselvesis not recursive. For example, assigning syntactic structure to the (ni-recursive) string`boys girls cats bite see fall' (and recognizing it as a complex sentence involving twocenter-embeddings) is readily done using the recursive set of phrase structure rules inFigure 2.1. An analysis of the string in terms of these phrase structure rules wouldsave their subset of regular languages which only permits i-recursion.










boys girls cats bite see fall
S
Figure 2.2. The syntactic tree for the doubly center-embedded sentence `boys girls cats bitesee fall'.result in the syntactic tree illustrated in Figure 2.2.At this point one might wonder how we can recover the syntactic information asexemplied by Figure 2.2 from the set of phrase structure rules listed in Figure 2.1.Or, more generally, how can the assignment of syntactic structure given a particulargrammar be mechanized so as to allow the processing of arbitrary utterances? What weneed is a mechanism|a parser|which in some way realizes a grammar such that it isable to recover the syntactic structure of (grammatical) utterances. As such, parsers aretypically built as rule-based production systems (Newell & Simon, 1976)6, comprisinga knowledge base realizing the grammar, a working memory in which intermediateprocessing results are stored, and a mechanism for applying the grammar rules giventhe content of the working memory. Non-iterative recursion is typically implementedby conguring part of the working memory as a last-in-rst-out push-down store, alsoknown as a stack. This data structure can be visualized as a pile (or stack) of papersthat can only be manipulated in two ways: either, we can remove a single piece ofpaper from the top of the pile, or, place yet another piece of paper on top. The last6For example, Marcus (1978) acknowledges this when describing his parser, PARSIFAL, in whichthe grammar \is made up of pattern/action rules; this grammar can be viewed as an augmented formof Newell and Simon's production systems" (p. 237).
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 15boys : : :[ NP boys ? ]  top[: : : ](a) boys girls : : :[ NP boys ? ][ NP girls ? ]  top[: : : ](b) boys girls cats : : :[NP boys ? ][NP girls ? ][NP cats ? ]  top[: : : ](c)boys girls cats bite : : :[ NP boys ? ][ NP girls ? ]  top[rel cats bite](d) boys girls cats bite see : : :[ NP boys ? ]  top[rel girls [rel cats bite] see](e) boys girls cats bite see fall top[S boys [rel girls [rel cats bite] see] fall](f)Figure 2.3. Stack (above) and constituent buer (below) contents when parsing the doublycenter-embedded sentence `boys girls cats bite see fall'paper to be placed on top of the pile will therefore be always be the rst paper thatcan be accessed. Notice that just as it is not possible to read papers that are in thepile, the parser typically only has access to the element on top of the stack.To provide a rough idea of how ni-recursion is implemented via a stack, considerthe following simplied version of a left-to-right parse of the above sentence. For thepurpose of clarication, the parser is not equipped with lookahead buer. Figure 2.3shows the stack contents during the processing of `boys girls cats bite see fall'. In (a),the parser receives `boys' as input, and categorizes it as a noun that can instantiatethe N variable in either of the two NP rules from Figure 2.1. Since the parser cannotdo anything with just a single noun, a partly instantiated NP rule is `pushed' on thestack (leaving the constituent buer empty). Next, the parser gets the noun `girls' asillustrated in (b). The parser is unable to attach the two nouns to each other via arule, so it is forced once more to push a partly instantiated NP rule on top of the stack.When the parser subsequently encounters `cats' in (c), it must again push a partlyinstantiated NP rule on the stack. Following the categorization of 'bite' as a transitive
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 16verb, the partly instantiated NP rule is `popped' o the stack (d). The two most recentinput words can now form a reduced relative clause, [rel cats bite], in the constituentbuer. This means that rel in the complex NP can be instantiated with `girls' as N.The parser then receives the transitive verb `see' in (e), and the process is repeated.The constituent buer now contains [rel girls [rel cats bite] see]. Once again, the nextitem on the stack can be used to instantiate N in yet another complex NP with thecontent of the constituent buer as rel. Finally in (f), the parser gets the last remainingverb, `fall', which matches as a VP with the complex NP to form an S. The constituentbuer now holds the full syntactic parse of the doubly center-embedded sentence (inbracketed form) corresponding to the syntactic tree in Figure 2.2.From the example, we can see that a stack provides an elegant way of realizing a ni-recursive grammar. Notice that the rules used by the parser above correspond directlyto the phrase structure rules in Figure 2.1. However, such a direct identity relationis not required between the parser rules and the rules of the grammar that the parseris realizing. Indeed, this is most often not the case for parsers of some complexity(e.g., the parsers developed by Berwick & Weinberg, 1984; Church, 1982; Marcus,1980). Instead, a general mapping between the theoretical grammar as a whole and itsparsing realization is typically adopted (for a more detailed picture, see, for example,Berwick & Weinberg, 1984). Importantly, in this weaker version of the grammar/parserrelationship the recursive nature of generative grammar is still mirrored directly in the(recursive) workings of the parser (as exemplied in Figure 2.3|albeit without theone-to-one mapping between grammar and parser rules).Historically, the direct identity relation was tried out rst, ideally providing a basisfor a strong link between grammatical competence and parsing performance. This wasthe motivation behind the Derivational Theory of Complexity|rst outlined by Miller& Chomsky (1963)|which sought to establish a one-to-one correspondence betweengrammar rules and the parser's computation over its representations. The basic ideawas that the number of transformations required to derive the syntactic structurefor a given utterance would be reected in terms of parsing complexity (that is, theactual time it would take to parse the utterance). This hypothesis was abandoned infavor of more general mappings in the late sixties, following a number of experimentalstudies showing no direct relationship between the length of tranformational derivationand processing time. However, this move also led to a methodological separation ofgrammatical knowledge from processing behavior, and subsequently accentuated thecompetence/performance distinction to which I turn to next.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 172.2 The Competence/Performance DistinctionIn modern linguistics, the paradigmatic method of obtaining data is through intuitivegrammaticality judgments. However, it is a generally accepted fact that the greaterthe length and complexity of a particular utterance is, the less sure people are intheir judgment thereof. Moreover, a variety of psycholinguistic studies have providedmuch evidence demonstrating the limitations of human language processing (for exam-ple, in the case of center-embedded sentences, Bach, Brown & Marslen-Wilson, 1986;Blaubergs & Braine, 1974; Foss & Cairns, 1970; King & Just, 1991; Larkin & Burns,1977; Marks, 1968; Miller, 1962; Miller & Isard, 1964; Stolz, 1967). In order to sal-vage the unbounded capacity of the recursively specied generative grammar from thedilemma caused by such human shortcomings, a distinction is typically made betweenan innite linguistic competence and a limited observable performance. The latter islimited by memory limitations, attention span, lack of concentration, and other pro-cessing constraints, whereas the former is construed as being essentially innite invirtue of the recursive nature of grammar and a total lack of constraints on syntacticderivation. Consequently, \a grammar of a language purports to be a description ofthe ideal speaker-hearer's intrinsic competence" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 4).The competence/performance distinction has been strongly advocated by Chomskyas having important methodological implications for language research. In particular,he has stressed that it is a common fallacy: : :to assume that if some experimental result provides counter-evidence toa theory of processing that includes a grammatical theory T and parsingprocedure P : : :then it is T that is challenged and must be changed. Theconclusion is particularly unreasonable in the light of the fact that in generalthere is independent (so-called \linguistic") evidence in support of T whilethere is no reason at all to believe that P is true. (Chomsky, 1981: p. 283)Since this position endorses a sharp functional distinction between linguistic compe-tence and processing performance, I will refer to it as the strong C/PD. According tothe strong C/PD, linguists do not need to pay much attention to psycholinguistics.Indeed, Chomsky seems to doubt the relevance of psycholinguistic results to languageresearch:In the real world of actual research on language, it would be fair to say, Ithink, that principles based on evidence derived from informant judgmenthave proved to be deeper and more revealing than those based on evidencederived from experiments on processing and the like, although the futuremay be dierent in this regard. (Chomsky, 1980: p. 200)
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 18In this light, the strong C/PD provides its proponents with a protective belt that sur-rounds their grammatical theories and makes them empirically impenetrable to psy-cholinguistic counter-evidence.2.2.1 The Chomskyan Competence ParadoxThere is, however, a methodological problem inherent in the strong C/PD. On theone hand, all linguistic theories rely on grammaticality judgments that (indirectly viaprocessing) display our knowledge of language. The strong C/PD, on the other hand,makes T immune to all kinds of empirical falsication|even (in a pinch) to informantjudgments|should they not t T. This leads to what I will call the Chomskyan compe-tence paradox. Thus, it seems paradoxical from a methodological perspective to acceptonly certain kinds of empirical evidence (i.e., grammaticality judgments), whereas therest is dismissed on what appears to be rather opportunistic grounds. Interestingly,George (1989) has argued against the `processing fetishism' of cognitive psychology andin defense of the psychological reality of linguistic grammars, that it is a \a peculiar,but common, assumption that we know a priori which kind of data (here, `the behav-ioral sort') is relevant to which conjectures" (p. 104). Note that this argument (mutatismutandis) applies equally well to the general rejection of psycholinguistic data, and, inparticular, to the selective use of informant judgments. George's argument is thereforejust as dangerous for proponents of the strong C/PD as for cognitive psychologistsfocusing entirely on behavioral data.The early history of generative grammar provides an interesting background for theChomskyan competence paradox. Chomsky originally stated that for an utterance tobe grammatical it must be \acceptable to a native speaker" (1957, p. 13). He even sug-gested a negative test for grammaticality in which an ungrammatical sentence would beread \with just the intonation pattern given any sequence of unrelated words" (p. 16).This ungrammaticality test became problematic in the light of Miller's (1962) resultswhich showed that when subjects are asked to repeat center-embedded sentences, \theirintonation is characteristic of the recitation of a list of unrelated phrases, not the ut-terance of a sentence" (p. 755{6). It was therefore soon abandoned, as was the positivetest; i.e., the link between grammaticalness and acceptability. Instead, Chomsky (1965)contended that \acceptability is a concept that belongs to the study of performance,whereas grammaticalness belongs to the study of competence. : : :although one mightpropose various operational tests for acceptability, it is unlikely that a necessary andsucient operational criterion might be invented for the much more abstract and farmore important notion of grammaticalness" (p. 11, my emphasis). Having thus severed
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 19the direct link between grammaticalness and acceptability, endorsing the strong C/PD,the opportunistic escape hatch was then further secured: \it is quite apparent that aspeaker's reports and viewpoints about his behavior and his competence may be in er-ror. Thus generative grammar attempts to specify what a speaker actually knows, notwhat he may report about his knowledge" (p. 8). This makes linguistic theory immunetowards potentially damaging informant judgments such as those reported in Marks(1968). He found that people judge center-embedded sentences with more than onelevel of embedding to be ungrammatical (whereas left- and right-embedded sentencesof diering length are judged to be grammatical).The Chomskyan competence paradox should now be obvious: how can it be thatamongst informant judgments, which are all elicited in exactly the same way, someare considered to be `true' facts about linguistic competence whereas others merelyreect performance? In other words, how can a theory (of linguistic competence) whichbuilds on a set of facts (i.e., grammaticality judgments) at the same time be used todistinguish among those very same facts, dismissing some of them, without circularity?One could, of course, respond that in certain exceptional cases we can allow (to rephraseQuine, 1960) that the `tail' of the theory is wagging the `dog' of evidence. However,this methodological move just leads us to a new version of the problem: how can wedetermine in a theory-neutral way which linguistic constraints are true limitations oncompetence and which are merely performance shortcomings? For example, why isit that the subjacency principle (which can be explained as a processing constraintcf., e.g., Berwick & Weinberg, 1984; Marcus, 1980) is typically considered to be agenuine constraint on competence, whereas human processing limitations with respectto center-embedded sentences are regarded as performance constraints? This echoedby Church (1982) who|whilst construing subjacency as a competence idealization|nevertheless notes that \in general, though, it is extremely dicult to prove that aparticular phenomenon is necessarily a matter of competence. We have no proof thatsubjacency is a competence universal, and similarly, we have no proof that center-embedding is a processing universal" (p. 12). The Chomskyan competence paradoxtherefore seems to be an unavoidable methodological implication of the strong C/PD,suggesting that the latter be eschewed7.7It might also be objected that we need a C/PD to account for the often mentioned fact thatpeople's performance on center-embedded sentences can be improved with training and the use ofpen and paper. So, the argument goes, we must have an (at least) in principle innite competenceunderlying our linguistic behavior. I will address this argument in section 2.3, suggesting that uponscrutiny it does not hold water.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 202.2.2 A Weaker Competence/Performance DistinctionA more moderate position, which I will refer to as the weak C/PD, contends thatalthough linguistic competence is supposed to be innite, the underlying grammarmust directly support an empirically appropriate performance. This is done by explic-itly allowing performance|or processing|considerations to constrain the grammar.Pickering & Chater (1992) have suggested that such constraints must be built intothe representations underlying the grammatical theory, forcing a closer relation to theprocessing theory. This ensures that the relation between the theory of grammaticalcompetence (Chomsky's T) and the processing assumptions (Chomsky's P) is no longerarbitrary, resulting in an opening for empirical testing. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Tand P are still functionally independent of each other, the option is always open forreferring any falsifying empirical data questioning T to problems regarding the inde-pendent P, i.e., to performance errors. In addition, although this position does notlead directly to the Chomskyan competence paradox, it still relies on a methodologi-cally problematic, theory-laden notion of what counts as evidence of competence andwhat counts as performance data.To compare the methodological dierences between models of natural languageprocessing that adopt, respectively, the strong or the weak C/PD, it is illustrative toconstrue the models as rule-based production systems. Recall that within the produc-tion system conceptualization of a parser, the grammar of a particular linguistic theorycorresponds to the system's knowledge base. The system can therefore be said to havean innite linguistic competence in virtue of its independent knowledge base, whereasits performance is constrained by working memory limitations. This is in direct cor-respondence with the strong C/PD, since the grammar is completely separated fromprocessing. Models adhering to the weak C/PD would similarly have an independent,declarative knowledge base corresponding to the grammar, but in addition they wouldalso encompass a separate knowledge base consisting of what we might coin linguisticmeta-knowledge. This knowledge consists of various performance motivated parsingheuristics|such as, for example, the `minimal attachment principle' (Frazier & Fodor,1978), `early closure' (Kimball, 1973), and `late closure' (Frazier & Fodor, 1978)|thatprovide constraints on the application of the grammar rules. Thus, the performanceof the model is constrained not only by limitations on working memory but also bylinguistic meta-knowledge.From the production system analogy it can be seen that proponents of both thestrong and the weak C/PD stipulate grammars that are functionally independent fromprocessing. As a consequence, empirical evidence that appears to falsify a particular
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 21grammar can always be rejected as a result of processing constraints|either construedas limitations on working memory (strong C/PD) or as a combination of working mem-ory limitations and false linguistic meta-knowledge (weak C/PD). In short, as long asthe C/PD|weak or strong|is upheld, potentially falsifying evidence can always beexplained away by referring to performance errors. This is methodologically unsoundinsofar as linguists want to claim that their grammars are part of the psychologicalreality of natural language. It is clear that Chomsky (1986) nds that linguistic gram-mars are psychologically real when he says that the standpoint of generative grammar\is that of individual psychology" (p. 3). Nevertheless, by evoking the distinctionbetween grammatical competence and observable natural language behavior, thus dis-allowing negative empirical testing, linguists cannot hope to nd other than speculative(or what Chomsky calls `independent linguistic') support for their theories. In otherwords, if linguistic theory is to warrant psychological claims, then the C/PD must beabandoned8.Having argued against the C/PD, both weak and strong, on methodological grounds,I will now turn to the question of whether the apparent occurrence of dierent kinds ofrecursion in natural language after all does warrant talk about a linguistic competencefunctionally independent from observable performance.2.3 Recursion and Natural Language BehaviorThe history of the relationship between generative grammar and language behaviordates back to Chomsky's (1957) demonstration that language can, in principle, becharacterized by a set of recursive rules. Recall that he argued that natural languagecannot be accounted for by a nite state automaton, because the latter can only produceregular languages. This class of languages|although able to capture left- and right-branching i-recursive structures|cannot represent center-embedded expressions. Forlinguistic theories adhering to the C/PD (weak or strong), this restriction on the powerof the nite-state grammars prevents them from being accepted as characterizations ofthe idealized linguistic competence. On this view, natural language must be at leastcontext-free, if not weakly context-sensitive (cf. Horrocks, 1987). However, havingeschewed the C/PD on methodological grounds in the previous section, the questionstill remains concerning how much processing power is needed in order to account for8By this I do not mean that the present linguistic theories are without explanatory value. On thecontrary, I am perfectly happy to accept that these theories might warrant certain indirect claims withrespect to the language mechanism, insofar as they provide means for describing empirical naturallanguage behavior.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 22observable language behavior. Do we need to postulate a language mechanism withthe full computational power of a ni-recursive context-free grammar?2.3.1 Non-iterative RecursionBefore answering this question, it is worth having a look at some examples of dierentkinds of recursive natural language expressions. Since the crucial distinction betweenregular and other richer languages is that the former cannot produce expressions in-volving unbounded center-embedding, we will look at such ni-recursive sentences rst.As the following three examples show, the diculty of processing a center-embeddedsentence increases with the depth of embedding:(1) The cat that the dog chased bit the girl.(2) The girl that the cat that the dog chased bit saw the boy.(3) The boy that the girl that the cat that the dog chased bit saw fell.The processing of center-embedded sentences has been studied extensively. Thesestudies have shown, for example, that English sentences with more than one center-embedding (e.g., (2) and (3) above) are read with the same intonation as a list ofrandom words (Miller, 1962), cannot be easily memorized (Foss & Cairns, 1970; Miller& Isard, 1964), and are judged to be ungrammatical (Marks, 1968). Bach, Brown& Marslen-Wilson (1986) found the same behavioral pattern in German, reporting amarked deterioration of the understanding and a sharp increase in the negative judg-ments of comprehensibility of center-embedded sentences with an embedding depth ofmore than one. It has also been shown that semantic bias and training can improveperformance on such structures (Blaubergs & Braine, 1974; Stolz, 1967), and that pro-cessing is inuenced by individual dierences in memory span. Importantly, Larkin &Burns (1977) have furthermore demonstrated that the diculty in the processing ofni-recursion is not conned to a linguistic context. These ndings, in turn, have leadto much debate concerning how they should be incorporated into accounts of naturallanguage processing (e.g., Berwick & Weinberg, 1984; Church, 1982; Frazier & Fodor,1978; Kimball, 1973; Pulman, 1986; Reich, 1969; Wanner, 1980).Proponents of the C/PD have explained the diculty in terms of performance limi-tations. For example, in order to account for the problems of parsing center-embeddedsentences, both Kimball's (1973) parser and Frazier & Fodor's (1978) `Sausage Machine'parser apply a performance-justied notion of a viewing `window' (or look-ahead). Thewindow, which signies memory span, has a length of about six words and is shiftedcontinuously through a sentence. Problems with center-embedded sentences are due tothe parser not being able to attach syntactic structure to the sentences because the verb
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 23belonging to the rst NP is outside the scope of the window. However, this solution isproblematic in itself (cf. Wanner, 1980) since doubly center-embedded sentences withonly six words do exist and are just as dicult to understand as longer sentences ofsimilar kind; e.g.:(4) Boys girls cats bite see fall.Others (e.g., Church, 1982; Pulman, 1986) impose limitations on the number of itemsallowed at any one time on the stack and invoke some kind of \forgetting" procedure toensure the stack does not grow beyond its limit. However, this stack limit is determinedin a rather ad hoc fashion so as to tailor the behavior of the parser to be comparablewith human performance9.A possible way out of this problem due to Reich (1969) is to argue that center-embedded sentences, such as (2){(4), are ungrammatical. However, this suggestionhas met strong opposition|even from many psycholinguists emphasizing performancemodels of natural language (e.g., Berwick & Weinberg, 1984; Church, 1982; Pulman,1986). The standard counter-argument consists in pointing out that performance can beimproved via training and by allowing the use of external memory aids (such as pen andpaper) and extra time, whereas this does not appear to be the case for ungrammaticalstrings. This is therefore taken to reect a genuine grammatical competence underlyingthe improvements in performance. Because this argument typically is considered toprovide a solid defense of the C/PD, I will address it in detail.My main objection to the practice/extra resource argument is that it may not tellus anything about the language capacity per se. Notice that these performance im-provements can only be obtained through hard conscious work (e.g., through verbalrehearsing, writing, etc.). In contrast, the processing of natural language under \nor-mal" circumstances is eortless and unconscious. This suggests a process of consciously`augmenting' an already existing|but relatively limited|grammatical ability10, ratherthan unveiling parts of an underlying innite competence.A Lesson from Garden Path SentencesThis objection is inspired by Marcus' (1980) `determinism hypothesis:9It should be noted that even though Pulman's parser uses an unconventional `stack-like' memorystructure, in which items within the stack can be accessed, the limitation on the number of items onthis stack is still determined in an ad hoc fashion.10This process of conscious augmentation may rely on abstract knowledge of language acquiredthrough schooling and/or semantic and contextual information about which lexical items may go to-gether. The latter has also been proposed by Stolz (1967), suggesting that subjects \might `learn' the[center-embedded] construction by noticing some connection between the test sentences and aspects ofhis nonlinguistic knowledge during the course of the experiment" (p. 869).
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 24There is enough information in the structure of natural language in general,and in English in particular, to allow left-to-right deterministic parsing ofthose sentences which a native speaker can analyze without conscious eort.(Marcus, 1980, p. 204; my emphasis)In this context, `determinism' means that the language processor is committed towhatever syntactic structure it is presently building, thus disallowing deterministicsimulations of non-determinism such as backtracking and pseudo-parallelism (i.e., thepossibility of following several dierent syntactic paths simultaneously)11. Marcus pro-posed the above hypothesis in order to be able to predict which sentences would sendpeople \down the garden path". Garden path sentences are fully grammatical sen-tences in which a structural ambiguity encountered early in the sentence might leadthe reader/listener to go down the wrong syntactic path. Consider, for example, theclassic garden path sentence:(5) The horse raced past the barn fell.In (5), the word `raced' induces a potential structural ambiguity, since it can be parsedeither as the main verb of a past tense sentence, or as the start of an unmarked reducedrelative clause (i.e, as a past tense participle). The former parse leads the languageprocessor down the garden path, because it will not be able to t `fell' into the syntacticstructure that it is building. Interestingly, most people will parse `raced' in this way,as if they were expecting the sentence to look like (6) rather than (5)12.(6) The horse raced past the barn.So, when they encounter `fell' they become aware of their misparsing, backtrack, andthen try to reparse the sentence from scratch13.11It may be that this strict determinism will have to be replaced by a more qualied determinismas found in the recent multiple-constraint models of parsing and comprehension (e.g., Taraban &McClelland, 1990). Such a change would, however, not change the general gist of the present consciousaugmentation hypothesis.12The preference of the main verb reading over the participle reading of `raced'might be explained interms of the distributional statistics concerning the relative occurrence of the two verb forms in everydaylanguage. We may therefore expect that the main verb (past tense) reading occurs signicantly moreoften than the participle reading, leading to a strong bias towards the former in ambiguous cases suchas (5). Thus, (6) is more likely to occur in normal English than (5). Evidence presented in, e.g., Juliano& Tanenhaus (1993) corroborates this expectation13Note that the garden path in (5) can be avoided if the relative clause is marked and unreduced asin: `The horse that was raced past the barn fell' (making it a center-embedded sentence of depth one).Moreover, experiments have shown that semantic (Milne, 1982) and contextual information (Altmann& Steedman, 1988; Crain & Steedman, 1985; Taraban & McClelland, 1990) can both induce andprevent garden paths.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 25The observable behavior of people, when faced with garden path sentences, havelead Marcus (1980) to propose his determinism hypothesis, and subsequently Milne(1982) to suggest that: : :the processing of a normal sentence does not require conscious eortand [it] is generally agreed that to understand a garden path sentence re-quires conscious eort. The reader notices a mental `jump' or `block' whenreading of the sentence, stops and the garden path is consciously realized.Experimentally, conscious eort is detected by an increase in reaction timeto a given task. As an armchair denition; any grammatical sentence thatseems abnormal to read, requires conscious eort. (p. 353)The operational criterion for `conscious eort' has been conrmed by response timestudies (Milne, 1982) demonstrating signicantly longer reading times for garden pathsentences, such as (5), compared with the corresponding non-garden path sentences,such as (6) (the latter being slightly altered to control for sentence length: `The horseraced past the old barn'). Eye-tracking studies further support the idea that consciouseort may be needed to recover from the garden path. For example, Rayner, Carlson& Frazier (1983) found that people make regressive eye movements when experiencingthe garden path eect in (5), indicating that conscious backtracking may be necessaryto recover from certain garden path sentences. However, there are also garden pathsentences which produce longer reading times, but which nevertheless do not seem torequire conscious eort14. This may be paralleled by the processing of sentences with asingle center-embedded object relative clause, such as (1), which do not appear to elicitconscious awarenes. These sentences also produce longer reading times in comparisonwith sentences expressing the same sentential content using a subject relative clause(cf. King & Just, 1991), as it was the case with the `unconscious' garden path eect.The lesson to be learned from the garden path case is that syntactic processing(in Milne's words) \is unconscious, deterministic and fast, but limited" (1982, p. 372).Despite the limitations, syntactic processing rarely fails. But when it does, consciouseort is needed to recover from the error. This allows the allocation of non-languagespecic, cognitive resources so that conscious re-processing of the problematic utteranceis made possible.Center-embedding and Conscious ProcessingReturning to the case of center-embedded sentences, I submit that when people arepresented with these kind of language constructions they exhibit the same kind of14In this connection, it should be noted that conscious awareness is presumably not an all or nonphenomena.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 26behavior as with garden path sentences. For example, Miller & Isard (1964) reportwork by Mackworth & Bruner in which the latter \have recorded the eye movementsof subjects when reading these sentences and have found that the number of xationsand the number of regressive movements of the eyes both increase markedly as theamount of self-embedding increases" (p. 299). Miller & Isard also go on to note thedirect correlation between conscious awareness and the point in the sentence where thegrammatical complexity starts:Mackworth and Bruner's recordings of eye movements while reading suchsentences conrms the introspective impression that the diculty does notbegin until the long string of apparently unrelated verbs is encountered to-ward the end of the self-embedded sentence. At this point the recursive eyemovements begin and one feels that all grasp of the sentence has suddenlycrumbled away" (p. 301; my emphasis).It should be clear that these behavioral ndings are similar to evidence concerningthe processing of garden path sentences (recall the \mental jump" mentioned by Milne,1982, and the regressive eye movements reported by Frazier, Carlson & Rayner, 1983).Thus the processing of center-embedded sentences is unconscious and eortless untilthe second or third verb is encountered towards the end of the sentence. At this pointconscious eort becomes necessary so that the string of verbs can be combined with thecorrect NPs in the beginning of the sentence. Notice that the rst verb (e.g., `chased' in(1){(3)) can easily be combined with the last NP (i.e., `the dog' in (1){(3)). The resultsof Bach, Brown & Marslen-Wilson (1986), Marks (1968), Miller (1962), and Miller &Isard (1964) taken together suggest that the combination of the second verb and thelast but one NP should not provide too much diculty either (so that (1) would stillbe processed without the need of additional conscious processing). But as soon as asentence has more than one embedding (i.e., (2){(4)), thus requiring the combinationof more than two NPs with their respective VPs, then the language processor will notbe able to complete the parse without additional conscious processing.But what about the performance improvements on center-embedded sentences ob-tained through training and/or the addition of extra processing resources? Such im-provements are in contrast with the often made observation that \no amount of practiceor articial aids can make a clearly ungrammatical sentence like `on mat cat the satthe' become grammatical" (Pulman, 1986, p. 204). Although this is trivially true, itis begging the question at hand. The real question, when making a comparison withthe center-embedding case, must be whether people would also be able to improvetheir performance on ungrammatical sentences (and not whether the latter can be-come grammatical). When addressing this question it is important to keep in mind
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 27that even with training the human performance on center-embedded structures is verylimited (Blaubergs & Braine, 1974). Indeed, experimental data seem to suggest thatmany \listeners can decode a novel [ni-]recursive sentence only when its recursive qual-ity has been learned as a specic part of the specic grammatical rule involved" (Stolz,1967: p. 872; my comment and emphasis).It is often noted that Miller & Isard have demonstrated that free recall of center-embedded sentences can be improved via learning, but it is almost equally often over-looked that they also reported a positive learning eect on strings of random words.In fact, the increase in performance through learning was three times higher for theungrammatical strings (about 100% from trial 1 to 5) than for each of the center-embedded sentences (with 0{4 embeddings). Since learning can improve performanceon both grammatical center-embedded sentences and ungrammatical strings of randomwords, the former cannot be assigned a special status as evidence in favor of an un-bounded competence15. That is, the learning induced performance improvements oncenter-embedded constructions do not support a distinction between competence andperformance. Presumably, we do not want to claim that the improvement of perfor-mance on the ungrammatical strings is evidence of the language processor's ability tolearn ungrammatical constructions (which would be a direct consequence of maintainingthe traditional practice/extra resource argument). Instead, we can explain both kindsof performance improvement as pertaining to the conscious use of non-language spe-cic cognitive resources. When the language processor is facing either center-embeddedsentences (with more than one embedding) or strings of random words, its unconsciousprocessing is interrupted and the help of our general cognitive reasoning abilities isrecruited to complete the task.This picture would be threatened if we could nd naturally occurring sentenceswith a depth of more than one. De Roeck, Johnson, King, Rosner, Sampson & Varile(1982) claim to have found such evidence. They provide examples from both Germanand English of sentences with up to six levels of embedding. Importantly, all theseexamples are from written texts (and, furthermore, mostly from sources (in)famousfor their complicated constructions). These examples are most certainly conscious15In this connection, I predict that people might also be able to improve their comprehension ofungrammatical sentences (such as, `on mat cat the sat the' and more complex cases) via learning. Theonly restriction necessary on a set of ungrammatical sentences would be that they must all reect thesame ungrammatical regularities (such as, for example, similar incorrect word order). The work onthe learning of articial grammars (for an overview, see Reber, 1989) can be taken to support thisprediction, since the former essentially involves the learning of a particular set of regularities (as itwould also be the case for the latter). Furthermore, in chapter 5 I argue that such learning processesmay subserve our language ability
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 28products of their authors, and also seem to require considerable conscious eort onbehalf of the reader to be understood16. Such sentences would presumably lead to thecharacteristic regressive eye movements as mentioned above, suggesting an interruptionof the language processor, and the subsequent backtracking and conscious reprocessing.De Roeck et al (1982, p. 332) do however provide one spoken example of a center-embedded sentence of depth two:(7) Isn't it true that example sentences that people that you know produce aremore likely to be accepted?This sentence appears to be parsable without any problems, thus potentially causinga problem for the above picture of the processing of center-embedded sentences. Icontend, however, that this is not the case, because the relative clause `people thatyou know' arguably is parsed as something like a single unit (because of its frequentoccurrence in everyday English). This seems to be in accordance with Miller & Isard's(1964) speculation that \subjects could, to a certain extent, organize the discontinuousconstituents as single units" (p. 300). In this light, compare (7) with (8).(8) Isn't it true that example sentences that people that you threaten produce aremore likely to be accepted?In (8), `people that you threaten' cannot be as easily chunked into a single unit as itwas the case with the innermost relative clause in (7). The subsequent increase in theprocessing diculty makes (8) more comparable with (2) than (7)17. This dierencein processing diculty between (7) and (8) suggest that semantic, contextual or (ashere) distributional statistics might ease the processing of doubly center-embeddedsentences|similarly to the case of garden path sentences.2.3.2 Iterative RecursionGiven the discussion above (and in the previous section), I contend that a languageprocessor need not be able to account for unbounded center-embedding (at any levelof analysis). Rather, it should experience diculty comparable with the experimental16The latter is, e.g., indicated by De Roeck et al with respect to their German examples: \Thesentences containing multiple center-embeddings : : : are, certainly, somewhat clumsy; a German-Swisscolleague commented on : : : [one of these sentences], for instance, that it is the kind of sentence whichyou have to look at twice to understand" (1982, p. 335).17It could be objected that the use of `threaten' in (8) makes the sentence semantically odd. However,this oddness does not appear until after all the three verbs have been encountered. Thus, talk aboutexample sentences uttered by people that you threaten does not appear to be less semantically coherentthan talk about example sentences uttered by people that you know.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 29evidence when encountering center-embedded sentences. Still, this leaves left- andright-recursion to be dealt with. That these i-recursive structures cannot be easilydismissed, but seem to be relatively ubiquitous in natural language, can be seen from thefollowing examples involving such constructions as multiple prenominal genitives (9),right-embedded relative clauses (10), multiple embeddings of sentential complements(11), and PP modications of NPs (12):(9) [[[[Bob's] uncle's] mother's] cat]: : :(10) [This is [the cat that ate [the mouse that bit [the dog that barked]]]].(11) [Bob thought [that he heard [that Carl said [that Ira was sick]]]].(12) : : : the house [on [[the hill [with the trees]][at [the lake [with the ducks]]]]].Furthermore, prima facie there seems to be no immediate limits to the length of suchsentences (but see section 4.2 in chapter 4 for a discussion of possible limitations oni-recursive structures).Even though (9){(12) are describable in terms of left- or right-recursion, it has beenargued|with support from, e.g., intonational evidence (Reich, 1969)|that these ex-pressions should be construed not as recursive but as iterative (Pulman, 1986). Strongsupport for this claim comes from Ejerhed (1982) who demonstrated that it is pos-sible for an FSA, comprising a non-recursive context-free grammar, to capture theempirical data from Swedish (provided that unbounded dependencies are dealt withsemantically). This demonstration is signicant because Swedish is normally assumedto require the power of context-sensitive languages (e.g., cf. Horrocks, 1987). Thus, wehave strong reasons for believing that an FSA may provide sucient computationalpower to account for natural language performance without needing to postulate afunctionally independent innite competence.In section 2.2, we saw that the competence/performance distinction was a directconsequence of construing the grammar underlying linguistic behavior as a set of re-cursive rules. Thus generative grammar by its very nature necessarily requires thatperformance be separated from competence in order to account for observable languagebehavior. So, it seems that if we are to abandon the distinction between competenceand performance (as the previous two sections suggest that we should), then we need adierent way of representing our knowledge of language. That is, we need a represen-tational vehicle that will allow us to avoid the methodological problems of the C/PDas well as model syntactic processing as being deterministic and unconscious in com-pliance with the limitations set by the experimental evidence. In the remaining part ofthis chapter, I present connectionism as a possible alternative framework in which torepresent the regularities subserving our language skills. First I provide a brief account
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 30of the main properties of connectionist representation and processing, before turningto a general discussion of neural networks as models of natural language.2.4 Connectionist Natural Language ProcessingConnectionism typically implies using articial neural networks as models of psycholog-ical phenomena18. As such, these networks consist of a collection of simple processingunits, typically organized into layers, that are connected to each other by weightedlinks (for an introduction to connectionism, see, e.g., Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991;Clark, 1989; Rumelhart et al. , 1986). An important property of neural networks isthat they can be trained to develop the representations necessary to deal with a specictask. Moreover, it has been observed that, through learning, connectionist models (withhidden units) are able to develop distributed representations whose internal structuremirrors that of the externally given input. More specically, vectors corresponding tothe individual patterns of activation over the hidden units can be conceived as points ina multidimensional state space (e.g., van Gelder, 1991a). The exact location of a givenvector is determined by the specic values of its constituents; i.e., by its internal con-guration. As a result, similar vectors are mapped into similar locations in space. Thedegree of similarity between vectors|the `distance' between them in space|can bemeasured using a variety of standard vector comparison methods (e.g., cluster analysisor trajectory analysis). Due to the superpositional and highly distributed nature of thenetworks in question, representations that are structurally similar|i.e., that have sim-ilar internal structure or, more precisely, have similar vector congurations|end up as`neighboring' positions in state space. Thus, structurally related input representationswill invoke `adjacent' representations in hidden unit state space.It is important to notice from a computational perspective that these similaritieshave causal signicance. The behavior of a network, being a complex dynamical system,is causally dependent on the current pattern of activation over the hidden units; that is,on the current representation's particular location in space. In other words, the speciclocation in space of a given representation will causally eect how it is processed. Sincethe internal structure of such distributed representations corresponds systematicallyand in an essentially non-arbitrary way to the structural conguration of the inputrepresentations, allowing us to project any semantic interpretation we might assign theinput onto the appropriate positions in vector space, and since variations of positionin state space are causally ecacious, the processing of a network can be seen as18The following is based in part on Christiansen & Chater (1992).
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 31being determined systematically according to the semantic content of the distributedrepresentations.Judging from this exposition it would seem to be the case that connectionist rep-resentations can be assigned content in an essentially non-arbitrary way, since theirinternal structure (given successful training) will correlate with structural contingen-cies in the input and produce a non-arbitrary representation; that is, connectionistrepresentations appear to be able to possess at least some bona de intrinsic content.However, the internal states of present day connectionist networks appear to be nomore \grounded" than their symbolic counterparts (also cf. Bechtel, 1989; Cli, 1990;Sharkey, 1991). Crucially, the distributed representations in question are only non-arbitrary in relation to the structure of the given input representations, not in relationto what the latter are representations of ; i.e., the entities they refer to in the outsideworld. Consequently, similarity is dened as a relation between input representations,and not as a relation to the appropriate external objects they are to represent. Fur-thermore, since the input representations provided by the programmer are typicallypre-structured and of a highly abstract nature, it is always possible to give a network'sinput representations a dierent interpretation, thus changing the projected contentof the internal distributed representations. This has been mirrored empirically by thefact that only a few experiments have been carried out with \real" sensory-type data(in the sense of not having been pre-processed by the programmer), and then with amostly unsuccessful outcome (see Christiansen & Chater, 1992, for an example andfurther discussion of this issue).There is, however, a sense in which connectionist representations are non-arbitrary;that is, the inter-representational relations in a network are essentially non-arbitrary.In contrast to symbolic systems in which the atomic symbols have no relation to eachother (albeit, complex symbols have non-arbitrary inter-relations), distributed repre-sentations are non-arbitrarily related to each other in state space. Whereas atomic sym-bols designating similar objects have no (non-coincidental) relation to each other, con-nectionist representations of similar object representations in the input will end up asneighboring points in state space. Thus, connectionist networks provides us with a kindof non-arbitrary representational \shape" that allows a notion of inter-representationalsimilarity. The important ability of connectionist networks to generalize derives fromthese similarity relations between representations corresponding to structurally similarinput. Despite the non-arbitrariness of these inter-relations and their grounding of arobust notion of representational similarity, the extra-representational links are stillfundamentally arbitrary and therefore ungrounded.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 322.4.1 Compositionality in Connectionist ModelsTurning to the issue of learning linguistic structure, the problem of learning structuredrepresentations comes into focus. This problem has received much attention follow-ing the debate initiated by Fodor's & Pylyshyn's (1988) attack on connectionism (forexample, Chalmers, 1990b; Chater & Oaksford 1990a; Fodor & McLaughlin, 1990;Oaksford, Chater & Stenning, 1990; Smolensky 1987, 1988; van Gelder, 1990a, 1991a).In this connection, it has been suggested that the classical notion of compositionalitymay be unnecessarily restrictive from the point of view of connectionist systems (thatis, the classical understanding of compositionality may induce an instance of the incom-mensurability trap|forcing connectionist systems into an inappropriate framework).This classical notion is labeled as concatenative (or `syntactic') compositionality, which\must preserve tokens of an expression's constituents (and the sequential relationsamong tokens) in the expression itself" (van Gelder 1990a: p. 360).A broader notion, functional compositionality, does not demand the preservation ofconstituents in compound expressions. What is needed is a general and reliable mech-anism that can produce composite expressions from arbitrary constituents and laterdecompose them back into their original constituents. As an example of functionalcompositionality, van Gelder (1990a) points to Godel numbering, which is a one-to-onecorrespondence between logical formulae and the natural numbers. For instance, on agiven scheme the proposition P will be assigned the Godel number 32, whereas a logicalexpression involving P as a constituent, say, (P&Q) would be assigned the Godel num-ber 51342984000. It is clear that the Godel number for (P&Q) does not directly (orsyntactically) contain the Godel number for P. Still, by applying the prime decomposi-tion theorem we can easily determine the Godel numbers for its primitive constituents.Thus, we have constituency relations without concatenative compositionality. Sincedistributed networks using superimposed representation appear to `destroys' the con-stituents of composite input tokens (at least from the viewpoint of human observers),they do not qualify as having concatenative compositionality. However, this is notirreversible because the original constituents can be recreated in the output.There is a danger that this would leave connectionist representations with the samestatus as, for example, data-compressed, or otherwise encrypted, les on a standardcomputer|as being useful only as storage but not for processing. For a genuinely con-nectionist account of the representation and processing of structured representations,it is necessary to be able to manipulate the functionally compositional representationsdirectly as van Gelder stresses. In the case of Godel numbering, operations which aresensitive to compositional structure (e.g., inferences) will not correspond to a (readily
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 33speciable) function at the arithmetic level. Hence, performing logical inference overGodel numbers is a rather hopeless endeavor. Notice too, the compositional semanticswhich can be easily dened over logical representations will have no (readily speciable)analog at the level of Godel numbers.What is important, from the viewpoint of language acquisition and processing, iswhether or not connectionist networks can handle (and, in particular, learn to handle)problems which are standardly viewed as requiring structured representations. That is,can connectionist representations attain what we shall call `apparent' compositionality.If apparent compositionality can be learned, then there are two possibilities concern-ing the nature of the representations that the network employs. It could be that, onclose analysis, the net is found to have devised a standard, concatenative composi-tional representation. Alternatively, the network might behave as if it used structuredrepresentations, without using structured representations at all. In the former case,it would seem appropriate to say that the network representations are compositional(in the standard sense); in the latter, that the network is not using a compositionalrepresentation (also in the standard sense). What is required, it appears, is not a newnotion of compositionality, but the attempt to devise networks which can behave asif they had structured representations, followed by an analysis of their workings. Ofcourse, there is a third possibility: that representations within networks do, implementcompositionality, but in some heretofore unknown way, unlike that used by classicalsystems (with appropriate operations over it, and an appropriate semantics). This pos-sibility would cause us to revise the notion of compositionality, much as the discoveryof non-Euclidean geometry enlarged and changed the notion of straight lines, paralleland so on. It will only be possible to develop a specically connectionist notion ofcompositionality, or even know if this possibility is coherent at all, post hoc|that is,by analyzing networks that exhibit apparent compositionality.19 In other words, whatkind of compositionality we should ascribe connectionist representations is an empiricalquestion, which can only be answered by empirical investigation.Recently, research eorts have therefore been made towards dening operationsthat work directly on the encoded distributed representations themselves, instead oftheir decomposed constituents. Chalmers (1990a) devised a method by which a simplefeed-forward, back-propagation network|dubbed a transformation network (TN)|wasable to manipulate compact distributed representations of active and passive sentencesaccording to their syntactical structure. First, a Recursive Auto-Associative Memory19Of course, it is likely that any such notion would be included as a subclass of functional compo-sitionality (as it is the case with concatenative compositionality)|but functional compositionality perse does not put us any further forward to nding such a notion.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 34(RAAM) network (Pollack, 1988) was trained to encode distributed representations ofthe sentence structures. Chalmers then trained the TN to transform compact represen-tations of active sentences into compact representations of passive sentences; that is,he trained the network to associate the RAAM-encoded distributed representations ofactive sentences with their distributed passive counterpart. In similar vein, Niklasson& Sharkey (1992) successfully applied the same combination of RAAM20 and TN to (asubpart of) the domain of logical axioms. These empirical investigations have shownthat it is possible to devise models, such as the TN, that can manipulate the compactdistributed representations in a structure sensitive way.It is worth mentioning that when addressing the issue of connectionist composition-ality there is a potential danger of falling into the incommensurability trap. As pointedout by Sharkey (1991), the division between semantics and structural considerationsmight be somewhat articial, since such a division seems to be collapsed in much con-nectionist research. On this view, even our own notion of apparent compositionalitycould get us trapped in the claws of incommensurability. Nevertheless, bearing this inmind, re-interpretation of old terminology seems to be the only productive way forwardfor a research program still in its infancy.Importantly, the above discussion of the general properties of connectionist modelssuggests that a connectionist perspective on language promises to eschew the C/PD,since it is not possible to isolate a network's representations from its processing. Therelation between the `grammar'|or, rather, the grammatical regularities which hasbeen acquired through training|and the processing is as direct as it can be (van Gelder,1990b). Instead of being a set of passive representations of declarative rules waiting tobe manipulated by a central executive, a connectionist grammar is distributed over thenetwork's memory as an ability to process language (Port & van Gelder, 1991). In thisconnection, it is important to notice that although networks are generally `tailored' tot the linguistic data, this does not simply imply that a network's failure to t the datais passed onto the processing mechanism alone. Rather, when you tweak a network tot a particular set of linguistic data, you are not only changing how it will process thedata, but also what it will be able to learn. That is, any architectural modications willlead to a change in the overall constraints on a network, forcing it to adapt dierently tothe contingencies inherent in the data and, consequently, to the acquisition of a dierentset of grammatical regularities. Thus, since the representation of the grammar is aninseparable and active part of a network's processing, it is impossible to separate a20Actually, they applied a slightly modied version of the RAAM in which an additional bit de-noted whether the input/output representations were atomic (i.e., not distributed) or complex (i.e.,distributed).
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 35connectionist model's competence from its performance.2.4.2 Rules and ConnectionismNevertheless, it might be objected that connectionist models of language may stillsomehow embody linguistic rules and thus, perhaps, encompass a C/PD after all. Muchhas been written about the question of rules in neural networks, but for present purposesa brief overview will suce (given the inconclusive nature of the overall discussion)21.Dennett (1991) argues on instrumentalist grounds that there are no rules to be foundin connectionist nets, but many nd that nets embody some kind of `implicit' rules(which is to be contrasted with the `explicit' rules of the classical approach). Forexample, Hateld (1991) suggests that connectionist nets are rule instantiating systems(in the implicit sense of rules). Similarly, Clark (1991) notes the implicitness of rules inneural nets, stressing the need to accommodate explicit rules (perhaps by letting a netimplement a virtual machine simulating a rule system, as suggested in Clark, 1989)22.The worry about the representation of explicit rules is echoed by Hadley (1993a) who,furthermore, strongly criticizes connectionist models for merely embodying implicitrules. In contrast, Sharkey (1992) emphasizes the exible nature of the implicit rules inneural nets, arguing that they are well-suited to serve as soft syntactic preference rules(in contrast with their classical counterparts). Moreover, Davies (1993) has oered adistinction between two notions of implicit rules, suggesting that this distinction mighthelp discover whether nets (and humans) embody rules.A radically dierent approach has been taken by Kirsh (1990) who argues that theimplicit/explicit discussion is misguided, and that we instead should take the explic-itness of a rule to be dependent on whether it is accessible in constant time (for acriticism of this view and a proposal for a `narrow' and a `broad' sense of both implicitand explicit rules, see Hadley, 1993b). Finally, MacLennan (1991) has proposed a for-malization of connectionist knowledge representation, a simulacrum (i.e., a continuousanalog to discrete calculus), in which almost discrete rules can sometimes be said toemerge from network processing, whereas the latter at other times form a continuum21It is worth noting that in this discussion it not always clear whether rules are implicit from ourpoint of view (i.e., we cannot readily nd them in the net), or from the net's perspective (i.e., it cannot`see' them).22In this connection, Bechtel & Abrahamsen (1991) list three possible connectionist responses tothe problem of dealing with explicit rules: i) the approximationist approach in which the rules areconsidered to be mere approximations of underlying connectionist substrate; ii) the compatibilist viewwhich implies that connectionist models must be able to implement the rules directly; and iii) theexternalist position which states that networks must be able to develop the capacity to manipulaterules that are external to the net.
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 36that is not expressible in terms of rules.Taken together, the research on whether connectionist networks embody rules (ex-plicit, implicit or otherwise) does not show much overall consensus. In my view, thisdiscussion may be seen as a parallel to the above discussion of compositionality. Aconnectionist language model might behave as if it has linguistic rules, although norules have been programmed into it. But does this warrant saying that the modelhas `implicit' (or `fuzzy') rules? Such talk about implicit rules is in danger of forc-ing connectionism into a symbolic mold by trying to apply a particular concept|i.e.,the classical notion of a computationally ecacious rule|to connectionism. As in thecase of apparent compositionality, we can only solve this problem through empiricalresearch, developing a much better conception of what is really going on inside neuralnetworks.However, this still leaves the question of what kind of linguistic performance datashould form the basis for connectionist models of language. For the purpose of empiricaltests of candidate language mechanisms we may need to distinguish between `real'performance data as exhibited in normal natural language behavior and examples ofabnormal performance, such as, `slips-of-the-tongue', blending errors, etc23. Noticethat the traditional notion of `grammaticality' does not capture the kind of data thatI would want to account for. Instead, we might apply something like Reich's (1969)notion of `acceptable' in the characterization of the data set to be modeled:A sentence is acceptable to me if my estimate of the probability of oc-currence of a sentence of like construction in natural language is greaterthan zero. I exclude from natural language text sentences dreamed up bylinguists, psychologists, English teachers and poets. (p. 260)In this way, what counts as valid data is not dependent on an abstract, idealizednotion of linguistic competence but on observable natural language behavior understatistically `normal' circumstances. Consequently, we should be able operationalizeReich's notion of acceptability in order to lter out the abnormal performance datafrom a language corpora simply by using `weak' statistical methods. For example,Finch & Chater (1992, 1993) applied simple distributional statistics to the analysis ofa noisy corpus consisting of 40,000,000 English words and were able to nd phrasalcategories dened over similarly derived approximate syntactic categories. It seemsvery likely that such a method could be extended to a clausal level in order to lterout abnormal performance data.23Of course, this does not mean that one should not try to model this kind of performance breakdown
CHAPTER 2. GRAMMARS AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 37Having shown the strong connection between the recursive nature of generativegrammar and the competence/performance distinction, as well as providing argumentsagainst upholding the latter distinction and in favor of a connectionist framework,which does not necessarily rely on such a distinction, I now present a number of con-nectionist simulations experiments in the next two chapters. In chapter 3, I presentsimulations demonstrating the ability of recurrent neural networks to deal with dif-ferent kinds of recursion in three articial languages involving ni-recursion, normallyconsidered to require the power of context-free (and even context-sensitive) grammars.Chapter 4 reports the results of simulations involving a linguistic grammar of consid-erable complexity (incorporating sentences such as (1){(3) and (9){(12), that is, bothi- and ni-recursive structures).
Chapter 3Modeling Recursion in RecurrentNeural NetworksOne of the Chomskyan legacies in modern linguistics is the stipulation that a nite stateautomaton cannot capture the linguistic structure of natural language. This positionis to a large extent based on the fact that no FSA can produce strings which containembedded substrings of arbitrary complexity and length. In this connection, the two ni-recursive linguistic phenomena|center-embedding and cross-dependency|have playedan important part in the history of the theory of language. In particular, they have beenused as an existence proof of the need for increasingly powerful language formalismsto describe natural language. Thus, in the second half of the fties, Chomsky (1956,1957) proved that regular languages cannot capture center-embedding of an arbitrarydepth. Given that center-embedding does occur in natural language, he concluded thatwe would need at least the power of context-free (CF) languages in order to specifyadequate grammars. In fact, at that time Chomsky went even further, arguing for thecombination of a CF grammar and a transformational component. The latter enablestransformations of CF strings into strings not derivable from the grammar itself. Thiswas, for example, used to account for passive constructions: an active CF string, say,`Betty loves Anita' is transformed into the passive string `Anita is loved by Betty'.About a quarter of a century later, arguments were put forward|most notablyby Pullum & Gazdar (1982)|defending the suciency of CF grammars (without anadditional transformational component). Shortly thereafter, the existence of cross-dependency in some languages was used in an attack on the adequacy of CF gram-mar formalisms (e.g., Shieber 1985|for a defense against that attack, see Gazdar &Pullum 1985). At the moment, this discussion is undecided, but the historic trend38
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 39within linguistics points towards increasingly powerful grammar formalisms. In con-trast, connectionist and other statistically based models of natural language processingare essentially nite state machines producing `only' regular languages. It is thereforenot surprising that linguists in general do not pay much attention to these kind ofapproaches to natural language processing. They are dismissed a priori as not beingpowerful enough to do the job. Part of the motivation for the simulation experimentspresented in this chapter (and the next) is therefore to challenge this speculative dis-missal of nite state models of language.In order to make this task more precise, consider an articial language whose only`words' are the letters `a' and `b'. Given this restricted basis, Chomsky (1957: p. 21)constructed the following three languages involving ni-recursion:i. ab, aabb, aaabbb, : : : , and in general, all sentences consisting of n occurrences ofa followed by n occurrences of b and only these;ii. aa, bb, abba, baab, aaaa, bbbb, aabbaa, abbbba, : : : , and in general, all sentencesconsisting of a string X followed by the `mirror image' of X (i.e., X in reverse),and only these;iii. aa, bb, abab, baba, aaaa, bbbb, aabaab, abbabb, : : : , and in general, all sentencesconsisting of a string X of a's and b's followed by the identical string X, and onlythese.If it is required that the strings of these three languages are to be of a possiblyinnite complexity, then an FSA will not suce (even though it can produce i-recursivestrings of an arbitrary length as pointed out in chapter 2). Assuming, as we must, thatall parameters have nite precision, any nite neural network is also an FSA. Thus,connectionist accounts of language processing appear to inherit the shortcomings of theFSA. On the other hand, if we only need to account for a certain depth of embedding,then we can devise an FSA that can process all the strings up to that particular limit.Similarly, we might be able to train a neural network to process bounded recursion.In chapter 2, I argued against using a distinction between an idealized competenceand the actual human performance in psychological theories of natural language pro-cessing. Empirical studies (e.g., Bach, Brown & Marslen-Wilson, 1986) have shownthat sentences involving three or more embeddings (such as, ii) or three or more cross-dependencies (such as, iii) are universally hard to process and understand. Neverthe-less, we do need to account for a limited depth of ni-recursive embedding. The questionis therefore whether this relatively simpler problem can be solved by a system adaptingto mere statistical contingencies in the input data. Furthermore, is it possible for such
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 40a system to develop an ability to generalize to new instances? In other words, can aneural network capture the ni-recursive regularities of natural language, while accept-ing that arbitrarily complex sentences cannot be handled? And very importantly, willthe system develop behavior comparable with humans on similar tasks?To address the above questions I have developed a number of benchmark testsbased on Chomsky's three abstract languages. This chapter reports the results of thesetests based on computer simulations involving two kinds of articial neural networksas well as a program implementing n-gram statistics. The rst section describes thethree articial languages that comprises the basis of the benchmark tests|both withrespect to their relationship to natural language and performance expectations. Section2 describes the neural network architectures and the n-gram statistical program. It alsoprovides a description of the form and conguration of the input data. The next twosections report the results obtained in two experiments involving, respectively, a twoword and an eight word vocabulary. The nal section summarizes and discusses theresults from the two benchmark experiments, comparing them with experimentallyobserved limitations on human processing of ni-recursive structures.3.1 Three Bench Mark Tests Concerning RecursionThe issue of ni-recursion has been addressed before within a connectionist framework.For example, both Elman (1991a) and Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans & McClelland(1989, 1991) have demonstrated the ability of Simple Recurrent Networks (SRN) todeal with right-branching i-recursive structures as well as limited instances of center-embedded ni-recursion (Chomsky's second abstract language). In addition, the latterform of ni-recursion has been studied further by Weckerly & Elman (1992). However,no study has directly addressed the Chomskyan challenge expressed in terms of thethree abstract languages mentioned above. This chapter takes up that challenge froma connectionist perspective incorporating psycholinguistic considerations.In order to make the tests slightly more natural language-like a constraint on Chom-sky's original languages was introduced1. This constraint consists of an agreement be-tween a `noun' class of words and a `verb' class of words. Each word has two forms|alower case form and a upper case form|which can be seen as corresponding to thesingular and plural forms of English. In this way, the constraint enforces an agreement1I am aware that the test languages are still far from being anything like natural language. Never-theless, they express the abstract structure of certain linguistic constraints (see below) and are thereforewell-suited as benchmark tests concerning learnability and generalization. Moreover, the simulationspresented in the next chapter involves more language-like data. Chapter 4 will also deals with thecombination of ni- and i-recursion.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 41between the `subject noun' and the verb so that lower case nouns only occur with lowercase verbs and similar for upper case words (except in the case of the rst language).Furthermore, each sentence has an end of sentence marker, a `.' (full stop), after thelast verb2. The three test languages have the following structure:i. az., aZ., AZ., Az., aAZZ., aAazzZ., : : : , and in general, all sentences consisting ofn occurrences of nouns followed by n occurrences of verbs and only these, as wellas a `.'. That is, in the simple case, a combination of a's and/or A's is followedby the exact same number of z's and/or Z's plus a `.', but with no agreementbetween nouns and verbs".ii. az., AZ., aazz., aAZz., AAZZ., AazZ., AaazzZ., aaAZzz., : : : , and in general,all sentences consisting of a string n of nouns followed by a string n of verbswhose agreement features constitute a `mirror image' of those in N (i.e., theorder reversed with respect to N), and only these, as well as a `.'. That is, inthe simple case, a combination of a's and/or A's is followed by the exact samenumber of z's and/or Z's plus a `.', but with the constraint that the last verbagrees with the rst noun, the second but last verb with the second noun, and soforth for all words in a given sentence.iii. az., AZ., aazz., aAzZ., AAZZ., AaZz., AaaZzz., aaAZzz., : : : , and in general, allsentences consisting of a string n of nouns followed by a string n of verbs whoseagreement features are ordered identically to those in N, and only these, as wellas a `.'. That is, in the simple case, a combination of a's and/or A's is followed bythe exact same number of z's and/or Z's plus a `.', but with the constraint thatthe rst verb agrees with the rst noun, the second verb with the second noun,and so forth for all words in a given sentence.Chomsky (1957) has claimed that the rst test language correspond to naturallyoccurring sentence constructions in English, such as, `If S1, then S2' and `Either S3,or S4' (where S1, S2, S3 and S4 are declarative sentences). These sentence structures,supposedly, can be nested arbitrarily deeply within each other as, for example, in thesentence `If, either, if the cat is out, then let the dog in, or, the bird is out, then gofor lunch'. It should be clear from this example that sentences with only two levelsof nesting become very dicult to process. Although there is no direct experimentalevidence to corroborate this, Reich 1969 has suggested that these constructions onlywill occur naturally with a limited depth of nesting.2Another motivation for the agreement constraint was to provide the systems with minimal help(e.g., cf. Cleeremans, Servan-Schreiber & McClelland, 1991).
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 42(a)A b c x y Z (b)(the) boys (the) woman (the) cat chases sees walkFigure 3.1. Illustration of the structural similarity between the second test language andEnglish.The second language corresponds structurally to center-embedded sentences whichare found in many languages (although typically not with a high frequency). Fig-ure 3.1(a) illustrates the subject-noun/verb dependencies in a sentence, `AbcxyZ', fromthe second test language. These dependencies correspond structurally to the abstractstructure of the subject-noun/verb agreements in (b) the English sentence, `(the) boys(the) woman (the) cat chases sees walk' (where lower case denotes singular and uppercase plural). Again, it is clear that even sentences with two center-embeddings aredicult to process, an intuition which is supported by psycholinguistic studies (e.g.,Bach, Brown, & Marslen-Wilson, 1986; Blaubergs & Braine, 1974; Larkin & Burns,1977).In much the same way, the structural properties of the third test language is similarto the much less common cross-dependency structures found in languages such as Dutchand Swiss-German3. Figure 3.2 shows (a) a sentence from the third test language,`AbcXyz', that can be seen as structurally equivalent (in terms of subject-noun/verbdependencies) to (b) the Dutch sentence `(de) mannen (hebben) Hans Jeanine (de paar-den) helpen leren voeren' (again with the convention that lower case denotes singularand upper case plural). The literal English translation of the latter is `the men haveHans Jeanine the horses help teach feed' and can be glossed as `the men helped Hansteach Jeanine to feed the horses'. As with center-embedding, there is experimentalevidence suggesting a limit on the number of cross-dependencies acceptable to nativespeakers of Dutch (Bach, Brown, & Marslen-Wilson, 1986).3The `respectively' constructions in English|e.g., `Anita and Betty walked and skipped,respectively'|are sometimes said to involve cross-dependency. However, many nd that these con-structions rely on semantic rather than syntactic constraints (e.g., Church 1982). Although I tend tolean towards the latter position, it will not matter for the arguments presented here if the former isadopted. In both cases there seems to be a limit on the length of acceptable `respectively' construc-tions. For instance, `Betty, the dogs, and Anita runs, walk, and skips, respectively' is questionable atbest. In unison with Church (1982), I nd that three cross-dependencies in these constructions is thelimit in terms of acceptability.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 43(a)A b c X y z(b)(de) mannen (hebben) Hans Jeanine (de paarden) helpen leren voerenFigure 3.2. Illustration of the structural similarity between the third test language andDutch.3.1.1 Performance ExpectationsWhen considering the three languages certain predictions can be made concerning thediculty of processing each of them. The task in question is to predict the next word ina sentence or a sentence ending. That is, the system gets a word as input at time t andthen has to predict the next word at time t+1. In this connection it should be noted thatit is not possible to determine precisely how many nouns are going to be encountered ina sentence or what their (upper/lower case) form might be.4 It is, however, possible todetermine exactly how many verbs a sentence will have and which (upper/lower case)form each of them will have (except, of course, for the rst language). Assuming thatthe system can learn to distinguish nouns from verbs, it should be able to make correctpredictions about subsequent verbs as well as the sentence ending once it receives therst verb as input. More specically, the number of verbs will correspond to the numberof nouns, and the form of the former will agree with the form of the latter as speciedby each particular language. The end of sentence marker should be predicted after thelast verb.Bearing this in mind, it appears to be the case that the rst language should be theleast dicult to process. Since this language does not have any agreement constraintsimposed on it, a system `merely' needs to predict the correct number of verbs in asentence and the end of sentence marker. To perform this task the system thereforeneeds to count the exact number of nouns encountered. It is then able to predict4Still, a learning system might develop some sensitivity to sentence length based on the lengthdistribution of all the sentences in the input. In this way, the system would tend to predict L/2 nouns,where L is the average sentence length in the input (measured in words). This sensitivity will probablyalso cause the system to activate the end of sentence marker after it has encountered L words. For
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 44(a)lower case  topa (b)upper caselower case  topaA(c)lower case  topaAZ (d)  topaAZzFigure 3.3. Stack contents when processing the the mirror recursive sentence aAZz.the correct number of verbs as well as the end of sentence marker by decreasing itscounter for each verb it predicts. For that reason I will refer to the structure of therst test language as counting recursion. As an example, imagine that the systempreviously has received aAZ 5 as its input. If the system has counted the number ofnouns encountered it should be able to predict the next word as being a verb (of eitherform). Next, it should predict the end of sentence marker as the last `word'.The most ecient way to process the second language is to develop a stack-likememory structure (as we saw in chapter 2); that is, to `implement' a last-in-rst-out memory storing the agreement forms of the nouns in the exact order they wereencountered. Once the system receives the rst verb as input, its form should agreewith the noun form on the top of the stack. This form information is removed from thestack. The next verb form can then be predicted as corresponding to the noun formwhich constitutes the new stack top. The same procedure is followed for subsequentverb form predictions until the stack is empty and an end of sentence marker can bepredicted. Using this memory structure a system will be able to predict the agreementform of all verbs (save the rst) as an exact mirror image of the noun forms. I willtherefore refer to the structure of the second test language as mirror recursion.Consider as an example the mirror recursive sentence `aAZz.'. After having re-ceived the rst noun, `a', as input, the stack would look something like Figure 3.3(a);sentences longer than this average this might lead to increasingly inaccurate predictions.5I will adopt the following typographical convention regarding prediction context: All the previousinput words will be listed up to and including the current input word. The latter will be emphasizedin bold. Underscore signies the item to be predicted.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 45(a)lower case  rsta (b)upper case lower case  rstaA(c)upper case  rstaAZ (d) rstaAzZFigure 3.4. Queue contents when processing the identity recursive sentence aAzZ.indicating that if the next word is a verb it must be lower case. Since the next wordis another `noun', its dependency constraint is put on top of the stack as illustrated in(b), predicting that if a verb is next it should be upper case. When the system gets therst verb, as in (c), the agreement form on the top of the stack is removed. The newtop (lower case) is used to predict the form of the next word as a lower case verb. Afterreceiving the last verb the stack becomes empty (d), and an end of sentence markercan be predicted.To process the third language most eciently a system needs to develop a queue-like memory structure. This is a rst-in-rst-out memory where the agreement formsof the nouns are stored in the exact order they are received as input (while keepingtrack of both rst and last word form). Once the rst verb is encountered its form willagree with the rst noun form in the queue. This word form is removed from the queueand the next verb form can then be predicted as having the form of the new head ofthe queue. Subsequent verb forms can be predicted using the same procedure. Whenthe queue becomes empty the end of sentence marker should be predicted. By using aqueue memory structure a system is able to predict the agreement forms of all the verbs(save the rst) as being identical to those of the encountered nouns. Consequently, Iwill refer to the structure of the third test language as identity recursion.As an example consider the identity recursive sentence `aAzZ.'. Figure 3.4 illus-trates the queue states while processing this sentence. Having received a noun, `a', asinput, its dependency constraint is stored in the queue (a). This allows the system topredict that if the next word is a verb it should have a lower case form. In (b), anothernoun, `A', has been given as input, and its agreement form stored behind the previous
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 46form in the queue. Thus, a lower case form is still predicted as the rst occurring verb.When the system gets the rst verb, `z', the rst element of the queue is removed. Thisleaves the upper case form in the queue (c), indicating that the next verb must havethis agreement form. Finally, the queue becomes empty after the system receives thesecond verb, `Z', and an end of sentence marker can be predicted (d).At rst glance the two last test languages appear to be equally hard in terms ofmaking predictions about the form of the verbs. Nonetheless, I suggest that mirror re-cursion should be easier to process than identity recursion. This is because the formerappears to be less demanding in relation to both memory load and learning. First,in traditional (symbolic) implementations of stacks only one pointer is needed to keeptrack of the stack top if it is assumed that the individual elements are linked togetherby pointers. In contrast, given the same assumption two pointers are necessary tobuild and maintain a queue structure (pointing to the rst and last element, respec-tively). This creates a higher load on a system's memory, which, in turn, might impairperformance. Secondly, there is a fundamental dierence between the two languageswith respect to learning. In the case of mirror recursion, strings with an embeddingdepth, D, generalizes directly to the next depth of embedding, D + 1. For example,the simple string az generalizes to the more complex strings aazz and AazZ. These, inturn, generalize to strings at the next embedding depth: AAazZZ, aAazZz, AaazzZ,and aaazzz, and so on ad innitum. This is, however, not the case for identity recur-sion. In this language, the most simple strings, e.g., az, do not generalize directly tothe more complex strings such as AaZz or AAaZZz. That is, the system cannot usegeneralizations from simple strings to facilitate the learning of more complex strings.This is very likely to make learning of identity recursive structures more dicult.In addition, I expect there to be dierences between the second and third testlanguages in the way the length of a sentence will inuence prediction accuracy6. It isreasonable to assume that a system only has a limited amount of memory available forthe implementation of a stack or a queue structure. This, in turn, limits the size, S, ofthe stack or queue (measured in terms of the number of elements they can maximallycontain). Given S and the length, L, of a sentence we can envisage prediction problemswhen L/2 becomes greater than S. Regarding mirror recursion, the system should6Note that if a system implements the most ecient way of processing counting recursion|that is,develop a counter|then the length of a sentence should not matter. However, it is likely that neuralnetworks are not able to adopt this strategy. For example, Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans & McClelland(1991) report simulations which suggest that SRNs tend to develop stack-like memory structures. Inrelation to counting recursion this implies that the system would store redundant information aboutprevious input. If this is the case, then the system should exhibit the same behavior as systems dealingwith mirror recursion|but perhaps with slightly better performance.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 47be able to make fairly accurate predictions with respect to the S innermost symbolsindependent of L.7 This is because these symbols will always be on the top part of thestack. For example, consider the sentence aAAaAZzZZz for S being 3. Although, thesystem might lose agreement information about the two rst nouns, a and A, it shouldstill be able to make fairly accurate predictions about the second and the third verbs.In eect, the system is likely to `see' the sentence as AaazzZ and predict an end ofsentence marker after the third verb. On the other hand, prediction performance onidentity recursion is likely to break down altogether when L/2 exceeds S because thefront of the queue will be lost. Consider the sentence aAAaAzZZzZ as an example forS being 3. Since it has lost the two rst noun forms, a and A, it will erroneously expectthe rst verb to be a Z because its queue will only contain agreement information aboutAaA. The prediction for the next verb will also be wrong (z instead of Z) whereas theprediction for the third verb form will be correct by chance (Z). Overall this shouldlead to better performance on the second test language than on the third.3.2 Network Architectures and n-gram StatsOne way of approaching the problem of dealing with recursion in connectionist modelsis to \hardwire" symbolic structures directly into the architecture of the network. Muchearly work in connectionist natural language processing (e.g., McClelland & Kawamoto,1986) adopted this implementational approach. Such connectionist re-implementationsof symbolic systems might have interesting computational properties and even be il-luminating regarding the appropriateness of a particular style of symbolic model fordistributed computation (Chater & Oaksford, 1990a). On the other hand, there is thepromise that connectionism may be able to do more than simply implement symbolicrepresentations and processes; in particular, that networks may be able to learn to formand use structured representations. The most interesting models of this sort typicallyfocus on learning quite constrained aspects of natural language syntax. These modelscan be divided into two classes, depending on whether preprocessed sentence structuresor simply bare sentences are presented.The less radical class (e.g., Hanson & Kegl, 1987; Pollack, 1988, 1990; Sopena, 1991;Stolke, 1991) presupposes that the syntactic structure of each sentence to be learned is7In fact, since neural networks only approximate a traditional stack structure (cf. Servan-Schreiber,Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Weckerly & Elman, 1992) it is to be expected that prediction accuracywill deteriorate gradually as we move down the stack (even within S). Performance on identity sentenceswhere S is greater than L/2 should likewise exhibit the same graded behavior.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 48given. The task of the network is to nd the grammar which ts these example struc-tures. This means that the structural aspects of language are not themselves learnedby observation, but are built in. These models are related to statistical approaches tolanguage learning such as stochastic context free grammars (Brill et al., 1990; Jelinek,Laerty, & Mercer, 1990) in which learning sets the probabilities of each grammar rulein a prespecied context-free grammar, from a corpus of parsed sentences.The more radical models have taken on a much harder task, that of learning syn-tactic structure from strings of words, with no prior assumptions about the particularstructure of the grammar. The most inuential approach is to train SRNs developed byJordan (1986) and Elman (1988). These networks provide a powerful tool with whichto model the learning of many aspects of linguistic structure (for example, Cottrell &Plunkett, 1991; Elman, 1990, 1991a; Norris, 1990; Shillcock, Levy & Chater, 1991);there has also been some exploration of their computational properties (Chater, 1989;Chater & Conkey, 1992; Cleeremans, Servan-Schreiber & McClelland, 1989; Maskara &Noetzel, 1992, 1993; Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans & McClelland, 1989, 1991). It is fairto say that these radical models have so far reached only a modest level of performance.In general, it seems to be possible to learn simple nite state grammars involving leftand right recursion. Still, only little headway has been made towards more complexgrammars involving center-embedded recursion (most noticeable by Elman, 1991 andWeckerly & Elman, 1992|furthermore, see next chapter for a non-trivial extension ofthese results), but not towards cross-dependency recursion. The simulations reportedin this chapter build on and extend this work.The SRN is a limited version of a more general neural network architecture: viz.,a fully recurrent network. Figure 3.5(a) shows an example of such a network. Thesenetworks are, however, dicult to train because they involve lateral connections be-tween the units in the hidden layer, thus preventing the application of standard back-propagation learning. Recurrent networks are therefore usually trained by `unfolding"them into feedforward networks with the same behavior. The hidden units from theprevious time-step are then treated as an additional set of inputs, allowing the resultingfeedforward network to be trained using conventional back-propagation.There are various ways in which this unfolding can be achieved (see Chater &Conkey, 1992). One approach is to unfold the network through several time steps(Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams, 1986) so that each weight has several `virtual incar-nations' and then back-propagate error through the resulting network. The overallweight change is simply the sum of the changes recommended for each incarnation. Asillustrated in Figure 3.5(b), this `back-propagation through time'|or, Recurrent Back-Propagation (RBP)|is typically implemented by unfolding through a small number of








(c)Figure 3.5. Unfolding a recurrent neural network (a) into a back-propagation through timenetwork (b) and into a simple recurrent network employing copy-back training (c).The copy-back scheme employed in SRNs can be viewed as a special case of RBP,in which the back-propagation of error stops at the rst copy of the hidden units|thecontext units|as indicated Figure 3.5(c). Note that the one-to-one copy-back linksgoing from the hidden layer to the context layer always have a value of 1.0, copying theactivation of the hidden units at time t to the context units so they can be used as inputat t+1. Simulations by Chater & Conkey (1992) have shown that RBP performs betterthan SRNs on a number of tasks (such as, learning to be a delay line and performingdiscrete XOR), although the former is considerably more computationally expensive.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 50A secondary motivation for the present simulations is therefore to compare the twotraining regimes on tasks that more closely resemble language8.In order to provide an independent basis for assessing the performance of the twokinds of networks, I developed a simple statistical prediction method, based on n-grams, strings of n consecutive words. The program is \trained" on the same stimuliused by the networks, and simply records the frequency of each n-gram in a look-uptable. It makes predictions for new material by considering the relative frequencies ofthe n-grams which are consistent with the previous n   1 words. The prediction is avector of relative frequencies for each possible successor item, scaled to sum to 1, sothat they can be interpreted as probabilities, and are therefore directly comparablewith the output vectors produced by the networks. Below, I report the predictions ofbigram, quadrogram, hexagram and octogram models and compare them with networkperformance.3.3 Experiment 1: Two Word VocabularyThe rst experiment involves the vocabulary found in Chomsky's description of histhree abstract languages (with the additional singular/plural agreement constraint asdescribed in section 3.1). Thus, we have a vocabulary consisting of a noun in a singularand plural form, 'a' and 'A' respectively, and a verb likewise in a singular and pluralform, 'z' and 'Z' respectively. Each of the networks in experiment 1 was trained with5, 10 and 25 hidden units on a data set consisting of 2000 sentences of variable length.For each sentence the depth of nesting was computed by iterating the following: ifr < pn(1  p) then an extra level of nesting would be added to the sentence, where r isa random number between 0 and 1; p the probability of adding a level of nesting (0.3 inthe simulations reported here); and n the number of nestings that the sentence alreadyhas. Then all the nets in the present experiment were tested on a data set consisting of1000 sentences, generated in the same way as the training set. The inputs and outputwere represented as binary localist vectors with one bit for each word form and one forthe end of sentence marker (totaling 5 inputs/outputs).Initial explorations indicated that the best performance for the SRNs was to beobtained with a learning rate of 0.5, a momentum of 0.25 and an initial randomization8In any interesting language-like task, the next item will not be deterministically specied by theprevious items, and hence it is appropriate for the prediction to take the form of a probability distribu-tion of possible next items. Consequently, network performance in the simulations reported below wasmeasured against this probability distribution directly, rather than against predictions of the specicnext item in the sequence. Following Elman (1991) the mean cosine between network output vectorsand probability vectors given previous context is used as the main quantitative measure of performance.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 51of the weights between 0:5. In the case of RBP, no momentum was used, the learningrate was set to 0.5 and the weights initialized randomly between 1:0. Through cross-validation it was found that the number of epochs necessary to reach peak performancein both cases varied with the size of the hidden unit layer. Increasing the hidden unitlayer resulted in faster training (although the RBP net exhibited much faster trainingacross the board)9. Subsequently, the SRNs with 5, 10 and 25 hidden units were trainedfor 500, 450 and 350 epochs, respectively. The RBP network with 5, 10 and 25 hiddenunits were trained for 275, 250 and 200 epochs, respectively.3.3.1 Counting RecursionThe networks were trained on a training set consisting entirely of sentences with count-ing recursive structures of variable length (mean: 4.69; sd: 1.37) and then tested ona test set (mean: 4.76; sd: 1.36). Table 3.1 shows the embedding distribution in bothdata sets. Embedding Depth 0 Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3Training set 31.15% 54.10% 13.65% 1.10%Test set 29.20% 54.40% 15.70% 0.70%Table 3.1. The distribution of dierent depths of embedding in the training and test setsinvolving counting recursion.General PerformanceBoth nets generally performed well on the counting recursion task10. The simulationresults are reported in table 3.2. It is clear that the nets have picked up the sequentialstructure of the data, otherwise their performance would not have surpassed the levelof performance obtained by merely making predictions according to the simple relativefrequency of the words in the data set (1gram)11. In fact, the performance of bothnets is at the same level as the bigram based performance. This could suggest thatnet processing is sensitive to the bigram statistics found in the input data. However,the nets are not able to perform as well as quadrogram, hexagram and octogram based9However, even though the SRNs require more epochs to learn a task, they are faster in overallcomputing time, because the RBP nets are very expensive in computational terms and take more CPUtime per epoch.10This is in comparison with Elman's (1991) results. He reported a mean squared error of 0.177 anda mean cosine of 0.852. Perfect performance would have resulted in 0.0 and 1.0, respectively.11This level of performance (1gram) is what, at best, could be expected from a standard feedforwardback-propagation network without any recurrent connections.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 52Network/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram error5hu 0.2060  0.1841 0.8143  0.1426srn 10hu 0.1817  0.1938 0.8450  0.125825hu 0.2315  0.2214 0.8095  0.15735hu 0.2145  0.2285 0.8469  0.1548rbp 10hu 0.2862  0.1579 0.7746  0.127925hu 0.1758  0.2519 0.8636  0.16181gram 0.3464  0.2468 0.6481  0.12262gram 0.1876  0.1904 0.8301  0.17054gram 0.0570  0.2120 0.9589  0.15586gram 0.0301  0.1163 0.9724  0.08028gram 0.1026  0.2081 0.9042  0.1905Table 3.2. General performance on counting recursive structures.performance. Also notice the decrease in performance for the octogram based predic-tions. This is presumably caused by the limited size of the training set which leads totoo many single occurrences of unique octograms.Network/ Mean squared Mean Cosineerror5hu 0.9506  0.4326 0.6515  0.2132srn 10hu 1.0844  0.1402 0.6214  0.093425hu 0.4008  0.2347 0.6441  0.11475hu 1.4760  0.2458 0.5956  0.1283rbp 10hu 1.4055  0.1956 0.6213  0.098425hu 1.5039  0.5310 0.6235  0.2188Table 3.3. Baselines for the general performance on counting recursive structures.Table 3.3 shows net performance on the test set measured before any learning hadtaken place. Mean squared error is high for all net congurations (except for theSRN with 25 hidden units12). The mean cosines are all near the performance foundby predicting according to the simple relative frequency of the words in the data set(1gram). This suggests that the net congurations are well-suited for the task at hand.Still, learning improves performance across the board by approximately 30%.12The low mean squared error for the SRN with 25 hidden units was also found for the same netin the mirror and identity recursion task because all nets of the same size started out with the sameset of initial weights for the sake of cross-task comparisons. However, the mean cosines for these SRNcongurations are of the approximately same size as the ones for the other two congurations. Sincemean cosines are going to be the quantitative focus of the performance assessments, the present meansquared error anomaly should be of no importance.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 53Network/ Mean Luce ratio Mean Luce ratio Mean Luce ration-gram dierence hits misses5hu 0.2967  0.1904 0.3780  0.0689 0.3769  0.0645srn 10hu 0.2635  0.2034 0.3601  0.0639 0.3578  0.064625hu 0.2825  0.2103 0.4361  0.0561 0.4385  0.05425hu 0.2626  0.2225 0.4882  0.0785 0.5163  0.0933rbp 10hu 0.3519  0.1474 0.6137  0.1400 0.6427  0.166025hu 0.1699  0.1716 0.5508  0.1427 0.4769  0.10732gram 0.2309  0.1760 0.4460  0.1234 0.4307  0.11584gram 0.0832  0.1359 0.5657  0.2100 0.5559  0.11156gram 0.0671  0.1018 0.6308  0.2499 0.5304  0.10698gram 0.1377  0.1831 0.6956  0.2475 0.5734  0.2435Table 3.4. Condence in predictions concerning counting recursive structures.The amount of condence that the nets had in their predictions is shown in table 3.4,measured as the Luce ratio (that is, the activation of the most active unit in proportionto the sum of the activation of the remaining units). The mean Luce ratio dierenceprovides a measure of the absolute dierence in condence between a set of predictionsand the full conditional probabilities. The RBP network generally seems to be slightlycloser than the SRN to the full conditional probabilities in terms of condence. Thisis also mirrored in the higher Luce ratio for both hits and misses13 obtained by theformer. Notice, however, that whereas the SRNs have the same condence regardingboth hits and misses, the RBP nets have a higher condence in their misses (exceptthe net with 25 hidden units which is the net that did best on all measures).Comparisons with the n-gram predictions again indicate that net performances ison the level of bigram predictions (though the RBP net does somewhat better). MeanLuce ratio dierences are exceptionally low for quadrogram and hexagram predictions,and only slightly higher for octogram predictions. Predictions based on these threen-grams also exhibit a higher condence in their hits, compared with their misses.Embedding Depth PerformanceSince we are dealing with recursive structures of variable length it is worthwhile lookingat performance across recursive embedding depth. Figure 3.6 illustrates that networkperformance generally decreases across embedding depth (except for the RBP networkwith 5 hidden units|its behavior might be a product of slight overtraining). This13A hit is recorded when the highest activated unit in a prediction vector is also the highest activatedunit in the full conditional probability vector. When this is not the case a miss is recorded.
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Figure 3.7. Network error regarding counting recursive structures plotted as a function ofembedding depth.

























































8gramFigure 3.9. Network (SRN: 10hu; RBP: 25hu) and n-gram error regarding counting recursivestructures plotted as a function of embedding depth.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 56is exactly what we would expect according to the performance predictions made inSection 3.1.1. Figure 3.7 shows the same network behavior, this time measured interms of mean squared error.From Figure 3.8 we can, once again, see that the performances of the best net ofeach kind (the SRN with 10 hidden units and RBP network with 25 hidden units)has a performance across recursion depth that is comparable with that of the bigrampredictions (perhaps even slightly better). The higher n-gram predictions are oncemore superior than the net predictions. It is worth noticing that even though theaccuracy of net and n-gram predictions degrades over time, all predictions seem tomeet at depth three at the level of predictions discernible using only the simple relativefrequence of the words in the data set (except the octogram predictions which for thereason mentioned above deteriorates rather than degrade). Figure 3.9 illustrates thesame net and n-gram prediction behavior, but measured in terms of mean squared error(since the mean squared error graphs essentially are mere mirror images of the meancosine graphs, only the latter will be presented hereafter).In summary, the counting recursion simulations came out very much as expectedwith performance gracefully degrading over embedding depth. However, the dierencein the size of the hidden unit layer did not seem to matter much given the task athand. In addition, it seems to be the case that both kinds of nets can only learn to besensitive to bigram stats.3.3.2 Mirror RecursionIn this task the nets were trained on a training set containing only sentence structuresof variable length from the mirror recursive test language (mean: 4.73; sd: 1.36).After training the nets were tested on a dierent mirror recursion data set (mean:4.79; sd: 1.33). The distribution of the sentence embeddings is shown in Table 3.5.Embedding Depth 0 Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3Training set 29.55% 55.50% 13.80% 1.15%Test set 26.90% 57.50% 14.70% 0.90%Table 3.5. The distribution of dierent depths of embedding in the training and test setsinvolving mirror recursion.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 57General PerformanceThe performance of the two nets on this task is generally poorer than on the countingrecursion task, but still at an acceptably high level.14 Moreover, this dierence inNetwork/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram error5hu 0.3417  0.3062 0.7508  0.1874srn 10hu 0.3122  0.2886 0.7953  0.178325hu 0.3550  0.4610 0.7553  0.25675hu 0.3062  0.4822 0.7914  0.2674rbp 10hu 0.2991  0.3032 0.8069  0.204225hu 0.3689  0.4070 0.7692  0.23531gram 0.5003  0.2652 0.5688  0.11612gram 0.2877  0.3281 0.8071  0.21764gram 0.0605  0.2642 0.9660  0.15856gram 0.0121  0.0951 0.9901  0.06788gram 0.0221  0.1051 0.9784  0.1092Table 3.6. General performance on mirror recursive structures.performance was to be expected cf. Section 3.1.1. The results|shown in Table 3.6|once again indicate that net performances are comparable with bigram predictions andthat predictions made using larger n-grams are superior to net predictions. Noticethat performance based on the higher n-grams are slightly better than their respectiveperformance on the counting recursion task. In addition there is an improvement ofthe octogram based performance (i.e., octograms are doing better than quadrograms,whereas the opposite was the case in the previous task). The overall performanceimprovement obtained by predictions based on higher n-gram statistics can plausiblybe ascribed to the existence of more deterministic structure in the mirror recursivetask.From Table 3.7 it can be seen that even though learning increased performanceapproximately 20 percentage points on both counting and mirror recursion, the relativeincrease in performance on mirror recursion was considerably bigger (about 45% versus30% for counting recursion). Learning also provided a bigger increase in performanceon the present task compared with the previous one, when the dierence between theobtained net performance and the performance based on the simple relative frequenciesof the word in the data set is considered (1gram). In addition, it should be noted that14Both nets displayed a performance below what Elman (1991) has reported, but well above theperformance obtained by Weckerly & Elman (1992) on mirror recursive structures.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 58the performance of the untrained nets is a great deal worse (about 30%) on the mirrorrecursion task compared with the previous task. This suggests that the present task ismore dicult than counting recursion (which was also predicted in Section 3.1.1).Network Mean squared Mean Cosineerror5hu 1.1040  0.4187 0.5675  0.1934srn 10hu 1.2309  0.2962 0.5568  0.127825hu 0.5579  0.2517 0.5602  0.10335hu 1.6253  0.4779 0.5381  0.1923rbp 10hu 1.5590  0.2442 0.5425  0.094625hu 1.6616  0.6922 0.5621  0.2566Table 3.7. Baselines for the general performance on mirror recursive structures.On the mirror recursion task, the nets were generally less condent about theirpredictions than on the counting recursion task. This is expressed in the higher meanLuce ratio dierences found in Table 3.8. The same is the case for the bigram basedpredictions. On the other hand, the higher n-gram predictions are actually doingslightly better on this measure (especially octogram based predictions). This is alsoNetwork/ Mean Luce ratio Mean Luce ratio Mean Luce ration-gram dierence hits misses5hu 0.4185  0.2495 0.3666  0.0810 0.3519  0.0869srn 10hu 0.3782  0.2984 0.3998  0.0615 0.3382  0.047725hu 0.3767  0.2448 0.5343  0.0928 0.4545  0.10795hu 0.2810  0.2757 0.5769  0.1784 0.5747  0.1020rbp 10hu 0.3486  0.2399 0.6290  0.1454 0.5255  0.115825hu 0.3671  0.2238 0.6939  0.1333 0.6364  0.11132gram 0.3229  0.2659 0.5266  0.0130 0.5360  0.00034gram 0.0744  0.1697 0.7445  0.2190 0.4725  0.17126gram 0.0329  0.0757 0.7980  0.2309 0.4387  0.10958gram 0.0484  0.1100 0.8202  0.2251 0.4513  0.1403Table 3.8. Condence in predictions concerning mirror recursive structures.mirrored in the distribution of mean Luce ratios on hits and misses for the higher n-grams. There is a bigger gap between the condence exhibited on correct predictionsand on incorrect ones|resulting from an increase of the mean Luce ratios for the formerand a decrease with respect to the latter. Net condence on hits and misses replicatethis pattern (although not with the same signicant gap between their condence incorrect and incorrect predictions). This diers from the pattern of net mean Luce
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 59ratios on hits and misses found on the counting recursion task, suggesting that themore deterministic structure in the mirror recursion data sets allows the nets (andn-gram program) to be more condent about their predictions.Embedding Depth PerformanceTurning to performance in terms of embedding depth, Figure 3.10 illustrates that per-formance generally degraded over embedding depth. This is of the same pattern asfound in the counting recursion task and in unison with the performance anticipationsexpressed in Section 3.1.1. Figure 3.11 shows the comparison between the best netperformance for each net and the performance based on n-grams. Again, the perfor-mance of the two nets are comparable with the performance of bigram predictions.In comparison, the higher n-gram performances follows a dierent trend with a highperformance up till an embedding depth of two, followed by a quite dramatical drop inperformance on depth three (presumably caused by the very few occurrences (1.10%)of depth three recursive structures found in the training set). Notice that the highern-gram performance across embedding depth is better on the present task than on theprevious task (compare with Table 3.7). Moreover, the drop in octogram based perfor-mance does not force it below the performance based on the simple relative frequencyof the words in the data set. In fact, neither net performance nor performance basedon n-gram predictions falls below this level of performance.To sum up, the nets generally did less well on the mirror recursion task comparedwith the counting recursion task. However, this was to be expected from the discussionof performance anticipations in section 3.1.1. As on the previous task, performancedegrades over embedding depth which is at par with human performance on similar(center-embedded) structures. Furthermore, the nets were not able to do better thanbigram based predictions on this task either.3.3.3 Identity RecursionThe networks were trained on a data set consisting exclusively of identity recursivesentences of variable length (mean: 4.73; sd: 1.39). Then nets were subsequentlytested on a separate data set (mean: 4.70; sd: 1.35) derived in the same manner asthe training set. Table 3.9 shows the embedding distribution in the two data sets.General PerformanceThe performance of both nets on this task were poorer than on the previous twotasks|conrming part of the analysis of the processings diculties in Section 3.1.1.
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8gramFigure 3.11. Network (SRN: 25hu; RBP: 5hu) and n-gram performance regarding mirrorrecursion plotted against embedding depth
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 61Embedding Depth 0 Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3Training set 30.70% 53.10% 15.10% 1.10%Test set 30.40% 54.80% 13.90% 0.90%Table 3.9. The distribution of dierent depths of embedding in the training and test setsinvolving identity recursion.However, the performance was only slightly worse on the present task than on themirror recursion task. The nets, then, did better on the identity recursion task thanwas expected given the structural complexity of the learning task. In comparisonNetwork/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram error5hu 0.3521  0.3208 0.7367  0.2150srn 10hu 0.3815  0.2817 0.7185  0.197225hu 0.3722  0.3067 0.7306  0.20675hu 0.4893  0.3358 0.6696  0.2245rbp 10hu 0.4857  0.3007 0.6904  0.220025hu 0.3442  0.3915 0.7409  0.31141gram 0.4960  0.2657 0.5714  0.11782gram 0.3308  0.3352 0.7621  0.23714gram 0.0514  0.2565 0.9717  0.14276gram 0.0085  0.0593 0.9914  0.05068gram 0.0188  0.0813 0.9811  0.0853Table 3.10. General performance on identity recursive structures.with the predictions based on n-grams, the nets, once again, display the same level ofperformance as bigram predictions. This is furthermore reected in the decrease of thebigram based performance on the identity recursion task compared with the previoustask. The performance obtained by higher n-gram predictions, on the other hand, isat the same level as on the previous task (and subsequently slightly higher than on thecounting recursion task).Since the baselines as reported in Table 3.11 are similar to those found on themirror recursion task (Table 3.7), the relative increase in performance obtained throughlearning is smaller on the present task than on the previous task (approximately 35%versus 45%). This indicates that identity recursion is relatively harder to learn thanmirror recursion (although perhaps not as dicult as anticipated). Still, the nets wereable to pick up a considerable part of the sequential structure in the training set asevinced by the gap between the performance of the two nets and that based on thesimple relative word frequency.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 62Network Mean squared Mean Cosineerror5hu 1.0980  0.4227 0.5712  0.1971srn 10hu 1.2290  0.2897 0.5571  0.127125hu 0.5476  0.2515 0.5680  0.10485hu 1.6166  0.4656 0.5422  0.1880rbp 10hu 1.5448  0.2349 0.5485  0.096925hu 1.6383  0.6744 0.5704  0.2507Table 3.11. Baselines for the general performance on identity recursive structures.Prediction condence as expressed in terms of the mean Luce ratio dierences pre-sented in Table 3.12 was smaller than on the mirror recursion task. This trend is alsoreected in the bigram based prediction condence, but not by the higher n-gram pre-dictions. The latter show the same condence as on the previous task|with a smallincrease in condence for both correct and incorrect predictions. The higher condenceexhibited by the higher n-grams on correct predictions compared with incorrect predic-tions noted with respect to the mirror recursion task can also be found on the presenttask. The network condence pattern on hits and misses are less clear, deviating fromthe condence pattern on the previous task.Network/ Mean Luce ratio Mean Luce ratio Mean Luce ration-gram dierence hits misses5hu 0.4346  0.2551 0.3961  0.0977 0.3853  0.0971srn 10hu 0.4549  0.2434 0.4007  0.0399 0.4486  0.102325hu 0.4036  0.3033 0.4349  0.0456 0.3644  0.03255hu 0.4418  0.2161 0.6440  0.1105 0.5557  0.1194rbp 10hu 0.4701  0.1707 0.6273  0.1550 0.6743  0.150725hu 0.3805  0.2634 0.6642  0.1053 0.6093  0.09732gram 0.3696  0.2785 0.4832  0.0821 0.4488  0.08124gram 0.0690  0.1448 0.8040  0.1882 0.4804  0.14236gram 0.0316  0.0586 0.8472  0.2011 0.4470  0.09088gram 0.0478  0.0921 0.8410  0.2116 0.4703  0.1158Table 3.12. Condence in predictions concerning identity recursive structures.Embedding Depth PerformanceLooking at Figure 3.12, we can see that network performance across embedding depthfollows a pattern comparable with the one found on mirror recursion; viz., performancedegrades as a function of embedding depth (except for the RBP network with 5 hidden
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8gramFigure 3.13. Network (SRN: 5hu; RBP: 25hu) and n-gram performance regarding identityrecursion plotted against embedding depth.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 64units). This was more or less what was predicted in Section 3.1.1. Figure 3.13 illus-trates that bigram based predictions follow the same trend. However, prediction basedon higher n-grams (especially hexagrams and octograms) are performing remarkablywell|considerably better than on the mirror recursion task. This might be explainedby the fact that the distance between the rst noun and its verb is shorter in an deeplyembedded identity recursive sentence compared with a mirror recursive sentence of thesame embedding depth. In addition, both network and n-gram based performanceis always above the level of performance that can be obtained by making predictionsaccording to the simple relative frequency of the words in the data set.To recapitulate, the nets did better than expected on this task{even though theirperformance is slightly worse than on the mirror recursion task. Once again, perfor-mance degraded across depth of embedding which is also the case for human perfor-mance on similar (cross-dependency) structures. However, the higher n-gram predic-tions did not display the same degraded performance, suggesting that they are notsuitable as a basis for a human performance model. And once more, net performancewas very close to that exhibited by bigram based predictions.3.3.4 SummaryThe performance of the two nets on the three tasks turned out to be close to theperformance predictions made in Section 3.1.1. However, a few things are worth noting.First of all, the overall performance (of both nets and n-gram based predictions) onthe identity recursion task was somewhat better than expected. This is a positiveresult, given that dealing with identity recursive structures require the acquisition of(something closely related to) a context-sensitive grammar. Secondly, there was nosignicant performance dierence between the two kind of networks on either of thetasks (albeit that the RBP network generally was more condent in its predictions).Thirdly, network performance was on the same level as performance obtained on bigrambased predictions. And nally, the size of the hidden layer did not seem to inuenceperformance|in particular, bigger nets did not do better (although there is a weaktendency towards better condence for bigger nets).3.4 Experiment 2: Eight Word VocabularyIn order to test further the ability of both networks to capture the recursive regularitiesnecessary for dealing with novel sentences, I conducted a second experiment involving
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 65an eight word vocabulary15. Thus, we have four nouns in a singular (`a',`b',`c',`d') and aplural form (`A', `B', `C', `D'), an four verbs likewise in a singular (`w', `x', `y', `z') anda plural form (`W', `X', `Y', `Z'). In experiment 1, I found that the size of the hiddenunit layer did not appear to inuence performance on either of the tasks. I thereforedecided only to train networks with 20 hidden units in the present experiment. TheSRN was trained for 400 epochs and the RBP net for 200 epochs (using the same back-propagation parameters as in experiment 1). Throughout experiment 2 the trainingsets contained 2000 sentences and the test sets 1000 sentences.Pilot studies indicated that the localist representation of words that I used in theprevious experiment was inappropriate for the current experiment. Instead, I adopteda dierent representation scheme in which each word was represented by a single bit(independently of its number) and the number was represented by one of two bits(common to all words) signifying whether a word was singular or plural. Thus, foreach occurrence of a word two bits would be on|one bit signifying the word and onebit indicating its number16. The input/output consisted of 11 bit vectors (one for eachof the eight words, one for each of the two word numbers (singular or plural), and onefor the end of sentence marker). To allow assessment of network performance on novelsentences, I introduced two extra test sets with, respectively, 10 novel sentences and10 previously seen sentences (all with mean length: 5.30; sd: 1.64).3.4.1 Counting RecursionIn this version of the counting recursion task, the nets were trained on a training setconsisting of counting recursive sentences of variable length (mean: 4.73; sd 1.33) andtested on a separate large data set (mean: 4.72; sd: 1.34) as well as on two small testsets consisting of, respectively, novel and previously seen sentences. The embeddingdistribution of the two large data sets is shown in table 3.13.15This extension of the vocabulary was necessary, since leaving out certain sentence structures in theprevious experiment would have skewed the training set in a problematic fashion. Moreover, I wantedto investigate how the networks would perform with a bigger vocabulary.16It is worth noticing that this kind of representational format appears more plausible than a strictlocalist one. In particular, it is unlikely that we `store' singular and plural forms of the same word(e.g., `cat' and `cats') as distinct and completely unrelated representations as it would be the casewith localist representations. Rather, I would expect the human language processing mechanism totake advantage of the similarities between the two word forms to facilitate processing. Derivationalmorphology could, perhaps, be construed as the instantiation of such a system
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 66Embedding Depth 0 Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3 Depth 4Training set 29.20% 55.70% 14.45% 0.65% 0.00%Test set 29.50% 55.90% 13.80% 0.70% 0.10%Table 3.13. The distribution of dierent depths of embedding in the training and test setsinvolving counting recursion.General PerformanceBoth nets performed slightly worse on this version of the counting recursion task com-pared with the previous version. As can be seen from table 3.14, the SRN is doingbetter than the RBP net. The latter is not doing better than performance based onthe relative frequency of the words in the training set (1gram), perhaps suggesting thatthe RBP net has not quite picked up the sequential structure of the data. Still, com-parisons between performance before and after training (presented in table 3.15 and3.14, respectively) indicates that performance improved considerably through learning.Thus, the SRN increased its performance 30% (from cos = 0:603 to cos = 0:789) andthe RBP net 58% (from cos = 0:466 to cos = 0:737).Network/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram errorsrn 0.3972  0.4146 0.7894  0.1722rbp 0.4870  0.5412 0.7371  0.23241gram 0.4487  0.4269 0.7327  0.23362gram 0.3004  0.4316 0.8424  0.19034gram 0.1867  0.4814 0.9218  0.17466gram 0.5342  0.6257 0.7198  0.31888gram 0.9367  0.4230 0.1898  0.3167Table 3.14. General performance on counting recursive structures.Network Mean squared Mean Cosineerrorsrn 1.3277  0.4506 0.6029  0.1451rbp 3.4272  0.8095 0.4657  0.1928Table 3.15. Baselines for the general performance on counting recursive structures tested onthe full conditional probabilities of the test set.However, it should be noted that the high level of performance obtained by thesimple relative frequency predictions is due to the semi-arbitrariness of the countingrecursion task. As there are no agreement constraints between nouns and verbs in this
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 67task, predicting the next word according to the relative frequency of the words in thetraining set will result in decent performance. In this experiment the bigram basedperformance is slightly better than the SRN performance. Yet, the biggest dierenceis that the higher n-gram based performance is quite poor (save quadrogram basedpredictions). As in experiment 1, this is because there are too many single occurrencesof unique higher n-grams in the training set. This impairs generalization from thetraining set to the test set.Network Novel Previously seensentences sentences(mean cosine) (mean cosine)srn 0.4594  0.2583 0.4819  0.2404rbp 0.4050  0.2603 0.3909  0.2747Table 3.16. Network performance on novel and previously seen sentences involving countingrecursive structures.Table 3.16 shows net performance on the novel and previously seen sentences. It isclear that both networks have acquired the ability to generalize to novel sentences17.There is only a small decrease in performance when comparison is made between the twotypes of test sentences. The performance of the SRN degrades by less than 5%, whereasthe performance of the RBP net actually improves very slightly by 4%. It is likelythat the RBP network performed slightly better on the novel sentences compared withpreviously seen sentences because the networkmight have been somewhat undertrained.Embedding Depth PerformanceTurning to performance across embedding depth, Figure 3.14 shows that the generaltrend from experiment 1 is replicated in the present task: performance degrades as afunction of embedding depth. Both nets exhibit the same behavior across embeddingdepth|though the RBP net performance is slightly poorer than that of the SRN.The bigram performance is closer to the SRN performance than table 3.14 suggests.Quadrogram based predictions do well at the rst two embedding depths, but degradesrapidly after that. Hexagram and octogram based performance are doing very poorly|especially the latter (for the reasons mentioned above). Most strikingly, predictions17Noe that this apparently low performance is due to the fact that it was measured against theprobability distribution of these two sets, whereas the nets had been trained on (and, thus, becomesensitive to) the much more complex probability distribution of the 2000 sentences in the training set.In addition, the embedding distribution in these test sets were skewed slightly towards longer sentences(hence the higher mean sentence length reported above).




























8gramFigure 3.14. Network and n-gram performance regarding counting recursion plotted againstembedding depth.relying entirely on the relative frequency of the words in the training set are superiorto all other kinds of prediction methods from depth 2 onwards.To sum up, both nets did slightly worse on this task than on the same task in theprevious experiment. Nevertheless, the nets were able to generalize to novel sentences.On the other hand, predictions made from the simple relative word frequency didsurprisingly well, suggesting that the semi-random nature of the counting recursiontask makes it dicult to learn for larger vocabularies.3.4.2 Mirror RecursionBoth networks were trained on exclusively mirror recursive sentences (mean: 4.77; sd:1.36) and tested on a large separate data set (mean: 4.68; sd: 1.35) as well as two10 sentence data sets with, respectively, novel and previously seen sentences. Table3.17 shows the embedding distribution in the two large data sets.Embedding Depth 0 Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3 Depth 4Training set 28.50% 55.65% 14.85% 0.95% 0.05%Test set 31.10% 54.30% 13.90% 0.70% 0.00%Table 3.17. The distribution of dierent depths of embedding in the training and test setsinvolving mirror recursion.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 69General PerformanceOn this task the SRN, once more, performed modestly better than the RBP network ascan be seen from table 3.18. In contrast to the previous task, both nets achieve a level ofperformance that is better than what can be accomplished by making predictions basedon simple relative word frequency (1gram). Moreover, the performance on this taskNetwork/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram errorsrn 0.3499  0.4202 0.8127  0.1931rbp 0.4838  0.4901 0.7756  0.19791gram 0.4492  0.4304 0.7328  0.23612gram 0.2984  0.4314 0.8443  0.18884gram 0.1985  0.4944 0.9163  0.17866gram 0.5393  0.6404 0.7174  0.32098gram 0.9473  0.4132 0.1862  0.3113Table 3.18. General performance on mirror recursive structures.(though somewhat poorer than on the counting recursion task) is comparable with theperformance on the same task in experiment 1. The n-gram based performance is veryclose to that obtained on the previous task. Bigram based predictions are still slightlybetter than net predictions. A comparison between the performance of the untrained(table 3.19) and the trained (table 3.18) nets reveals that the RBP net had a muchhigher relative performance improvement through learning (67% { from cos = 0:464 tocos = 0:776) than the SRN (35% { from cos = 0:602 to cos = 0:813).Network Mean squared Mean Cosineerrorsrn 1.3313  0.4512 0.6016  0.1451rbp 3.4352  0.8087 0.4635  0.1926Table 3.19. Baselines for the general performance on mirror recursive structures.From table 3.20 it can be seen that the networks exhibited no signicant dierencein performance on, respectively, the novel and the previously seen test sentences. Thus,the nets have learned to generalize to novel sentences. The performance of the SRNis practically the same on both kinds of sentences (a dierence of less than 1%). TheRBP net, again, had an increase in performance (9%) on the novel test sentencescompared with the sentences it had already been exposed to during training (oncemore suggesting, perhaps, undertraining). Notice also that the SRN is doing better onboth kinds of sentences compared with the previous task. In the same way, the RBP




























8gramFigure 3.15. Network and n-gram performance regarding mirror recursion plotted againstembedding depth.In summary, the nets performed satisfactorily on this task|especially on novel
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 71sentences. The SRN reached the same level of performance as on the mirror recursiontask in the previous experiment. The RBP net performed slightly worse.3.4.3 Identity RecursionOn the nal task, the networks were trained on a identity recursion training set (mean:4.75; sd: 1.34) and tested on a similar, but separate, data set (mean: 4.70; sd: 1.33)as well as two 10 sentence test sets comprised of, respectively, novel and previously seensentences. Table 3.21 presents the distribution of embeddings in the two large data sets.Embedding Depth 0 Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3Training set 28.70% 55.90% 14.55% 0.85%Test set 29.70% 54.10% 13.40% 0.80%Table 3.21. The distribution of dierent depths of embedding in the training and test setsinvolving identity recursion.General PerformanceThe overall performance of the two nets was much alike, though favoring the SRN. Thisis in contrast to the relative increase in performance achieved through learning, wherethe RBP network obtained a 58% improvement (from cos = 0:476 to cos = 0:755)compared with the SRN's 28% (from cos = 0:604 to cos = 0:773) (cf. table 3.22and 3.23). The performance of both nets on identity recursion was better in thisNetwork/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram errorsrn 0.4097  0.4417 0.7732  0.1760rbp 0.4629  0.5070 0.7546  0.20021gram 0.4456  0.4217 0.7326  0.23252gram 0.2962  0.4214 0.8429  0.18664gram 0.1918  0.4773 0.9174  0.17396gram 0.5371  0.6202 0.7129  0.32538gram 0.9375  0.4147 0.1849  0.3127Table 3.22. General performance on identity recursive structures.experiment compared with the same task in experiment 1 (but worse than on theprevious two tasks|which is in accordance with the performance predictions made inSection 3.1.1). All the n-gram based performances closely mirrored the performanceon the previous two tasks.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 72Network Mean squared Mean Cosineerrorsrn 1.3229  0.4466 0.6036  0.1442rbp 3.2900  0.7834 0.4763  0.1903Table 3.23. Baselines for the general performance on identity recursive structures.Most importantly, as it was the the case in the previous tasks, both networks wereable to deal with novel sentences, indicating that they had learned the underlyingrecursive regularities. Table 3.24 contains the results from the testing of the two netson novel and previously seen sentences. The SRN performance on novel sentencesdegraded by only 2% compared with its performance on previously seen sentences.Once again, the RBP net achieved a small performance improvement of 3% on novelsentences compared with its performance on sentences that had been presented to itduring training. Network Novel Previously seensentences sentences(mean cosine) (mean cosine)srn 0.5376  0.2436 0.5485  0.2451rbp 0.4762  0.2473 0.4629  0.2828Table 3.24. Network performance on novel and previously seen sentences involving identityrecursive structures.Embedding Depth PerformanceFigure 3.16 illustrates the close t between the performance of the two networks acrossembedding depth. It also shows that the nets are not as close to the bigram performanceas in the previous task (and in the previous experiment). As in the previous two tasks,both hexagram and octogram based predictions reach a poor level of performance(especially, the latter). Moreover, the performance of both nets is again inferior to thequadrogram based performance. For embedding depths 2 and 3, predictions relying onthe simple relative frequency of the words in the training set are still superior to allother prediction methods.In short, both nets also did well on this version of the identity recursion task. Inparticular, they were able to generalize what they had learned to novel sentences|eventhough both nets performed slightly worse on this task compared with the previous twotasks in the current experiment.




























8gramFigure 3.16. Network and n-gram performance regarding identity recursion plotted againstembedding depth.3.4.4 SummaryThe two nets performed in much the same way in the present experiment as in theprevious experiment. Thus, the performance predictions outlined in Section 3.1.1 wereconrmed once more (again with the exception of the relatively good performanceachieved in the identity recursion task). However, there are a few dierences betweenthe two experiments. First, in the current experiment the SRN achieved better resultson all three tasks compared with the RBP net|though there are some indicationsthat the latter might have been undertrained. Secondly, both nets accomplished asatisfactory level of generalization when faced with novel sentences. This suggeststhat the nets were able to learn the recursive regularities underlying the three tasks.Thirdly, for all three tasks predictions based on the relative word frequencies of thetraining set reached a surprisingly high level of performance. This is presumably due tothe new representation format. Finally, the better performance on novel sentences onthe mirror and identity recursion tasks (measured in terms of mean cosines) comparedwith the counting recursive task indicates that the learning of generalization relevantinformation is facilitated by the agreement constraints.3.5 DiscussionIn this chapter I have addressed Chomsky's (1957) challenge in a slightly reformulatedform: Can neural networks capture the ni-recursive regularities of natural language
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 74if we accept that arbitrarily complex sentences cannot (and, perhaps, should not) behandled? The ability of both kinds of networks to generalize to novel sentences involv-ing three kinds of ni-recursion (in experiment 2) suggests that neural networks mightbe able to do the trick. But where does that leave the pattern of gradual breakdownof performance as observed in all the simulations presented here? If we compare thebreakdown pattern in the mirror and identity recursion tasks with the degradation ofhuman performance on center-embedded and cross-dependency structures (as can beadduced from Figure 3.1718), we can conclude that such a breakdown pattern is, indeed,desirable from a psycholinguistic perspective. Thus, network (and bigram based) per-formance across embedding depth appears to mirror general human limitations on theprocessing of complex ni-recursive structures. Moreover, given the performance on thecounting recursion task we can make the empirical prediction that human behavior onnested `if{then' structures will have the same breakdown pattern as observed in relationto the nested center-embedded and cross-dependency sentences (though with a slightlybetter overall performance). That is, I predict that humans are only able to processa very limited nesting of `if{then' structures, and that the performance, furthermore,will exhibit graceful degradation over depth of nesting.Two other things are worth noting. First of all, the overall performance (of bothnets and n-gram based predictions) on the identity recursion task was better than ex-pected. This is a positive result, given that dealing with identity recursive structuresrequires the acquisition of (something closely related to) a context-sensitive grammar,whereas mirror recursion `merely' requires the acquisition of a context-free grammar.The networks, then, did better on the identity task than was to be expected given thestructural complexity of the learning task (as outlined in section 3.1.1). This is impor-tant, since human performance seems to be quite similar on both kinds of ni-recursivestructure (see Figure 3.17). Secondly, there was no signicant performance dierencebetween the two kinds of networks on either of the tasks (in both experiments). Thismeans that the negative results reported by Chater & Conkey (1992) regarding SRNperformance on certain non-language tasks do not extend themselves to more language-like tasks. Thus, in addressing my secondary motivation for the present simulations,we found, rather surprisingly, that unfolding a recurrent network for the purpose ofRBP does not seem to provide additional computational power on the language-liketasks presented here.18The data from Bach, Brown & Marslen-Wilson (1986: p. 255, table 1: test results) is displayedby reversing the scale so that it is readily comparable with the simulation results expressed in termsof mean cosines. This amounts to plotting the y-coordinates as f(n) = 9  n, where n is the originaldata point.












































Dutch       
German/inf. 
German/part.Figure 3.17. The performance of native speakers of German and Dutch on, respectively, center-embedded (mirror recursive) sentences and sentences involving cross-dependencies (identity recursion)is plotted against embedding depth. The gure is based on data reported in Bach, Brown, & Marslen-Wilson (1986).The close similarity between the breakdown patterns in human and neural networkperformance on complex ni-recursive structures supports two wide-reaching conjectures.On the one hand, neural network models|in spite of their nite-state nature|mustbe considered as viable models of natural language processing. At least, I have shownthat the existence of center-embedding and cross-dependency no longer can be used asa priori evidence against neural network (and other nite state) models of linguisticbehavior. On the other hand, the common pattern of graceful degradation also suggeststhat humans, like neural networks, are sensitive to the statistical structure of language.Neural networks pick up certain simple statistical contingencies in the input they receive(the simulations presented here indicate that such statistics might resemble bigrambased probability distributions19). I suggest that the breakdown pattern in humanperformance on complex recursive structures might also be due to a strong dependenceon such statistics in the acquisition of linguistic structure. Whether these conjecturesare true is a matter of future empirical research, not a priori speculation.This chapter has focused on addressing the Chomskyan (1957) challenge expressedin terms of his three abstract languages involving ni-recursion. The results presented19However, it should be noted that the very good n-gram results presented in this chapter should betaken with some caution. The next chapter shows that an SRN attains better performance than n-grambased predictions when faced with a more realistic grammar incorporating both i- and ni-recursion.
CHAPTER 3. RECURSION IN RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 76here are obviously somewhat limited by the fact that only one kind of recursive struc-ture occurs in each of the three languages. In the next chapter, I therefore presentsimulations replicating the results found here, but in the context of a grammar incor-porating not only ni-recursion but also dierent instances of i-recursion.
Chapter 4Connectionist Learning ofLinguistic StructureIt is often noted that natural language recursion poses a serious problem for connec-tionist and other nite state models of language. Indeed, the existence of recursion inany cognitive domain appears to be highly problematic for non-symbolic approachesto cognition because recursion qua computational property is dened in essentiallysymbolic terms (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This problem becomes even more pressingsince most classical models of cognition rely on recursion to achieve innite produc-tivity. For example, the `language of thought' hypothesis (Fodor, 1975) involves theprocessing of recursive structures with respect to most|if not all|kinds of cognitivebehavior. However, in their recent defense of the classical position against the threatof connectionism, Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) concentrate on language as a paradigmcase for symbolic processing involving recursion. More specically, they argue that\the empirical arguments for [recursive] productivity have been made most frequentlyin connection with linguistic competence" (p. 34); and that \linguistic capacity is aparadigm of systematic cognition" (p. 37). Consequently, the productivity and sys-tematicity arguments they provide in favor of the classical position are all based eitherdirectly on language, i.e., linguistic capacity, or indirectly on language related behavior,i.e., verbal reasoning.Crucially, the existence of recursion in natural language presupposes that the gram-mars of linguistic theory correspond to real mental structures, rather than mere struc-tural descriptions of language per se. Yet, there are no a priori reasons for assumingthat the structure of the observable public language necessarily must dictate the formof our internal representations (Stabler, 1983; van Gelder, 1990b). Nevertheless, what-ever system of internal representations we might want to posit instead of the traditional77
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 78linguistic grammars, it must be able to account for the diversity of language behavior.As pointed out in chapter 2, connectionist models are able to deal with a certain kindof recursion: iterative recursion (i-recursion). Chapter 3 demonstrated that recurrentneural networks moreover are capable of processing a limited amount of non-iterativerecursion (ni-recursion) and, furthermore, exhibit a graceful degradation of performancecomparable with that of humans. However, it remains to be seen whether such modelscan learn the regularities underlying grammars involving both i- and ni-recursion, and,at the same time, display a human-like performance.In the present chapter, I address this question via two simulation experiments inwhich simple recurrent networks are trained on grammars incorporating left- and righti-recursion as well as ni-recursion, either in the form of center-embeddings or cross-dependencies. The rst section describes the two grammars used in the experiments.The training regime adopted here is that of incremental memory learning (Elman,1991b, 1993) which simulates the eects of maturational constraints on the acquisitionprocess. The next section reports the results, with general performance rst followed bythe performance on ni- and i-recursive structures, respectively. Section 3 discusses theissue of generalization in connectionist models, outlines a formalization of linguisticgeneralization, and presents simulation results suggesting that connectionist modelsmay be able to attain a powerful kind of generalization. Finally, I discuss the prospectsfor this type of networks as models of language learning and processing.4.1 Learning Complex GrammarsThe simulations presented in this chapter build on, and extend, the results from chapter3 as well as simulation work reported in Chater (1989), Chater & Conkey (1992),Cleeremans, Servan-Schreiber & McClelland (1989), Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans &McClelland (1989, 1991), and most notably in Christiansen & Chater (1994), Elman(1991a, 1991b , 1992, 1993), and Weckerly & Elman (1992). In the present simulationexperiments, a simple recurrent network was trained to derive grammatical categoriesgiven sentences generated by a phrase structure grammar. Two grammars were usedin these experiments, both involving left- and right i-recursion but diering in the kindof ni-recursion they incorporated. Whereas the grammar shown in Figure 4.1 allowscenter-embedding, the one illustrated in Figure 4.2 aords cross-dependencies. Bothgrammars use the same small vocabulary, presented in Figure 4.3, consisting of twoproper nouns, three singular nouns, ve plural nouns, eight verbs in both plural andsingular form, a singular and a plural genitive marker, three prepositions, and three(`locative') nouns to be used with the prepositions.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 79------SNPVPrelPPgen NP VP \."who NP V(tjo) j who VPprep prepNPropN j N j N rel j N PP j gen N j N and NPV(i) j V(t) NP j V(o) (NP) j V(c) that SN \s" j gen N \s"+ +Figure 4.1. The phrase structure grammar incorporating center-embedded as well as left-and right-recursive structures.--------SSSNPVPrelPPgen NP VP \."N1 N2 V(tjo)1 V(i)2 j N1 N2 N V(tjo)1 V(tjo)2N1 N2 N3 V(tjo)1 V(tjo)2 V(i)3 j N1 N2 N3 N V(tjo)1 V(tjo)2 V(tjo)3who VPprep prepNPropN j N j N rel j N PP j gen N j N and NPV(i) j V(t) NP j V(o) (NP) j V(c) that SN \s" j gen N \s"+ +Figure 4.2. The phrase structure grammar incorporating crossed dependencies as well asleft- and right-recursive structures.--------PropNNV(i)V(t)V(o)V(c)prepprepN fJohn, Marygfboy, boys, girl, girls, man, men, cats, dogsgfjumps, jump, runs, rungfloves, love, chases, chasegfsees, seegfthinks, think, says, say, knows, knowgfnear, from, ingftown, lake, citygFigure 4.3. The vocabulary used with the two grammars (singular forms are placed beforetheir corresponding plural forms where appropriate).
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 80Importantly, the grammars are signicantly more complex than the one used byElman (1991a, 1992). The latter involved subject noun/verb number agreement, verbswhich diered with respect to their argument structure (intransitive, transitive, andoptionally transitive verbs), and relative clauses (allowing for multiple embeddings withcomplex agreement structures). I have extended this grammar by adding prepositionalmodications of noun phrases (e.g., `boy from town'), left recursive genitives (e.g.,`Mary's boy's cats'), conjunction of noun phrases (e.g., `John and Mary'), and sententialcomplements (e.g., `John says that Mary runs'). In the cross-dependency grammar, theobject relative clause (which creates center-embedding) has been removed. Instead,four additional expansions of S have been added to allow for crossed dependencies(see section 4.2.2 for further explanation)1. Both grammars can generate the followingsample sentences involving i-recursive structures:Mary knows that John's boys' cats see dogs.boy loves girl from city near lake.man who chases girls in town thinks that Mary jumps.John says that cats and dogs run.Mary who loves John thinks that men say that girls chase boys.In addition, the center-embedding grammar are able to produce ni-recursive sentencessuch as:girl who men chase loves cats.cats who John who dogs love chases run.These two sentences can be rephrased in terms of subject relative clauses; that is,as `men chase girl who loves cats' and `dogs love John who chases cats who run', re-spectively. The cross-dependency grammar, on the other hand, can express the samesentential content in this way:men girl cats chase loves.dogs John cats love chases run.Notice that the cross-dependency grammar can also rephrase these two sentences interms of subject relative clauses.1The cross-dependency grammar is supposed to correspond to a Dutch grammar, even though thevocabulary used for convenience is English (Figure 3). This also means that the semantic constraintson cross-dependency structures in Dutch are likely to be violated. As pointed out to me by PaulineKleingeld (a native Dutch speaker), Dutch cross-dependency structures are limited to constructs ex-pressing something which can be observed together. However, the lack of such semantic constraintsare not important for the present simulations, since the latter only deals with syntax.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 81The results from the previous chapter showed no marked dierence in the learningability of simple recurrent networks (Elman, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991a) compared withnetworks using back-propagation through time (Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams, 1986).I therefore chose to use only the former in the present simulations because it is muchless expensive in computational terms, and, perhaps, more cognitively plausible. Recallthat this kind of network is a standard feedforward network equipped with an extralayer of so-called context units to which the activation of the hidden unit layer at timet is copied over and used as additional input at t + 1 (see also Figure 3.5 in chapter3). The nets used here had 42 input/output units2 and 150 hidden units (a 42{150{42conguration) with an additional 150 context units. Each net was trained on a nextword prediction task using incremental memory learning as proposed by Elman (1991b,1993), providing the net with a memory window which \grows" as training progresses.Pilot simulations had suggested using a learning rate of 0.1, no momentum, and aninitial randomization of the weights between 0.001. All training sets used in thesimulations consisted of 10,000 randomly generated sentences of variable length andcomplexity. Sentences in the training sets generated by the center-embedding grammarhad an approximate mean length of 6 words (sd: 2.5). The cross-dependency grammaralso produced sentences with a mean length of about 6 words (sd: 2.0).The training, using the incremental memory learning strategy, progressed as follows:First, the center-embedding net was trained for 12 epochs and the cross-dependency netfor 10 epochs on their respective training sets. To simulate an initially limited memorycapacity, the context units were reset randomly after every three or four words. Thetraining sets were then discarded, and both nets trained for 5 epochs on new trainingsets, now with a memory window of 4{5 words. This process was repeated for twoconsecutive periods of 5 epochs, each on dierent training sets with a memory windowof 5{6 words and 6{7 words, respectively. Finally, the nets were trained for 5 epochson new training sets, this time without any memory limitations3. The growing mem-ory window is assumed to reect decreasing constraints on a child's memory abilitiesfollowing maturational changes, ending up with the full adult system (Elman, 1993).Other simulations (not reported in detail here) have shown that `adult' networks|that2Of the 42 input/output units only 38 were used to represent the vocabulary and other lexicalmaterial in a localist format (the remaining four units were saved for other purposes not mentionedfurther here). The choice of the localist representation over the compressed representation used inexperiment 2 in chapter 3 was motivated by the need to separate simultaneous activations of bothsingle and plural items.3Although the center-embedding net was trained for 32 epochs and the cross-dependency net for 30epochs, preliminary results from other simulations, presently underway, suggest that optimal perfor-mance is reachable after much less training.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 82is, nets not undergoing simulated maturational changes|cannot learn the grammati-cal regularities of the two grammars in a satisfactory way4. This corroborates similarresults presented in Elman (1991b, 1993) and in Goldowsky & Newport (1993), sug-gesting that the initial memory limitations of children may, at least in part, help withthe bootstrapping of linguistic structure. Data from rst and second language learningfurther supports this `less is more' hypothesis (Newport, 1990|for further discussionof maturational constraints on learning, see chapter 5, section 5.3)4.2 ResultsIn order to provide an independent basis for the assessment of general network per-formance on the two grammars, the simple statistical prediction method developed inconnection with the previous chapter, was adjusted to produce n-gram given the datafrom either grammar. It should be noted that this program was only trained on thetraining set that the networks saw in their nal ve epochs of training. However, giventhe size of the training sets this should not lead to a signicant decrease in performancecompared with that of the nets.4.2.1 General PerformanceBoth the net trained on sentences from the center-embedding grammar and the nettrained on sentences from the cross-dependency grammar performed very well. Theiroverall performance was comparable with general net performance in the two exper-iments reported in chapter 3 (see also section 4.3.4 on generalization tests). Moreinterestingly, both nets were able to surpass n-gram based performance, indicatingthat the nets are doing more than just learning n-gram statistics.Performance on the Center-embedding GrammarThe general performance on the center-embedded grammar in Figure 4.1 was assessedon a test set consisting of 10,000 randomly generated sentences (mean length: 6.13; sd:2.53). The results are presented in table 4.15. The trained network is doing slightlybetter than n-gram based prediction in terms of mean cosines, but reaching the samelevel of mean squared error performance as trigram based prediction. Looking at the4The adult center-embedding and cross-dependency nets were trained for 32 and 30 epochs,respectively.5As in chapter 3, the results were measured not against the target, but against the full conditionalprobabilities in order to take the indeterministic nature of the prediction task into account (see also,chapter 3, footnote 8).
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 83Network/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram errortrained net 0.2169  0.3523 0.7904  0.2702untrained net 9.9506  0.4075 0.3264  0.15271gram 0.4093  0.3650 0.3851  0.21812gram 0.2662  0.3668 0.7084  0.29093gram 0.2255  0.3629 0.7843  0.29484gram 0.2636  0.4142 0.7335  0.31185gram 0.4225  0.5222 0.5499  0.3579Table 4.1. General performance of the net trained on the center-embedding grammar.standard deviation we can also see that the net is more consistent in its predictions(albeit all standard deviations are relatively high6). Notice the 97% decrease of themean squared error (from 9.9506 for the untrained net to 0.2169 for the trained net).The training induced increase in performance measured via the mean cosine is animpressive 142%|almost 2.5 times better than the untrained performance (from cos =0:3264 to cos = 0:7904). Together with the low performance obtained by merely makingpredictions according to the basic relative frequency of the words in the training set(1gram) this strongly suggests that a considerable amount of sequential structure hasbeen learned by the net. Moreover, although the overall performance of the adultnet (MSE: 0.2142  0.3467; mean cosine: 0.7989  0.2698) is comparable with thethat of the maturationally constrained net, a more detailed analysis of the former'spredictions showed that it performed signicantly worse on complex structures such ascenter-embedding.Performance on the Cross-dependency GrammarThe network trained on sentences produced by the cross-dependency grammar in Figure2 was tested for general performance on 10,000 randomly generated sentences (meanlength: 5.98; sd: 2.01), and the results reported in table 4.2. This net was ableto surpass n-gram based predictions both in terms of mean cosine and mean squarederror, distancing itself more clearly from trigram based performance than in the center-embedding case above. Overall, standard deviations are similar to what was found inthe previous simulation (that is, still rather high). Again, we see a signicant increasein performance as a consequence of learning. The mean squared error was reduced by6These high standard deviations hide the fact that the errors made by both the center-embeddingand the cross-dependency nets generally increased gradually with sentence length (see the detailedresults below), whereas n-gram errors remained slightly more constant.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 84Network/ Mean squared Mean Cosinen-gram errortrained net 0.1931  0.3436 0.8100  0.2516untrained net 9.9283  0.4162 0.3597  0.19891gram 0.4014  0.3722 0.4304  0.21552gram 0.2758  0.3697 0.6547  0.31163gram 0.2264  0.3655 0.7646  0.30144gram 0.2618  0.4225 0.7247  0.30275gram 0.4430  0.5087 0.4977  0.3484Table 4.2. General performance of the net trained on the cross-dependency grammar.98% (decreasing it from 9.9283 to 0.1931) and the mean cosine performance improvedby 125% (from cos = 0:3597 for the untrained net to cos = 0:81 after training). And,once more, it is clear that predictions based on relative word frequency are highlyinadequate for the task at hand. Finally, the detailed behavior on complex structuresevinced by the net trained using the incremental memory strategy again surpassed thatof the adult net, even though the two nets displayed a quite similar general performance(adult net: MSE: 01978  0.3461; mean cosine: 07950  0.2482).4.2.2 Performance on Non-iterative Recursive StructuresWe saw above that both nets were able to achieve a level of performance above that ofn-gram based predictions. A more detailed analysis of the latter revealed certain short-comings compared with the nets. Predictions using n-grams are not able to deal withmore complex structures where agreement features have to be remembered over longdistances. The adult nets, on the other hand, were inconsistent in their predictions oncomplex structures. As was to be expected following Elman (1993), the maturationallyconstrained nets were much more consistent in their prediction behavior vis-a-vis com-plex grammatical regularities. Next, we shall see in detail how the nets dealt withmultiple instances of center-embedding and cross-dependency, respectively.Multiple Center-embeddingsIn chapter 3, we saw that nets were able to learn a limited amount of center-embedding(mirror recursion), and furthermore exhibited a behavior similar to that of humans onsimilar structures. Recall that the mirror recursion simulations did not involve instancesof i-recursion, so the nets could concentrate entirely on learning the former. However,in the human case, instances of ni- and i-recursion are interspersed with each other inthe input that children receive. It therefore remains to be seen whether a net can learn
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 856 6 6??cats who John who dogs love chases runFigure 4.4. An illustration of the subject noun/verb agreement dependencies (arrows below)and the object nouns of the transitive verbs (the arrows above) in the doubly center-embeddedsentence `cats who John who dogs love chases run'.a limited degree of ni-recursion from input also incorporating i-recursive structures.Elman (1991b, 1993) has demonstrated that some ni-recursion can be achieved when anet is trained on input with center-embeddings and a single kind of i-recursion (in theform of right-branching subject relative clauses). In the present simulation based on thegrammar in Figure 4.1., the net was faced with the much more complex task of learningni-recursive regularities from input also containing several instances of right-branchingi-recursion (sentential complements, prepositional modications of NPs, conjunctionof NPs, and subject relative clauses) as well as instances of left-branching i-recursion(prenominal genitives).Figure 4.4 provides an illustration of the dependency structure involved in theprocessing of the multiple center-embedded sentence `cats who John who dogs lovechases run'. Notice that the two object relative clauses require transitive verbs whichhave the two rst nouns as their object (hence creating the double center-embedding).Figure 4.5 shows the prediction made by the net (in terms of summed activations)when processing each word in the above sentence7.In (a), we see the initial state of the network at the beginning of a sentence. Herethe net is expecting either a singular or a plural noun. Having received `cats : : : ' in (b)the net predicts that it will get a plural verb, `who', `and', a preposition, or a singulargenitive marker (the last three predictions are in misc). Next, the net anticipatesreceiving either a noun or a plural verb in (c). Given the context `cats who John : : : 'as in (d) the net correctly predicts a transitive singular verb, because it has realized thatan object relative clause has begun (see Figure 4.4), another `who', an `and', a singulargenitive marker, or a preposition starting a PP modication of John. The picture in(e) is similar to that of (c)|except that the net is predicting a singular verb. In (f),the net rightly presupposes that yet another object relative clause may have begun and7In Figure 4.5 and 4.7, s-N refers to proper/singular nouns; p-N to plural nouns; s-iV, s-tV, ands-cV to singular intransitive, transitive verbs plus optionally transitive, and clausal verbs, respectively;p-iV, p-tV, and p-cV to plural intransitive, transitive verbs plus optionally transitive, and clausalverbs, respectively; wh to who; eos to end of sentence marker, and misc to that, and, genitive markers,prepositions, and the nouns used with the prepositions.

















































































































cats who John who dogs ...
(f)
Figure 4.5. Network predictions after each word in the center-embedded sentence `cats whoJohn who dogs love chases run'.
























































cats who John who dogs love chases run ...
(i)
Figure 4.5. continued.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 88predicts a plural transitive verb to match with `dogs, or, alternatively, a third `who',an `and', a plural genitive marker, or a preposition. Problems arise in (g) when the netis supposed to predict the second verb whose subject noun is `John'. The net wronglyactivates the end of sentence marker, the plural verbs as well as the intransitive andclausal forms of the singular verbs. The net should only have activated the transitive(and optionally transitive) singular verbs. That the latter have the highest activationof all the verb forms at least suggests that the net is going in the right direction. Again,in (h) we see that the net is somewhat o target. It should only have predicted pluralverb forms, but also activated both nouns, singular verbs, and the end of sentencemarker. Nevertheless, the net is able to correctly predict the end of sentence marker,once it has received the last verb, `run', in (i).The sudden breakdown of performance in (g) is not as detrimental for the net asa model of language acquisition and processing as one might initially think. In fact,this breakdown pattern closely follows the observed problems that humans have withsimilar sentences assessed in terms of recall (Miller & Isard, 1964), comprehension(even after some training on center-embedded structures, Larkin & Burns, 1977), andgrammaticality judgements (Marks, 1968). Moreover, whereas the net had signicantproblems with doubly center-embedded sentences|as we saw above|it had no, orvery little, trouble with sentences involving a single center-embedding. This has alsobeen demonstrated in the human case (Bach, Brown & Marslen-Wilson, 1986; Larkin& Burns, 1977; Marks, 1968; Miller & Isard, 1964). This means that not only was thenet able to reproduce the behavior observed on center-embedded structures in chapter3 given considerably more complex input, but its performance also closely mimickedhuman processing behavior on the same sentence structures8. So, at least, when itcomes to center-embedding, simple recurrent networks are viable candidates as modelsof human sentences processing. Next, we shall take a closer look at the detailed behaviorof the network trained on the cross-dependency grammar from Figure 4.2.Multiple Cross-dependenciesIn contrast to the simulation involving the center-embedding grammar from Figure 4.1,there seems to be no precursors for the simulation incorporating the cross-dependencygrammar, save the identity recursion simulations reported in the previous chapter.8It should be noted, however, that this is not meant to suggest that humans would exhibit the exactsame breakdown pattern, only that they will experience similar processing diculties. For example,concerning Figure 4.5(g) this means that one cannot take the erroneous activation of eos as indicatingthat humans would predict end of sentence at this point. Instead, activations of illegal categories shouldbe taken throughout this chapter as indications of processing diculties.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 896 6 6? ?dogs John cats love chases runFigure 4.6. An illustration of the subject noun/verb agreement dependencies (arrows below)and the object nouns of the transitive verbs (the arrows above) in the sentence `dogs John catslove chases run' with two crossed dependencies.The latter simulations demonstrated that recurrent networks were able to learn somedegree of cross-dependency recursion, and, furthermore, display a behavior similar tothat of humans on similar structure. This was not a trivial nding given that cross-dependencies are taken to require the power of context-sensitive languages. Nonethe-less, as in the mirror recursion case, the training sets used to induce the regularitiesunderlying identity recursion did not involve any instances of i-recursion. To allow amore close comparison with natural language, the present cross-dependency simulationadditionally incorporates the same right- and left-branching i-recursive structures as inthe center-embedding simulation.Figure 4.6 shows the structure of the crossed subject noun/verb dependencies inthe sentence `dogs John cats love chases run' as well as the object nouns of the twotransitive verbs. Recall that this sentence structure is meant to correspond to Dutchwith an English gloss. In Dutch, crossed dependencies allow the objects of transitiveverbs to follow the latter's subject nouns. So, in Figure 4.6 we see `John' following themain subject noun `dogs' as the object of the main verb `love'. `John' is also the subjectof the rst subordinate clause with `chases' as its verb and with `cats' as its object.The latter is located as the third consecutive noun and is, in turn, the subject of asecond subordinate clause having `run' as its verb. Figure 4.7 illustrates the behaviorof the network when processing the above sentence involving two crossed dependencies.The rst histogram (a) shows that the net always expects a noun as the rst wordin a sentence. When it receives `dogs' in (b), it predicts that the next word is eitheranother noun (leading to crossed dependencies), a plural verb of any form, `who', `and',a preposition, or a plural genitive marker (the last three predictions are collapsed inmisc). Having seen `dogs John : : : ', the net recognizes in (c) that it is receiving asentence with, at least, one crossed dependency, and correctly anticipates either anoun or a plural transitive verb as the subsequent input. This pattern is replicated in(d) after the net is fed a third noun, `cats'. Given `love' as input in (e), the net rightlyactivates the singular transitive verbs to match with `John' (see Figure 4.6), but alsoerroneously activates the plural transitive verbs. Notice that the correct activationsare twice as high as the incorrect activations. In (f) the erroneous activations have

















































































































dogs John cats love chases ...
(f)
Figure 4.7. Network predictions after each word in the cross-dependency sentence dogs Johncats love chases run.'.


















dogs John cats love chases run ...
(g)
Figure 4.7. continued.diminished. The net appropriately predicts a plural verb and the end of sentencemarker, but wrongly activates singular verb forms. Following the last verb `run' in (g),the net condently predicts end of sentence as it should.As it was the case in the center-embedding simulation, the present network experi-ences problems when it is to predict the second verb in (e). However, the breakdown ofperformance here is not as severe as with the net trained on the center-embedding gram-mar. Moreover, the recovery from the problems following the second verb predictionalso appears to be better. This dierence could be a consequence of a heavier memoryload in the processing of the center-embedded sentence because of the additional twoinstances of `who' before the rst verb is encountered. No such dierence was observedin the simulations presented in chapter 3. Still, it is worth noticing that humans appearto perform better on cross-dependency structures than on center-embedded construc-tions of similar depth (Bach, Brown & Marslen-Wilson, 1986). So, in this way thedierence in performance between the net trained on the center-embedding grammarand the net trained on the cross-dependency grammar may reect a real dierencein the learnability and processability between the languages that the two grammarsgenerate|at least, insofar as the same dierence is also found in human performance.But, can the two nets perform equal to humans on i-recursive structures? I turn tothis question next.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 924.2.3 Performance on Iterative Recursive StructuresThe results presented above suggested that the nets were able to deal with ni-recursionin a human-like manner. In chapter 2, I argued that a model of language not onlyshould be able to process a limited degree of ni-recursion, but also must be able tohandle a considerable amount of left- and right-branching i-recursion. The followingfour subsections report the nets' behavior on left-recursive structures exemplied bymultiple prenominal genitives and right-recursive structures instantiated by multipleembeddings of sentential complements, multiple subject relative clauses, and multipleprepositional modications of NPs. Since the two nets exhibited very similar behavioron these i-recursive structures, I only report two examples from each net as illustrationsof their common level of performance.Multiple Prenominal GenitivesLeft-branching i-recursive structures are not frequent in English which is a predom-inately right-branching language (as opposed to, e.g., Japanese). The left-branchingconstruction that presumably occurs most often in English is the prenominal genitivephrase. This construction permits the modication of nouns in a left-branching fash-ion as when we want to express the complex ownership of a given cat in terms of thephrase `Bob's teacher's mother's cat'. Figure 4.8 demonstrates the patterns of acti-vation (in the cross-dependency trained net) when processing selected words in thesentence `Mary's boys' cats' John sees' with three prenominal genitives9.We have already seen the initial activation patterns of both nets in Figures 4.5 and4.7. In (a), the net is predicting from the context of `Mary : : : ', suggesting that thenext input will be a noun, a singular verb, a singular genitive marker, a preposition,`and', or `who' (the activation of the last three being collapsed in misc). Once the netreceives the singular genitive marker, it expects that a noun must be next in (b). Giventhe plural noun `boys' in (c) the net predicts that the next word is either a plural verbor a plural genitive marker. When the net subsequently gets another genitive markeras its input, it activates singular and plural nouns only (not shown here, but similarlyto (b)). Next, following the input of `cats' in (d), we have an activation pattern similarto (c)|albeit the activation is lower for both the plural verbs and the plural genitivemarker, and a small erroneous activation of the end of sentence marker appears. The9In the remaining gures in this chapter, the verb forms have been collapsed into a set of singularverbs s-V and a set of plural verbs p-V. The single and plural genitive marker have been separatedfrom the misc group as, respectively, s-g and p-g. The group misc in Figure 4.8 covers activations ofthat, who, and, prepositions, and the nouns used with the latter.

















































































































Mary’s boys’ cats’ John sees ...
(f)
Figure 4.8. Network predictions after selected words in a sentence with multiple prenominalgenitives: `Mary's boys' cats' John sees'.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 94net's problems grow somewhat in (e), showing the correct prediction of a singularverb, the singular genitive marker as well as a small activation of `and', `who' and theprepositions, but also the incorrect prediction of a plural verb and, again, the end ofsentence marker. The net gets back on track in (f), expecting either an object noun oran end of sentence marker after `sees'. Thus, it seems that the net is able to deal withleft-branching i-recursion but in a, perhaps, non-optimal fashion given the apparentincrease in error following the increase in recursion depth. I will return to this pointlater, and continue with an illustration of net behavior during the processing of multiplesentential complements.Multiple Embeddings of Sentential ComplementsSentential complements provide a convenient way of expressing, for instance, propo-sitional attitudes in English, such as, `Mary thinks that cats chase dogs'. Figure 4.9depicts the activation patterns (in the net trained on the center-embedding grammar)observed when processing the sentence `Mary says that men think that John knows thatcats run' which incorporates three sentential complements10.Having received `Mary : : : ' in (a), the net predicts that the next word will be eithera singular verb, a singular genitive marker, a preposition, `and', or `who' (with the lastthree predictions grouped together in misc). In (b), the net has received the clausalverb `says' and correctly predicts that the complementizer `that' must come next. Afterthe complementizer has been given to the net as input, only a noun can follow, whichis what the net predicts in (c). When the net receives the predicted noun, in thiscase `men', the activation pattern displayed in (d) is similar to that of (a)|save thecorrect prediction of a plural verb matching the plural input noun. The subsequent veprediction patterns follow exactly the previous patterns in the order (b), (c), (a), (b),(c) (and they will therefore not be shown here). The pattern of summed activation asillustrated in (e) is similar to (d), but produced given the context of `Mary says that menthink that John knows that cats : : : '. Finally, we see in (f) that the net rightly predictsthe end of sentence marker after the intransitive verb `run'. It is clear that the nets werebetter at processing sentential complements than prenominal genitives. In fact, therewas no erroneous activation at all. This may suggest that sentential complements arealso easier for humans to process compared with prenominal genitives. Leaving furtherdiscussion of this issue for later, I now describe the nets ability to process multipleobject relative clauses.10Note that the complementizer `that' has been separated from the misc group. Otherwise, the labelsin Figure 4.9 are the same as in the previous gure.

















































































































Mary says that men think that John knows that cats run ...
(f)
Figure 4.9. Network predictions after selected words in a sentence with multiple sententialcomplements: `Mary says that men think that John knows that cats run'.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 96Multiple Right-embedded Relative ClausesAs mentioned earlier, right-embedded relative clauses allow us to rephrase the contentof both center-embedded and cross-dependency sentences in a more readily understand-able form. Thus, both the center-embedded and the cross-dependency sentences abovecan be rewritten as `dogs love John who chases cats who run'. Numerous studies havedemonstrated that multiple subject relative clauses are considerably easier to processthan center-embedded sentences (Blaubergs & Braine, 1974; Foss & Cairns, 1970; King& Just, 1991; Marks, 1968; Miller & Isard, 1964) and cross-dependency sentences (Bach,Brown & Marslen-Wilson, 1986) of a similar depths of recursion. Figure 4.10 showsthe behavior of the (cross-dependency grammar trained) network whilst processing thesentence `dogs love John who chases cats who see Mary who chases girls' involving threeright-embedded relative clauses11.First, the pattern of summed activation pattern given the context `dogs love : : : 'is presented in (a), depicting an activation of the nouns as objects of the transitiveverb. Next, the net predicts either `who, the singular genitive marker, end of sentence,a preposition, or `and' (the last two collapsed in the misc group). The net also has anincorrect, but insignicant, activation of the verbs. In (c), we also nd a very smallerroneous activation of the plural verbs which is dwarfed by the correct activation of thesingular verbs. When the net subsequently gets `chases' as input, it again predicts onlynouns as in (a). Having received `cats' in (d), the net produce a pattern of activationsimilar to (b), but with the plural genitive marker activated instead of the singularone. Given a second `who' in (e), the net rightly predicts a plural verb with some minorincorrect activations of the singular verbs. Presented with the optionally transitive verb`see' in (f), either an object noun or an end of sentence marker is correctly predictedby the net. The previous erroneous activation have now become somewhat higher asexhibited by the activations of the plural and the singular verb forms. As we can seefrom (g), the net displays some spurious, but minute, activations of both nouns, verbs,and the plural genitive marker, all of which are not allowed in the context of `dogslove John who chases cats who see Mary : : : '. Still, it by far rightly predicts `who',a singular genitive marker, end of sentence, a preposition, and a conjunction. Theprediction pattern in (h) is similar to that of (c), although the singular verb group isactivated less strongly and the wrong activations slightly more pronounced this time.A comparison between the noun predictions in (a) and in (i)|both following transitiveverbs|indicates that the net has become less condent in its predictions as the number11In this gure, `who' has been separated from the misc group. The remaining labels correspond tothose of Figure 4.8.

















































































































dogs love John who chases cats who see ...
(f)
Figure 4.10. Network predictions after selected words in a sentence with multiple rightrelative clauses: `dogs love John who chases cats who see Mary who chases girls'.











































































dogs love John who chases cats who see Mary who chases girls ...
(j)
Figure 4.10. continued.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 99of embeddings increase. The predictions shown in the last histogram (j) continues thistendency with spurious, mistaken activation of the nouns and verbs, and decreasedcondence in the correct predictions of `who', end of sentence, and the prepositions.It thus seems that net performance on subject relative clauses, though superior toperformance on ni-recursive structures of a similar degree of embedding, nonethelessshow evidence of degradation as sentence length increases. I will return to this afteroutlining net behavior on sentences involving multiple prepositional modications ofan NP.Multiple Prepositional Modications of NPsThe nal example of i-recursion in the present simulations addresses the processingof complex NPs, such as, `the owers in the vase on the table near the box'. Suchmultiple instances of prepositional modications of NPs are notorious for their inherentambiguity. For instance, is it the vase or the table which is near the box? Leavingthese ambiguity issues aside here (they also concern ambiguity concerning NP or VPattachment of the PP), I focus on simple right-branching PPs modifying a noun. Figure4.11 demonstrates the behavior of the (center-embedding trained) network during theprocessing of the sentence `cats from lake in town near city chase girls' incorporatingtwo PP embeddings12.Given the context of `cats from : : : ' in (a), the net condently predicts that thefollowing word must be one of the nouns used with the prepositions. Next, in (b) thenet rightly expects either a plural noun or another preposition, but also produce a smallamount of erroneous activation of the singular verbs and the end of sentence marker.As in (a), the net has no problems predicting another preposition noun subsequentto receiving the preposition `in' (not shown). In (c), the pattern of (b) repeats itselfwith the correct activations of plural verbs and prepositions, but with some mistaken,minor activation of the singular verbs and the end of sentence marker. This pattern oferror becomes slightly more evident in (d), which also displays a reduced condence inthe right predictions given the context `cats from lake in town near city : : : '. Havingreceived `chase', the verb that the net was waiting for, it recovers and predicts that anoun must come next as the obligatory object of transitive input verb. Finally, the netmakes the appropriate predictions in (f) following `dogs'; that is, either the next wordis a preposition, a plural genitive marker, end of sentence, `who', or `and'. As with theright-branching relative clauses exemplied in Figure 4.10, there is a tendency for the12In Figure 4.11, the prepositions and their nouns have been separated from the misc group. Theremaining labels correspond to those of Figure 4.8.

















































































































cats from lake in town near city chase dogs ...
(f)
Figure 4.11. Network predictions after selected words in a sentence with multiple PP mod-ications of the subject noun, `cats from lake in town near city chase girls'.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE101performance to degrade as the degree of i-recursive complexity increases.Given the patterns of slow degradation of performance on all the i-recursive struc-tures, save the case of multiple sentential complements, the question is whether thesepatterns are comparable with observed human limitations on similar structures. Wehave already seen that net performance on both center-embedded and cross-dependencystructures closely mimicked human behavior on the same ni-recursive constructs. Itis typically assumed that humans are able to deal with i-recursive structures of an inprinciple unbounded length. In classical parsers, incorporating grammars consistingof a recursive set of rules and some kind of stack memory structure (as described inchapter 2), both left- and right branching i-recursive structures of an innite lengthcan be processed|even when a limit is imposed on the stack depth. This is becausei-recursion allows the parser to clear its memory at the start of each recursive level.The stack memory is therefore not in danger of being exhausted as, for example, in thecase of center-embedded structures (see Figure 2.3 in chapter 2, for more details on thelatter).It is, however, not clear that humans have such an innite capacity for i-recursion.Indeed, it appears (from a literature search and communication with colleagues) thathuman performance on i-recursive structures have not been studied explicitly. That is,the purported human ability to deal with an unlimited length of i-recursion has, to myknowledge, never been demonstrated in an experimental context. In fact, evidence ex-ists pointing in the opposite direction and, in part, corroborating the simulation resultson subject relative clauses as illustrated in Figure 4.10. When comparing sentencescontaining multiple center-embeddings with sentences consisting of multiple subjectrelative clauses, Blaubergs & Braine (1974) found that the comprehension of the lat-ter also decreased (almost) proportionally with the increase in i-recursive complexity(contrasted with the more dramatic decrease in the performance on center-embeddedsentences). This is indirectly comparable with the simulation results presented on theprocessing of multiple subject relative clauses. If this connection between network per-formance and human performance on i-recursive structures is genuine, then we mayexpect human performance on multiple instances of both prenominal genitives andprepositional modications of NPs to follow the same kind of degradation relative tosentence complexity. Intuitively, this seems to be the case, but it remains to be testedexperimentally.This still leaves the perfect network performance on the multiple sentential comple-ments, as depicted in Figure 4.9, to be explained. Two explanations, at least, comesto mind. It could be the case that this kind of i-recursive structure is easier for the
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE102nets to process because the two grammars allow fewer prediction choices during theprocessing of these sentences. For example, only `that' can follow a clausal verb, andonly nouns are permitted after this complementizer. In contrast, at most points in theprocessing of the other three i-recursive structures, more than one category is allowed.Human performance on sentential complements might thus be worse than what the netsexhibited because in English `that' can indicate either the start of a relative clause (asin `I saw the house that you grew up in') or the beginning of a sentential complement(as it is used in the sentence in Figure 4.9). Alternatively, the simulation results couldbe taken to suggest that we may nd a qualitative dierence in human performanceon sentences with multiple sentential complements compared with sentences involvingnumerous instances of the other three kinds of i-recursion discussed here. The bottom-line is that the simulation results from the processing of i-recursive structures makecertain predictions which can be tested experimentally13.4.3 Generalization in Connectionist NetworksThe simulation results reported above have suggested that simple recurrent networksare viable models of language processing. It remains to be seen whether they aordthe kind of generalization abilities that we would expect from models of language.Recently, Hadley (1994a) has attacked connectionist models of language learning for notachieving a sucient degree of generalization. He rightly points out that generalizationin much connectionist research has not been viewed in a sophisticated fashion. Testingis typically performed by recording network output given a test set consisting of itemsnot occurring in the original training set (as it, admittedly, was the case in experiment2 in chapter 3). Hadley, in eect, criticizes connectionists for not going beyond usingtraining and test sets which have been put together according to convenience. Hetherefore challenges connectionists to adopt a more methodological training and testingregime. I have already addressed this challenge elsewhere (in Christiansen & Chater,1994|but see also the reply by Niklasson & van Gelder, 1994, and Hadley, 1994b, fora response to both replies), and I report and extend those results here14.13Importantly, the kind of performance degradation reported here was found to be a general trendthroughout my exploratory simulations using nets of varying sizes and dierent congurations (suchas, the auto-associative simple recurrent network of Maskara & Noetzel, 1992, 1993).14The discussion of of Hadley's (1994a) notion of syntactic position and the formalization thereofis based on Christiansen & Chater (1994). The simulation results presented here are new and diersomewhat from the ones reported in the latter paper.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE1034.3.1 Degrees of SystematicityIn an eort to operationalize Fodor & Pylyshyn's (1988) abstract criticism of connec-tionism, Hadley (1994a) has dened dierent degrees to which a language learningsystem can generalize from experience, what he calls dierent degrees of systematic-ity. In his paper, he focuses on syntactic generalization, presenting notions of weak,quasi- and strong systematicity as benchmarks for connectionist models (`c-nets' inHadley's terminology). As we shall see below, these denitions are rather vague inso-far as more complex grammatical structure is concerned|as, e.g., in the simulationsreported above. Despite Christiansen & Chater's (1994) criticism of this fact, andHadley's (personal communication) acknowledgement of it, these denitions are re-iterated in Hadley (1994b). Before we turn to Christiansen & Chater's discussion, andsubsequent formalization, of Hadley's notions of syntactic systematicity, a brief look athis denitions are in order.According to Hadley (1994a) \a c-net exhibits at least weak systematicity if it iscapable of successfully processing (by recognizing or interpreting) novel test sentences,once the c-net has been trained on a corpus of sentences which are representative" (p.6). A training corpus is `representative' if \every word (noun, verb, etc.) that occurs insome sentence of the corpus also occurs (at some point) in every permissible syntacticposition" (p. 6). Quasi-systematicity can be ascribed to a system if \(a) the system canexhibit at least weak systematicity, (b) the system successfully processes novel sentencescontaining embedded sentences, such that both the larger containing sentence and theembedded sentence are (respectively) structurally isomorphic to various sentences inthe training corpus, (c) for each successfully processed novel sentence containing aword in an embedded sentence (e.g., `Bob knows that Mary saw Tom') there existssome simple sentence in the training corpus which contains that same word in thesame syntactic position as it occurs within the embedded sentence (e.g., `Jane sawTom')" (p. 6{7). Finally, a system will exhibit strong systematicity if \(i) it can exhibitweak systematicity, (ii) it can correctly process a variety of novel simple sentences andnovel embedded sentences containing previously learned words in positions where theydo not appear in the training corpus (i.e. the word within the novel sentence does notappear in that same syntactic position within any simple or embedded sentence in thetraining corpus)" (p. 7).Central to each denition is the notion of `syntactic position', which may or maynot be shared between items in the training and test sets. Since syntactic position isnot a standard term in linguistics, and since it is not discussed in either of Hadley's(1994a, 1994) papers, it is necessary to examine his examples to discover what meaning
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE104is intended. These are concerned with the relationship between verbs and their argu-ments. The various argument positions of a verb (subject, direct object and indirectobject) are taken to count as distinct syntactic positions. Also, the active and passiveforms of a verb are taken to occupy dierent syntactic positions.If these examples are taken at face value, diculties emerge. For example, a lexicalitem is the subject with respect to some verb whether or not it occurs within anembedded sentence, a simple sentence, or the main clause of a sentence which containsan embedded sentence (and similarly with the other examples). This means that,for Hadley, `John' has the same syntactic position in `John loves Mary' as in `Billthinks that John loves Mary'|indeed, this is explicit in point (c) of the denition ofquasi-systematicity. Nonetheless, it would appear that, according to Hadley, a learningsystem which generalizes from either of these sentence to the other only requires weaksystematicity (since no item occurs in a novel syntactic position). Yet, this seemsto be exactly the kind of case which is supposed to distinguish quasi-systematicityfrom weak systematicity in Hadley's denitions. But, as we see, it appears that weaksystematicity already deals with such cases, if syntactic position is dened in terms ofgrammatical role, since grammatical role abstracts away from embedding. Quasi- andweak systematicity therefore appear to be equivalent.Presumably, either weak or quasi-systematicity is intended to have an additionalcondition, which is not explicit in Hadley's denition. The suggestion is made belowthat quasi-systematicity is only exhibited when the test and training sets contain em-bedded sentences. An alternative interpretation would be that Hadley is implicitlymaking use of a more global notion of syntactic context, which distinguishes the syn-tactic position of a subject in a sentence which contains an embedded clause, and onethat does not, for example15.In order to extend the account beyond the cases of subject and object, a moregeneral account of syntactic position is needed. Christiansen & Chater (1994) havesuggested a possible denition which is presented below. This denition, in turn,allows them to dene what they call three levels of generalization, which are intendedto be close to the spirit of Hadley's original denitions of systematicity.15Hadley (personal communication) seems to lean towards the latter interpretation in a recent revi-sion of his denition of weak systematicity: \the training corpus used to establish weak systematicitymust present every word in every syntactic position and must do so at all levels of embedding foundin the training and test corpus. In contrast, a quasi-systematic system does not have to meet thecondition in the second conjunct, but does satisfy the rst conjunct". Notice that this revision sug-gests that Elman's (1989, 1991a) net might be quasi-systematic after all (pace Hadley, 1994a, p. 17).Interestingly, in Hadley (1994b) the denition of quasi-systematicity is left out.

















(a) (b)Figure 4.12. Phrase structure trees for (a) the simple sentence `John loves Mary' and (b)the complex sentence `Bill thinks John loves Mary'.The syntactic position of a word is dened to be the tree subtended by the imme-diately dominating S or VP node, annotated by the position of the target word withinthat tree. This tree will be bounded below either by terminal nodes (Det, Proper Noun,etc.), or another S or VP-node (i.e., the syntactic structure of embedded sentences orverb phrases is not expanded). For example, consider the phrase structure trees forthe simple sentence `John loves Mary' and the complex sentence `Bill thinks John lovesMary' as shown in Figure 4.12. In a simple sentence like (a), the subject is dened byits relation to the dominating S-node. The object and the verb are dened in relationto the verb phrase. This captures the distinction between subject and object nounpositions. Figure 4.13(a) and (b) depict this distinction, illustrating, respectively, thesyntactic positions of `John' and `Mary'.












V(a) (b)Figure 4.14. The syntactic position of (a) the main verb and (b) the subordinate verb inthe sentence `Bill thinks John loves Mary'.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE1074.3.3 Degrees of GeneralizationUsing this denition of syntactic position, Christiansen & Chater recast Hadley's de-nitions to give three levels of generalization for language learning systems16.i. Weak Generalization: A learning mechanism weakly generalizes if it can general-ize to novel sentences in which no word occurs in a novel syntactic position (i.e.,a syntactic position in which it does not occur during training)17.ii. Quasi-Generalization: A learning mechanism is capable of quasi-generalization ifit can generalize to novel sentences as in (1), with the additional constraint thatembedding must occur in the grammar.iii. Strong Generalization: A learning mechanism strongly generalizes if it can gen-eralize to novel sentences, that is, to sentences in which some (suciently many)words occur in novel syntactic positions. It is furthermore required that em-bedding occurs in the grammar, and that the learning mechanism can stronglygeneralize to both simple and embedded sentences18.Given this denition of strong generalization, consider the following two test sen-tences:John thinks Bill loves Mary.Bill loves Mary.If `Mary' does not occur in the object position in the training set (in either embedded ormain clauses), the syntactic position of `Mary' in both these sentences is novel. Thus,for a net to be ascribed strong generalization, it is necessary that it be able to processboth sentences. On the other hand, if `Mary' did occur in object position even just oncein the training set, then in neither of the two sentences is the syntactic position novel(and the net can therefore, at most, be characterized as capturing quasi-generalization).Thus, the above denitions are meant to capture the spirit of Hadley's (1994) proposals16Note that further formalization may perhaps be needed to capture the full complexity of naturallanguage. However, this would presumably have to take place within a given linguistic framework atthe cost of the inter-theoretical compatibility sought for in Christiansen & Chater (1994).17Note that Hadley's revised denition of weak systematicity (as mentioned in a previous footnote)diers from this notion of weak generalization.18The requirement concerning simple and embedded sentences has been added to the denitionfound in Christiansen & Chater (1994) following worries expressed in Hadley (1994b). He criticizedthe denition of strong generalization for being easier to meet than his notion of strong systematicity,since the latter denition requires that the net be able to process both simple and embedded novelsentences. As it were, the example of strong generalization presented in Christiansen & Chater doesmeet the requirements of this new denition.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE108in a reasonably precise and general way. Next, I present some simulation results whichaim to test how readily these denitions can be met by a simple recurrent network.4.3.4 Generalization ResultsAs a rst step towards meeting the strong generalization criterion described above, Ireport additional results from the simulation involving the cross-dependency grammardepicted in Figure 4.2. Results from the net trained on the center-embedding grammarillustrated in Figure 4.1 were presented in Christiansen & Chater (1994) and will notbe treated in detail here. As mentioned earlier, both simulations build on and extendElman's (1988, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1993) work on training simple recurrentnetworks to learn grammatical structure. However, Hadley (1994a) rightly notes thatthe training regime adopted by Elman does not aord strong systematicity (nor doesit support the notion of strong generalization) since the net by the end of trainingwill have seen all words in all possible syntactic positions. To address the issue ofgeneralization, I therefore imposed an extra constraint on two of the nouns from Figure4.3 (in both their singular and plural form). Thus, I ensured that `girl' and `girls' neveroccurred in a genitive context (e.g., neither `girl's cats' nor `Mary's girls' were allowedin the training set), and that `boy' and `boys' never occurred in the context of a nounphrase conjunction (e.g., both `boys and men' and `John and boy' were disallowed inthe training corpus). Given these constraints I was able to test the net on known wordsin novel syntactic positions as required by the denition of strong generalization andby Hadley's notion of strong systematicity19.Strong Generalization in Genitive ContextRecall that neither `girl' nor `girls' has occurred in a genitive context in any of the train-ing sets. Figure 4.15 illustrates the behavior of the net when processing the sentence`Mary's girls run' in which the known word `girls' occupies the novel syntactic positionconstituted by the genitive context (and the control sentence `Mary's cats run')20.We have already seen evidence of net processing up to the point of `Mary's : : : 'in Figure 4.8(a) and (b)21. Here, in Figure 4.15(a), the behavior of the network is19Hadley (personal communication) has acknowledged both test cases as possible single instances ofstrong systematicity; though these instances might not be sucient to warrant the general ascriptionof strong systematicity to the net as a whole.20The labels are the same as in Figure 4.8.21It should be noted that the net was not able to predict neither `girl' nor `girls' after the genitivemarker in `Mary's : : : ' (Figure 4.8(b)). At rst, this would seem to preclude the ascription of stronggeneralization altogether, a point Hadley (1994b) has stressed. Christiansen & Chater (1994) treatthis as a partial error, but I will argue below that it is an unimportant one and may, perhaps, even be





































Mary’s girls run ...
(b)
Figure 4.15. Network predictions after the last part of the test sentence `Mary's girls run.'(boxes) and in the control sentence `Mary's cats run.' (small squares).shown after having received `girls' as input. The net was able to correctly activatethe plural genitive marker in the test case even though it had never seen a genitivemarker following `girls'. This indicates that the net is able to strongly generalize bypredicting a known lexical item, the genitive marker, in a novel syntactic position, i.e.,following `girls'. The activation of the plural genitive marker is not as high as thecontrol, but it is nevertheless signicant. Notice also that the prediction of a pluralverb is stronger in the test case than in the control. Given the plural verb `run' in (b),the net is fully condent in its expectation of a end of sentence marker (both test andcontrol). Importantly, strong generalization was also found in embedded sentences,such as, `Mary's boys' girls run, thus fullling the requirement of generalization tonovel syntactic positions in both simple and embedded sentences. This positive ndingbecomes even more important, since Christiansen & Chater (1994) failed to obtainstrong generalization in genitive contexts (although a minor activation of the pluralgenitive marker following `girls' did indicate that progress was possible).Strong Generalization in NP ConjunctionsIn contrast to Christiansen & Chater's problems in the genitive context, they reported asuccessful outcome of their testing of noun phrase conjunctions. This is also replicatedbelow|albeit the results here evince a slightly higher degree of error than found inChristiansen & Chater. Figure 4.16 illustrates network behavior during the processingwarranted.
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE110of the sentence `Mary says that John and boy from town see' in which `boy' occurs inthe novel syntactic context of a noun phrase conjunction (contrasted with the controlsentence `Mary says that John and man from town see')22.The patterns of activation produced by the rst four words have been depictedearlier. Given the context `Mary says that John : : : ', the net predicts that the subse-quent word must be either a singular verb, or a modication of `John' starting with apreposition, a conjunction, a singular genitive marker, or `who' (the latter in the miscgroup). The net also minimally activates the nouns which are not permitted here. In(b), the net is rightly condent that only a noun can come next23. Already in (c),we see the net's ability to strongly generalize in the NP conjunction case when it ac-tivates the plural verbs to match the conjoined NP `John and boy'. Recall that thenet has only seen a singular verb following after `boy'. This means that the net has to`overwrite' the statistical correlation between `boy' and single verbs in order to makethe correct generalization that the NP conjunction takes a plural verb. Admittedly,the activation of the plural verbs are not as high as in the control sentence, but isstill signicant. Notice that despite the plural verb prediction, the net still expectsthat a singular genitive marker might be next (or, a preposition or `who'). The netexhibits a minor error by activating the singular verbs slightly (and does not reach thelevel of activation of `and' found in the control sentence). Since the input in (d) isthe preposition `from', the net predicts that the next word must be one of the nounsused with the prepositions. In (e) it is possible to detect two small errors in the net'spredictions concerning the singular verbs and the end of sentence marker. This error isslightly more pronounced here than in the results presented in Christiansen & Chater.Nonetheless, the net still gets the plural verb agreement right across the prepositionalphrase. As pointed out in Christiansen & Chater (1994), this is a considerable feat,since the net thus is able to strongly generalize across several words. In particular, itshows that the net is not simply predicting plural verbs on the basis of having seen an`and' two items before, but has learned the grammatical regularities subserving nounphrase conjunctions. Lastly, (f) demonstrates that not only is the net able to predicta correct end of sentence after `Mary says that John and boy from town see : : : ', butit is also capable of predicting that `see' might take an optional direct object. Asthe net is also able to strongly generalize given NP conjunctions in simple sentences,such as, `John and boy run', the net therefore fulll the additional requirements for theascription of strong generalization dened above.22In Figure 4.16, misc contains only `that' and `who'.23Again, it should be noted that neither `boy' nor `boys' receive anything but very minimal activationcompared with the other nouns. I explain below why this should not be considered problematic.

















































































































Mary says that John and boy from town see ...
(f)
Figure 4.16. Network predictions after each word in the test sentence `Mary says that Johnand boy from town see.' (boxes) and in the control sentence `Mary says that John and manfrom town eat.' (small squares).
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE112While describing network behavior during the processing of the test sentences Inoted that it was not able to predict `girl' and `girls' following a genitive marker and`boy' and `boys' following a conjunction. Hadley (1994b) raises doubts about whetherthe nets therefore can be said to exhibit genuine strong generalization. He suggeststhat they fail to do so: \it is dicult to see why the network's ability to predict onlypreviously encountered nouns, at the crucial novel position, should in any way count asa success (at that position), given that we are testing for the network's generalizationof other nouns into that position" (p. 13). Now, adults, and presumably children too,are able to predict subsequent words given a particular context (Grosjean, 1980). IfHadley's criticism is taken at face value, we would expect children to be able to predictnewly learned words in novel syntactic positions. This seems highly unlikely. Forexample, if a child had never heard the word `boy' in a NP conjunction context, thenshe would arguably never predict `boy' in this position either (if somehow tested)|unless she had semantic or contextual information to tell her otherwise. This is exactlywhat is the case in the language learning studies that Hadley (1994a) refers to (e.g.,Gropen, Pinker, Hollander, Goldberg & Wilson, 1989; Pinker, Lebeaux & Frost, 1987).In these studies children are taught nonsense words, such as, `pilk', and primed to applythem in a novel syntactic context. It seems clear from the elaborate set-up in theseexperiments that this kind of generalization can only be obtained under conditionsof strong semantic and contextual priming. These studies furthermore acknowledgethat children generally appear to be rather conservative language learners. Of course,Hadley (1994b) is right to say that \children are capable of spontaneously producingsentences containing words in novel positions" (p. 13), but such occurrences are rareand, I submit, cued by semantic and/or contextual information. However, the networksused in Christiansen & Chater (1994) and here do not have such information available.The nets can therefore hardly be blamed for not predicting nouns in novel syntacticpositions when no child, relying solely on syntactic information, is likely to be able toperform this task either.Given these considerations, the ascription of strong generalization seems warrantedin the test cases presented here. Whether these two instances of strong generalizationare sucient to endow the system with Hadley's notion of strong systematicity dependson whether four nouns out of a total number of ten nouns count as a \signicantfraction of the vocabulary" (Hadley, 1994a, p. 7). Independent of the answer to thisquestion, we may agree with Hadley that human language learners presumably are ableto strongly generalize in a number of dierent syntactic contexts, more than reportedhere. Yet the net's ability to strongly generalize in both genitive and conjoined NPcontexts suggests that this more widespread, human-like (strong) generalization may
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE113not be beyond simple recurrent networks.4.4 DiscussionIn the current chapter, I have reported a number of simulation results extending thosepresented in chapter 3. In particular, the results here show that simple recurrent net-works appear to have sucient computational power to induce quite complex grammarsinvolving both i-recursive structures and ni-recursive structures (the latter instantiatedas either center-embedding or cross-dependency). Importantly, the nets exhibit thesame kinds of limitations observed (or predicted to be found) in human performanceon both ni- and i-recursive sentence constructions. Moreover, the nets also acquiredan ability for strong generalization (at least, in the two test cases discussed above)comparable to what we may expect from human language learners. Simple recurrentnetworks therefore seem to be viable candidates as models of certain important aspectsof human language acquisition.One limitation of the simulations put forward in both this and the previous chapteris that they do not incorporate semantic or other non-syntactic information. Whethersuch a separation is warranted has been the matter of some controversy. Some re-searchers (e.g., Ferreira & Clifton, 1986; Perfetti, 1990; Rayner, Carlson & Frazier,1983) have suggested that syntactic processing is autonomous from other kinds of lan-guage processing. Others again (e.g., Altmannn & Steedman, 1988; Crain & Steedman,1985; Taraban & McClelland, 1990) have argued that semantic and contextual informa-tion indeed does aect syntactic processing. Although the debate is undecided, recentexperimental evidence reported in, for example, Spivey-Knowlton & Tanenhaus (1994)does point towards the latter position. What is important in the present context is thatwe should, at least, be able to envisage how non-syntactic information may be incorpo-rated in the currently purely syntactic account of language acquisition and processing.Fortunately, a simulation experiment conducted by Weckerly & Elman (1992) showssome indication of how this might be done. They trained a simple recurrent networkon sentences with certain constraints on subject noun/verb combination. More specif-ically, certain animate verbs would only occur with animate subject nouns, whereasother varied freely between animate and inanimate subjects. When testing the net oncenter-embedded structures, a dierence was observed in net performance depending onwhether the verbs in the those sentences were biased towards the animacy/inanimacyof their subject nouns or neutral. As also reported in studies of human subjects testedon semantically biased and neutral center-embedded sentences (e.g., King & Just, 1991;Stolz, 1967), such bias clearly facilitates processing. Of course, the word co-occurrence
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE114bias in the Weckerly & Elman's training set does not correspond to semantics proper.However, it does suggest that children may initially use statistical contingencies in lan-guage to bootstrap their further development of semantics (in a linguistic context|seealso Finch & Chater, 1993, for a similar statistically motivated view). Pointers in thedirection of implementing something closer to contextual processing may be found inSt. John & McClelland's (1990) recurrent network model of the learning and appli-cation of contextual constraints in sentence processing which incorporates incrementalinterpretation. Although extending the simulation results presented in here, and inchapter 3, is not trivial, the results reported in Weckerly & Elman (1992) and St. John& McClelland (1990) indicate, at least, that such an extension is not impossible inprinciple.Another possible limitation concerns the simulation results on strong generalizationpresented in the latter part of this chapter. It is often noted that connectionist andother bottom-up statistical models of language learning will not be able to scale up tosolve human language acquisition because of arguments pertaining to the purportedpoverty of the stimulus. I address these arguments at length in the next chapter.Here it suces to say that there are some evidence that models employing simplestatistical analysis may be able to attain strong generalization. Christiansen & Chater(1994) mention that when Redington, Chater & Finch (1993) applied a method ofdistributional statistics (see also Finch & Chater, 1992, 1993) to a corpus of childdirected speech (the CHILDES corpus collected by MacWhinney & Snow, 1985), theyfound that the syntactic category of a nonsense word could be derived from a singleoccurrence of that word in the training corpus. This indicates that strong generalizationmay be learnable through bottom-up statistical analysis|even on a scale comparablewith that of a child learning her rst language. In this context, it is also importantto note that achieving strong generalization is not only a problem for connectionistmodels of the learning of linguistic structure. As pointed out by Christiansen & Chater(1994), most symbolic models cannot be ascribed strong generalization since they inmost case are spoon-fed the lexical categories of words via syntactic tagging. Thequestion of strong generalization is therefore just as pressing for symbolic approachesas for connectionist approaches to language acquisition. The results presented in thischapter suggest that connectionist models may be closer to solving this problem thantheir symbolic counterparts.Up until now, I have focused on establishing that connectionist models have su-cient computational power and generalization capability to serve as models for naturallanguage learning and processing. Next, in chapter 5, I outline a theory of how our
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTIONIST LEARNING OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE115language ability may have evolved to its present state (as modeled, in part, here andin the previous chapter). Learning plays an important role in this account of the originand evolution of language, and the observations made in the present chapter regardingthe incremental memory training regime provide partial support for an explanation ofhow children may overcome the apparent poverty of the stimulus.
Chapter 5The Evolution and Acquisition ofLanguageWhen studying natural language one cannot help being lled with awe over its intricate,yet highly regularized, complexity. Moreover, the speed at which children acquire thisformidable means of communication must strike even the most casual observer withamazement. How do children accomplish this enormous feat? Do they learn to speaktheir native tongue? Or, does their language ability gradually unfold according to agenetic blueprint (in much the same way that a chicken grows a wing)? Thus, thequestion is whether there is sucient environmental information available to the childto make language learnable (given general non-linguistic constraints on learning), or,is it necessary to presuppose the existence of specic linguistic constraints in order toaccount for language acquisition?For a child to acquire language it is clear that whatever mechanisms participate inthis task, they would have to be biased in some way towards the learning of language|or, at least, towards the learning of sequential and hierarchical structure. Otherwise, wewould be able to teach computers to speak simply by talking to them whilst they recordour speech. In other words, that there must be internal constraints on the acquisitionof language is hardly controversial, but the nature and extent of these constraints isthe focus of much debate. For a period spanning three decades Chomsky (1965, 1972,1975, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1986, 1988, 1993) has argued forcefully that a substantial innateendowment of language specic knowledge is necessary in order to provide sucientconstraints on language acquisition. These constraints form a `Universal Grammar'(UG); that is, an innate database consisting of a collection of universal grammaticalprinciples that hold across all human languages. In this framework, all that language`learning' amounts to is the setting of a number of parameters in UG according to116
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 117the specics of the particular language being learned. The staunchest proponents ofthis view even go as far as to claim that \doubting that there are language-specic,innate computational capacities today is a bit like being still dubious about the veryexistence of molecules, in spite of the awesome progress of molecular biology" (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994: p. 335).Given this view of language acquisition, a question naturally arises concerning theevolution of such an elaborate and highly specialized innate structure. It is often notedthat humans appear to be the only species in which nature has bestowed language(at least, in its present complexity). But how did the human language ability comeabout in the rst place? What kind of phylogenetic explanation might be found forthis uniquely human capacity? The proponents of UG are generally divided into twocamps when addressing the issue of language evolution. One camp (e.g., Chomsky,1988; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989) has suggested that natural selection only played aminor role in the emergence of language in humans. On this account, UG is a productof exaptation; that is, it is hypothesized that it might have arisen as a by-product ofincreased brain size following evolutionary pressures driven by other functions thanlanguage, or, perhaps, as a consequence of random mutations. The other camp (e.g.,Bloom, 1994; Corballis, 1992, 1994; Greeneld, 1991; Hurford, 1991; Pinker, 1994;Pinker & Bloom, 1990) emphasizes a gradual evolution of the human language facultythrough natural selection. In this picture, it is assumed that having a language confersadded reproductive tness on humans and that this, in turn, leads to a selective pressuretowards increasingly more complex grammars.Both accounts of the evolution of language do not leave much room for learning.The proponents of neo-Darwinian evolution do, however, leave a little elbow roomfor learning inasmuch as evolution through natural selection|being essentially a hill-climbing process (Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Maynard-Smith, 1987; Pinker & Bloom,1990)|can be construed as a kind of (non-Larmarckian) learning process in which aparticular species searches the evolutionary problem space for good genotypes (albeitthat the species has no `memory' of its previous searchpath since individuals withpoorly adapted genotypes tend not to live to tell the tale). The exaptationists seekto abolish the term \learning" altogether, suggesting \that we would gain in clarityif the scientic use of the term were simply discontinued" (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989:p. 2; see also Chomsky, 1980, for a similar view). Given that learning generally playsa fundamental role in most connectionist theories, and in the work presented in theprevious chapters in particular, such eschewal of the concept of (non-trivial) learning
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 118within cognitive science would have a devastating impact on connectionist research1.In this chapter, I therefore sketch a theory in which considerations regarding learningand processing, rather than innate linguistic knowledge, provide the explanation oflanguage development and evolution. This involves a reappraisal of the poverty ofthe stimulus arguments typically presented in favor of an innate UG, suggesting analternative account of the psycholinguistic data based on a dynamic perspective onthe co-evolution of language and the human mechanism underlying both learning andprocessing of linguistic structure. If this account is correct, then it is a mistake tobury a scientic term which is still very much alive and kicking. Indeed, I predict thatthe concept of learning is destined to play an important part in future research intolanguage and other parts of cognition.The content of this chapter is as follows: First I examine the main exaptationist andadaptationist perspectives on the evolution of language. An alternative view is proposedin which language is treated as an organism that is forced to adapt to the idiosyncrasiesof its human hosts. To exemplify the kind of explanation of linguistic phenomena thatthis approach may oer, I discuss subjacency as a classic example of an arbitrarylanguage universal. Next, in section 2, I address the issues concerning the origin oflanguage. It is argued that sequential learning is the basis of our language ability. Thelatter is hypothesized as having started as a manual language which gradually evolvedinto a predominately vocal language following bipedalism and changes in the humanvocal tract. I furthermore contend that such a learning based language capabilitycould not have become innate following subsequent evolution. An account of linguisticchange is then put forward, pointing to increases in vocabulary size as the key factorin bringing about morphological and syntactic change. The emphasis on learning inthe evolutionary scenario is continued in section 3 which discusses the acquisition oflanguage. Innate, but not language-specic, maturational constraints are advocatedto determine the acquisition process, providing a plausible explanation of the criticalperiod of language learning. The argument from the poverty of the stimulus is re-appraised, and it is argued that language may be learnable without the help of themassive endowment of innate linguistic knowledge presupposed by the proponents ofUG. Finally, two possible objections to the present theory are debated.1It should be noted that connectionism, in principle, might be compatible with some kinds of na-tivism (cf. e.g., Clark, 1993; Ramsey & Stich, 1991), but it seems clear that the spirit of connectionismis incompatible with the strong innateness hypothesis espoused by, for example, Crain (1991), Chomsky(1980, 1986, 1993) and Piattelli-Palmarini (1989, 1994).
























UGFigure 5.1. Schematic representation of four positions concerning explanations of the acquisi-tion (domain-general vs. domain-specic) and evolution (natural selection vs. non-Darwinian)of language.5.1 Language: Organ, Instinct, or Nonobligate Symbiant?Ultimately, language has to be tied to the phylogeny and ontogeny of human biol-ogy. In an attempt to characterize the biological underpinnings of language, Chomsky(1965, 1986, 1988) has advocated that language should be viewed as one amongst many`mental organs' which \develop in specic ways each in accordance with the geneticprogram, much as bodily organs develop; and that multipurpose learning strategies areno more likely to exist than general principles of `growth of organs' that account forthe shape, structure, and function of the kidney, the liver, the heart, the visual system,and so forth" (Chomsky, 1980: P. 245). More recently, Pinker (1994) has argued thatlanguage is better construed as an instinct because \it conveys the idea that peopleknow how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs" (p. 18).Both terms carry much the same nativist commitments on their sleeves, indicating thatonly highly domain-specic `trigger' learning can take place. Yet, the two positions di-verge substantially on what role natural selection is meant to play in the evolution ofUG.The general relationship between the two perspectives is illustrated in Figure 5.1,where the `exaptationist UG' 2 position is taken by Chomsky (1972, 1982, 1988, 1993)2It should be noted that I here follow Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) in using `exaptation' as an umbrellaterm for recent nonadaptationist mechanisms for evolution, such as, genetic hitch-hiking (Maynard-Smith, 1978), that is, a mechanism by which non-selected genes might \catch a ride" with anothergene that was selected for, if they are in close proximity to the selected gene along a chromosome;spandrels (Gould & Lewontin, 1979), i.e., architectural by-products with no previous function, butwhich come to serve some novel function (by analogy to the mosaics on the triangular spaces formed atthe intersection of the arches of the dome in the San Marco basilica in Venice); and, exaptation proper
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 120and Piattelli-Palmarini (1989, 1994) whereas the (seemingly more popular) `adapta-tionist UG' view counts Bloom (1994), Corballis (1992, 1994), Hurford (1991), Pinker(1994), Pinker & Bloom (1990) amongst its proponents. A third perspective empha-sizing both natural selection and genuine (domain-general) learning in the phylogenyand ontogeny of language|here named `adaptationist learning'|is held by, e.g., Bates,Thal & Marchman (1989), Bates & Elman (1993) and Elman (1993). The logical struc-ture of Figure 5.1 suggests a fourth way of looking at the issues involved in the evolutionand acquisition of language: the `exaptationist learning' viewpoint3. To my knowledgeonly one person comes close to having this point of view. In arguing for his view oflanguage as a spandrel, Gould (1993) acknowledges that he \can't prove that languagewas not the selected basis of increasing brain size, but the universals of language are sodierent from anything else in nature, and so quirky in their structure, that origin asa side consequence of the brain's enhanced capacity, rather than as simple advance incontinuity from ancestral grunts and gestures, seems indicated" (p. 321). Elsewhere,Gould (1979) has made comments which could be interpreted (as they have, indeed, byPinker & Bloom, 1990) as suggesting that the increased brain size produced a multipur-pose learning device that can acquire not only language, but also many other cognitiveabilities.5.1.1 The Exaptationist ViewThe other exaptationist viewpoint|though certainly not the most popular accountof language development and evolution|has its prominent advocates. For instance,Chomsky (1972, 1982, 1988) has for more than two decades expressed strong doubtsabout neo-Darwinian explanations of language evolution and has recently been joinedby Piattelli-Palmarini (1989). This skepticism does not merely concern adaptationistaccounts of language origin, but the selectionist theory of evolution as a whole:What Darwin achieved is of extraordinary importance, but there's virtuallynothing of a theory there : : :when you try to account for why particularorgans develop, or species, and so on, all you can do is wave your hand: : :To move to more far reaching explanation, you're going to have to nd(Gould & Vrba, 1982), that is, when something that was originally adapted to serve a particularfunction is put to use to serve a novel function.3I would like to stress that I do not intend the four positions represented in Figure 5.1 to exhaust allpossible perspectives on the evolution and development of language. Indeed, my own view, as we shallsee, falls outside this schematization. I have included this gure in order to provide a clear schematicrepresentation of the relations between the three viewpoints most often found in the recent literaturefocusing on the issues at hand. The possibility of the exaptationist learning position follows logicallyfrom the gure, but does not seem to have much support.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 121something about the space of physical possibility within which selection op-erates. That space might be extremely narrow. For example, it might be sonarrow that under the particular conditions of human evolution, there's onepossibility for something with 1011 neurons packed into something the sizeof a basketball: namely, a brain that has these computational properties.(Chomsky, 1993: p. 83)Chomsky is careful to add that he is not proposing such an evolutionary picture. In-deed, he does not commit himself to any particular view of evolution4. Chomsky does,however, show a strong inclination towards an exaptationist framework, rather thanan adaptationist one (also cf. Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Piattelli-Palmarini (1989), onthe other hand, demonstrates an even stronger commitment to exaptationism, ndingadaptationist explanations much too weak: \Adaptive constraints are typically insuf-cient to discriminate between real cases and an innity of alternative, incompatiblemechanisms and traits which, although abstractly compatible with the survival of agiven species, are demonstrably absent" (p. 19).The exaptationist positions from Figure 5.1 both rely on the complexity and in-tricacy of the putative UG as the premise for their arguments against adaptationistexplanations of language evolution. UG appears to be so unique in terms of structureand properties, that it is unlikely that it could be a product of a process of natu-ral selection amongst random mutations, or so the argument goes. Instead, Chomsky(1988) has suggested that, perhaps, the property of `discrete innity' (recursion) aroseas a consequence of a mutation in some protohuman being, making language possible.Elsewhere, Chomsky (1972, 1982, 1993) proposes that the language organ might be aby-product of having a brain of a particular size and structural complexity followingcertain (yet unknown) properties of physical mechanisms. This view of language asspandrel has received further support from Gould (1993). Moreover, in reference tothe arbitrariness of the specic set of principles and parameters that characterizes UG,Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) has noted that \adaptationism cannot even begin to explainwhy the natural languages that we can acquire and use possess these central featuresand not very dierent ones" (p. 24).5.1.2 The Adaptationist PerspectiveRecently, Pinker & Bloom (1990) have forcefully defended the adaptationist perspectiveon language from the exaptationist attacks (briey summarized above). They, too,adopt UG as a premise for their arguments (thus, espousing the adaptationist UG4Elsewhere, for instance, Chomsky says in an often quoted passage that \language must surelyconfer enormous selective advantages" (1980, p. 239).
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 122position in Figure 5.1). But in contrast to Chomsky, Gould and Piattelli-Palmarini,Pinker & Bloom nd that the complex and intricate structure of UG bears evidenceof design, indicating its adaptation as an ecient means of communication. Moregenerally, they argue that \natural selection is the only scientic explanation of adaptivecomplexity. `Adaptive complexity' describes any system composed of many interactingparts where the details of the parts' structure and arrangement suggest design to fulllsome function" (p. 709; their emphasis). As another example of adaptive complexity,they refer to the vertebrate visual system. This system consists of many parts thathave to work together to create vision; starting with the refracting cornea and theillumination sensitive pupil (regulating the amount of incoming light), which allow lightto impinge on the retina through a variable focus lens. The image is then transmittedvia the optical nerves to the visual cortex where specialized neural structures respond tovarious parts of the input patterns, such as, edges, color, motion, and so on. Moreover,the eyes are equipped with muscles that ensure coordination between the two eyes aswell as visual stability (for instance, to maintain xation on a given point in visualspace when the head is moving). Pinker & Bloom argue that such an arrangement ofmatter has an extremely low probability of occurring by chance because of the complexinteractions amongst its highly specialized parts. Consequently, they nd that it wouldamount to something close to miracle for the vertebrate visual system to emerge asa product of random mutation (e.g., via genetic hitch-hiking), some (yet unknown)laws concerning the possible biological arrangements of matter, recycling of a structureadapted for another function (exaptation proper), or as the byproduct of architecturalconstraints of other unrelated structures (a spandrel).Given that language couched in terms of UG appears to show a degree of complexityequal to that of the vertebrate visual system, Pinker & Bloom conclude that it ishighly improbable that language is the product of some nonadaptationist process. Inparticular, they contend (pace Chomsky, Gould and Piattelli-Palmarini) that languagecannot be an unmodied spandrel. Although unmodied spandrels appear to exist (e.g.,as when wading birds use their wings primarily to block out the reections of the sunwhile shing), each such exaptation is merely one amongst many crude solutions to asimple engineering task, and is therefore not likely to play a dominant role in evolutionof more complex capacities. On the other hand,modied spandrels|that is, cases wherespandrels are redesigned to serve new functions|play a much more important role inevolution because they provide starting points for adaptive complexity. As an example,Pinker & Bloom mention the evolution of insect wings which involved the redesigning
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 123of structures that were originally evolved for the purpose of thermal exchange5. Thus,exaptationist processes appear to provide the raw material for natural selection, whichin turn, never has a clean slate to start with, but must always work as tinkerer withwhatever building materials are at hand. Importantly, it is adaptation that shapes andnetunes the structures underlying complex functions.Pinker & Bloom acknowledge that language might be a modied spandrel thatevolved from general cognitive processes not specic to language. In particular, theyspeculate that \the multiplicity of human languages is in part a consequence of learningmechanisms existing prior to (or at least independent of) the mechanisms specicallydedicated to language" (1990: p. 723). Such learning mechanisms subserving early lan-guage would then have been shaped by natural selection into our presentday languageability via natural selection. On this view, what originally had to be learned graduallybecame innate following the `Baldwin eect' (Baldwin, 1896; Hinton & Nowlan, 1987;Maynard-Smith, 1987), thus creating the UG that Pinker & Bloom take to underliehuman language. The basic idea behind the Baldwin eect is that when a speciesis faced with the learning of an adaptive task, certain initial settings of the learningmechanism are better than others. Individuals endowed with good starting congura-tions are likely to learn faster, which, in turn, confers added reproductive tness ontothem. These individuals should therefore proliferate, creating ospring with equallygood starting points for learning (genetic drift aside). This process repeats itself, pro-ducing better and better initial settings for learning, until the task becomes more orless innately specied. At this point learning might merely consist in the triggering of afew switches in an otherwise innate database. The Baldwin eect thus provides a wayin which learning can guide evolution in a nonLamarkian way, and is used by Pinker &Bloom to explain how the innate UG might have evolved from language independentlearning mechanisms (for a criticism of this view, see section 5.2.3).The Arbitrariness of Linguistic UniversalsHaving thus defended the adaptationist UG position against the onslaught of the exap-tationists, Pinker & Bloom still have to explain why the principles of UG are essentiallyarbitrary (as pointed out by Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989). They address this issue by sug-gesting that the constraints imposed by UG function as communicative protocols. Assuch, the specic nature of these standards does not matter as long as everyone (within5It is amusing to note that if the Disney character \Dumbo" was a real living organism, then itwould seem to have followed the same path to ight as the insects; that is, a transformation of its ears(as heat exchangers) into structures subserving ight. However, this is not to say that there might notbe laws of nature that generally prevent elephants from ever becoming airborne by their own power.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 124a given speech community) adopts the same set of standards. The arbitrariness ofthe principles of UG can therefore be seen to parallel the arbitrariness of technicalcommunication protocols, such as, those used in communication between computers.When using a modem it is important to use the right protocol; for instance, odd parity,handshake on, 7 bit, etc. There is no particular reason for having a protocol with ex-actly these settings, other combinations would be just as eective. What is important,however, is that the two computers that are to communicate with each other adoptthe same protocol|otherwise, communication will not be possible at all. So, when itcomes to the specics of UG, Pinker & Bloom suggest that \in the evolution of thelanguage faculty, many `arbitrary' constraints may have been selected simply becausethey dened parts of a standardized communicative code in the brains of some criticalmass of speakers" (1990: p. 718)6.Pinker & Bloom's (1990) elaborate account of the evolution of language still leavessome questions to be answered; an important one being: How did language get to havethe structure that it has? The adaptationist UG view leaves the origin of languagestructure mostly unexplained, characterized as a collection of arbitrary communicationstandards. For example, Pinker & Bloom write that: : :many aspects of grammar cannot be reduced to being the optimal solu-tion to a communicative problem; rather, human grammar has a universalidiosyncratic logic of its own : : :Evolution has had a wide variety of equiv-alent communicative standards to choose from; there is no reason for it tohave favored the class of languages that includes Apache and Yiddish, butnot Old High Martian or Early Vulcan : : :Whatever rationales may haveinuenced these choices are buried in history.(p.719)Pinker & Bloom further suggest that these idiosyncrasies are in part culturally deter-mined, but this suggestion just pushes the question back one level: How did they evolvein the cultural domain? Thus, it seems to be something of a mystery that we only learnthe human languages (with their arbitrary idiosyncrasies) given that they comprise amere fraction of the total set of theoretically possible languages.5.1.3 Language as an OrganismIf we, however, invert the perspective on language evolution|recognizing that languagehas evolved to t the human learning and processing mechanism|then the mystery6In addition, Pinker & Bloom (1990) point out that it is often the case that natural selectionhas several (equally adaptive) alternatives to choose from to carry out a given function (for example,both the invertebrate and the vertebrate eye support vision despite having signicant architecturaldierences.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 125can be unraveled; and we might, furthermore, understand how language got to haveits apparently \idiosyncratic" structure. Instead of saying that humans can only learna small subset of a huge set of possible languages, we must refocus by observing thatnatural languages exist only because humans can produce, learn and process them.In this connection, it is useful to construe language as an organism, adapted throughnatural selection to t a particular ecological niche: the human brain. Darwin (1900)was one of the rst to recognize this as is evident from the following quote:The formation of dierent languages and of distinct species, and the proofsthat both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiouslyparallel : : :We nd in distinct languages striking homologies due to com-munity of descent, and analogies due to a similar process of formation. Themanner in which certain letters or sounds change when other change is verylike correlated growth : : :Languages, like organic beings, can be classed ingroups under groups; and they can be classed either naturally, accordingto descent, or articially by other characters. Dominant languages and di-alects spread widely, and lead to the gradual extinction of other tongues. Alanguage, like a species, when once extinct, never : : : reappears : : :A strug-gle for life is constantly going on among the words and grammatical formsin each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantlygaining the upper hand : : :The survival and preservation of certain favoredwords in the struggle for existence is natural selection. (p. 106)In this sense, natural language is akin to an organism whose evolution has beenconstrained by the properties of human learning and processing mechanisms. It istherefore not surprising that we, after all, are so good at acquiring language. Languageis closely tailored for human learning, rather than the other way round (as suggestedby Pinker & Bloom, 1990: p. 712). In addition, it is also worth noting that thehuman language learning mechanism is not static (as we shall see in section 5.3). Itundergoes signicant changes during the period of (optimal) language acquisition. Inthe present picture, language evolution and development are tied strongly together(pace e.g., Chomsky, 1988, 1993; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989; Pinker & Bloom, 1990;Pinker, 1994). Only by studying both in unison can we begin to understand hownatural language came to be the way we experience it today.Presentday natural language is not due to exaptation (of almost magical propor-tions) as suggested by Piattelli-Palmarini (1989), nor is its many universal featuresessentially arbitrary as implied by Pinker & Bloom's (1990) account. Rather, I con-tend that language is the product of an evolutionary process in which language hadto adapt to the human learning mechanism (with all its developmental idiosyncrasies)
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 126in order to `survive'7. This is not to say that having a language does not conferselective advantage onto humans. It is clear that humans with a superior languageability are likely to have a selective advantage over other humans (and other organ-isms) with lesser communication powers. This is an uncontroversial point, forming thebasic premise of many evolutionary theories of language origin (save Chomsky, 1988;Gould, 1993; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989, 1994).What is often not appreciated is that the selective forces working on language tot humans is signicantly stronger than the selective pressure on humans to be able touse language. In the case of the former, a language can only survive if it is learnableand processable by humans. On the other hand, adaptation towards language use ismerely one out of many selective pressures working on humans (such as, for example,being able to avoid predators and nd food). Whereas humans can survive withoutlanguage, the opposite is not the case (at least, not as far as human languages|the focusof linguistics|is concerned). Thus, language is more likely to have adapted itself to itshuman hosts than the other way round. Languages that are hard for humans to learnsimply die out, or, more likely, do not come into existence at all. Following Darwin, Ipropose to view natural language as a kind of a benecial parasite|i.e., a nonobligatesymbiant|that confers some selective advantage onto its human hosts without whomit cannot survive. Consequently, the rate of linguistic change is far greater than therate of biological change. Whereas it takes about 10,000 years for a language to changeinto a completely dierent \species" of language (e.g., from protolanguage to presentdaylanguage, Kiparsky, 1976), it took our remote ancestors something in the neighborhoodof 250,000 years to evolve from the archaic form of Homo sapiens into the anatomicallymodern form we have today, Homo sapiens sapiens (cf. data in Corballis, 1992). Thefact that children are so successful at language learning is therefore more appropriatelyexplained as a product of natural selection of linguistic structures, rather than naturalselection of biological structures, such as UG.Returning to the universal principles of UG and their supposedly arbitrary nature,it is clear that they are arbitrary from a linguistic point of view. That is, given a7In this connection, it is interesting to note that a group of linguists recently also adopted the viewof language as a kind of organism (although I presume that they would not agree with the conclusionsthat I draw here from this perspective). In a collection of papers Hale et al (1992) express their worriesabout the rapidly increasing number of endangered languages; that is, languages that have disappeared,or are about to disappear, from the face of the earth. In one of the papers, Michael Kraus suggests that\language endangerment is signicantly comparable to|and related to|endangerment of biologicalspecies in the natural world" (p. 4). He goes on to warn us that \the coming century will see either thedeath or doom of 90% of mankind's languages" (p. 7). This kind of language extinction is, however, nota product of natural selection (with respect to the human brain), but a product of a general pressuretowards cultural homogeneity (cf. Kraus).
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 127strictly linguistic perspective on language these constraints would appear to be arbi-trary, since we can imagine a multitude of alternative, and equally adaptive, constraintson linguistic form. For instance, Piattelli-Palmarini's (1989) contends that there are no(linguistic) reasons not to form yes-no questions by reversing the word order of a sen-tence instead of the normal inversion of subject and auxiliary. However, on the presentaccount linguistic universals are no longer arbitrary. Rather, they are determined bythe properties of the human learning and processing mechanisms that underlie our lan-guage capacity. This is why we do not reverse the word order to form yes-no questions;it would put too heavy a load on memory to store a whole sentence in order to be ableto reverse it8. In eect, language universals are by-products of processing and learn-ing under certain limitations on memory, attention, etc. (and this, as we shall see insection 5.3, surprisingly makes language easier to learn). Consequently, there are goodreasons why we are able to speak Apache and Yiddish, but not Old High Martian orEarly Vulcan (pace Pinker & Bloom, 1990): the latter, non-human languages did notevolve because they simply do not t the human learning and processing mechanisms.However, if we imagine that these brain mechanisms had followed a dierent evolu-tionary path, then we might have both Old High Martian and Early Vulcan amongstpresentday human languages, but not Apache and Yiddish. Whereas the make-up ofthe human language machinery is arbitrary (it is, at least, conceivable that it couldhave been dierent), the structure of the human languages are not, since they are evo-lutionarily customized to t human learning and processing capabilities. In short, myview amounts to the claim that most|if not all|linguistic universals will turn out tobe terminological artifacts referring to mere side-eects of the processing and learningof language in humans9.Subjacency: A Classic Example of ArbitrarinessSince the subjacency principle, according to Pinker & Bloom (1990: p. 717), \is aclassic example of an arbitrary constraint", it is well-suited as a demonstration of what8Besides, this also presupposes that transformations must underlie the construction of yes-noquestions|a point which is not an established truth (as we shall see later).9Recently, Chomsky (1993) has expressed a somewhat similar view when outlining his new `min-imalist' program: \Grammatical constructions such as relative clause, passive, verbal phrase, and soon, appear to be taxonomic artifacts, like `terrestrial mammal' or `household pet'; the array of phe-nomena derive from the interaction of principles of much greater generality : : : these principles maythemselves be epiphenomenal, their consequences reducing to more general and abstract properties ofthe computational system, properties that have a kind of `least eort' avor" (p. 51). However, it isclear that Chomsky takes a rather dierent position on most other issues involved in the evolution anddevelopment of language.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 128my position implies10. The grammatical theory underlying Chomskyan UG (that is,Government and Binding (GB), e.g., Chomsky, 1981) involves an essential distinctionbetween S-structures and D-structures (formerly, e.g., Chomsky, 1965, called \surfacestructures" and \deep structures", respectively), where the former is derived trans-formationally from the latter via \move-", a general procedure for the movement ofconstituents. In order to restrict this powerful movement procedure, so that the trans-formed sentence structures correspond to what is acceptable to a normal speaker, anumber of constraints are imposed on such transformations|subjacency being one ofthese. Thus, the subjacency principle involves certain general restrictions on the move-ments of constituents during transformation (the exact details are irrelevant here).Consider the following:(1) Who does Anita believe Betty bit (gap)?(2) [S1 comp1 Anita believes [S2 comp2 Betty bit who]]In GB, the gap at the end of the S-structure in (1) is a result of two consecutivemovements of `who' from its position at the end of the D-structure in (2). Thesemovements are shown in the syntactic tree in Figure 5.2. Now, consider the followingungrammatical (S-structure) sentence (3) and its underlying D-structure (4):(3) *Who does Anita believe the story that Betty bit (gap)?(4) [S1 comp1 Anita believes [NP the story [S2 comp2 Betty bit who]]]As before, the gap in (3) is due to the movement of `who' from it tail position in (4).In order to explain the ungrammaticality of (3) compared with (1) the subjacencyprinciple|formalized in Figure 5.3|is invoked. By comparing Figure 5.2 and 5.4in the light of 5.3, we can now see why (1) is rendered grammatical within the GBframework and (3) is not. Figure 5.4 shows that the second movement of `who' in(3) is illegal because it results in a movement across two bounding nodes (NP andS2). This is prohibited by the subjacency principle. As such, the subjacency principleseems to lend itself easily to an explanation in terms of memory limitations (alsocf. Elman, 1992). Indeed, Berwick & Weinberg (1984) have provided a functionalexplanation of subjacency. In their framework, the subjacency principle emerges from10I have included this somewhat elaborate example to provide some linguistic `weight' to the presenttheory and to make the discussion of linguistic universals more concrete. The example is furthermorepresented as a preliminary template for the explanation of other linguistic universals as well as indi-cating how it may cut across the particulars of dierent linguistic frameworks (hence the GPSG partof the example).












V NPFigure 5.2. A Chomskyan (GB) transformational derivation of of the S-structure `Who doesAnita believe Betty bit' from the D-structure `Anita believes Betty bit who' with the arrowsillustrating the cyclic movements of `who'.
βα. . . X . . .[   . . . [  . . .Y. . .  ] . . .  ] . . . X . . .Figure 5.3. A formalization of the subjacency principle: no transformation may move aconstituent from position Y to either of the X positions; that is, no single movement is allowedacross more than one boundary node (where ; |i.e., the bounding nodes|are either NP orS).

















Figure 5.4. A Chomskyan (GB) derivation of of the ungrammatical S-structure `Who doesAnita believe the story that Betty bit' from the D-structure `Anita believes the story that Bettybit who' with the plain arrow showing the rst, legal movement of `who' and the dashed arrowthe second, illegal movement across two bounding nodes (NP and S2).the limitations on stack depth, when a GB grammar is implemented in a deterministicparsing system. Since we therefore reasonably can construe subjacency simply as aconstraint on processing (or performance cf. chapter 2), it can no longer be consideredto be an arbitrary linguistic phenomenon (as suggested by Pinker & Bloom, 1990), butmust instead be conceived as a nonarbitrary byproduct of limited human processingabilities.At this point it is furthermore illuminating to recall that the putative principlesof UG are not established, scientic facts (even though Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994, andothers would have us believe so). The GB framework underlying UG (as expounded by,e.g., Chomsky, 1957, 1965, 1976, 1981, 1986; Crain, 1991) is merely one amongst manylinguistic theories|albeit perhaps the most dominant one. Many alternative theoriesexist in the realm of linguistics, such as, for example, Categorial Grammar (Steedman,1987), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987), Dependency Grammar (Hudson, 1990),Lexical Functional Grammar (Kaplan & Bresnan, 1982), and Generalized Phrase Struc-ture Grammar (GPSG: Gazdar, Klein, Pullum & Sag, 1985). Hence, it is possible to












VFigure 5.5. A syntactic tree derived via GPSG for the grammatical sentence `Who does Anitabelieve Betty bit' with the arrows showing how the gap (i.e., that a N is needed) is percolatedup the tree and discharged at the root.adopt a number of dierent analyses of the linguistic data, some of which do not in-volve transformations, and therefore explain the ungrammaticality of sentences, suchas (3), without reference to subjacency. For example, in GPSG (1) would result inthe syntactic tree displayed in Figure 5.5. The gap (that is, the missing N) is simplypercolated up the tree until it can can be discharged at the root. Notice that in GPSGsyntactic trees are basically a collection of local trees of depth one (the exact nature ofGPSG is irrelevant for the purpose of the present comparison with GB). A grammaticalprinciple, such as subjacency, applies to larger tree structures and can therefore notbe implemented directly in GPSG. Instead, we might explain the ungrammaticality of(3) in terms of a local lter proposed by Horrocks (1987). Figure 5.6 depicts this locallter which prohibits a gap from passing through V when the latter is the complementof a lexical head noun. This lter will prevent the gap from being discharged in (3), ascan be seen from Figure 5.7., thus making (3) ungrammatical. Consequently, as alsopointed out by Harris (1991), Slobin (1991), and Wasow (1991), it might be the casethat many of the universal principles of UG are mere theoretical artifacts of a particu-lar (Chomskyan) perspective on language. This, in turn, suggests that other linguisticframeworks might lead to signicantly dierent language universals. Nevertheless, whathas to be kept in mind concerning the present perspective is that linguistic facts, suchas, e.g., the unacceptability of (3) compared with acceptability of (1), may be explained
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bitBettyFigure 5.7. A syntactic tree derived via GPSG for the ungrammatical sentence `Who doesAnita believe the story that Betty bit'. The plain arrows illustrate the upwards percolation ofthe gap to the point where it is stopped by the ungrammaticality lter of Figure 5.6 (the dashedarrow), preventing the gap from being discharged.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 133in terms of constraints arising from processing and learning independently of any par-ticular linguistic framework. If one adopts the linguistic perspective of GB, subjacencycan be explained as a processing constraint (as we saw earlier). Even though no oneyet, to my knowledge, has tried to demonstrate this for GPSG based parsing, localgrammaticality lters, such as Figure 5.6, might plausibly follow from a GPSG parser,given the right processing limitations restricting the upwards percolation of gaps.In closing this section, we might ask whether language is an organ as suggestedby Chomsky (1965, 1980, 1986, 1988). I would say `no'. Rather, we should construelanguage as an organism with its own evolutionary history (rst suggested by Darwin,1900). This will provide a better understanding of why language looks the way it doestoday. Nonetheless, it might be objected that Pinker (1994) also invoked Darwin assupport for his notion of language as an instinct. Darwin characterized language asa `wonderful engine' of great importance to human evolution: \A great stride in thedevelopment of the intellect will have followed, as soon as the half-art and half-instinctof language came into use; for continued use of language will have reacted on the brainand produced an inherited eect; and this again will have reacted on the improvementof language" (1900: p. 634; my emphasis). Elsewhere, he emphasized that \it certainlyis not a true instinct, for every language has to be learned" (Darwin, 1900: p. 101). So,as Pinker (1994: p. 20) also seems to acknowledge, Darwin suggested that evolutionendowed us with an instinct to learn language, rather than a language instinct per se.Thus, I submit that it is most fruitful to construe language as a nonobligate symbiant(and not as an organ nor as an instinct). Next, we shall see that this perspective helpsus understand how language|as an organism|might have evolved in close relationshipwith the evolution of its human hosts.5.2 The Origin of LanguageAs indicated in chapter 1, the origin of language has been a controversial topic for sometime|a topic that still incites much debate (e.g., Bloom, 1994; Corballis, 1992, 1994;Greeneld, 1991; Hurford, 1991; Kiparsky, 1976; Lieberman, 1973, 1976; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989; Pinker, 1994; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). In this section, I outline apicture concerning the origin and evolution of language. All research on this topicwill necessarily be somewhat speculative since language did not leave any fossils tostudy. Nevertheless, I believe that my sketch receives credibility from being based ontheories and data from a variety of elds including historical linguistics, anthropology,implicit learning theory, evolutionary theory (and articial life simulations thereof),speech perception and production, neuroscience, and connectionist modeling.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 134Cognitive behavior|human and non-human|can conveniently be divided into twobasic kinds of processes: 1) processes dealing with sequential/temporal information inthe input11; and 2) processes dealing with the categorization and identication of input(or parts of it). In organisms with stereoscopic vision, for example, visual processingis divided into processes dealing with motion detection (that is, sequential changes inthe visual array) and processes dealing with object recognition (Bruce & Green, 1985).Motion detection needs to be fast (so that, say, approaching predators can be detectedquickly) and therefore only deals with a very reduced part of the visual array. Torecognize objects, on the other hand, more detailed information is necessary, leadingto slightly slower processing following the heavier information load. Moreover, the twokinds of processes are not completely isolated from each other. They, at least, interactat some level, as when we move our head sideways (thereby varying the angle of thevisual input) in order to determine the depth of an object. At other times, we are notable to even detect something (and therefore identify it) before it moves as in the caseof a well-camouaged animal lying still. The distinction also has close analogues in,e.g., the neuropsychological literature (Kolbe & Whishaw, 1990 ) with its distinctionbetween declarative and procedural types of memory corresponding, respectively, tocategorial and sequential processing.The processes involved in vision are presumably to a large extent hardwired intothe brain in order to maximize processing speed at the cost of exibility in primaryvisual processing. This trade-o is possible given that the fundamental structure ofvisual world (i.e., the existence of lines, edges, etc.) does not change dramatically overphylogenetic time, but follow natural laws. In other parts of cognition, exibility is ofthe greatest importance. For example, when Homo erectus spread from Africa to muchof the Old World, it needed to be exible enough to classify a vast range of new animalsin terms of categories, such as predator, food, etc. Today, we can also nd this kindof exibility in many other parts of cognition, but here I will concentrate on languageand speech processing. Liberman & Mattingly (1989), for instance, have demonstratedthat the processes underlying the perception of consonants and vowels are distinct fromthose processes that pinpoint the source of the sound and its auditory qualities. Theformer processes rely on sequential properties of the input to uncover the appropriatephonological information, whereas the latter categorizes parts of the input stream, interms of pitch, loudness and timbre, mostly independently of sequential information.Importantly, they stress that the extraction of phonetic information from sequential11Note that input can come either from the environment external to the organism via its sensoryapparatus, or from within the organism itself in terms of, for instance, intermediate processing resultsor feedback from internal organs.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 135input (i.e., the detection of changes in vocal tract resonances|formants|caused bya speaker's shifting congurations of articulators) has to be learned. So, although allhumans are born with the same set of phonetic units, covering the sounds found inall human languages, infants rapidly (within 6 months) acquire a special sensitivity totheir native tongue (Kuhl, Williams, Lacerda, Stevens & Lindblom, 1992|more aboutthis later).More generally, language processing involves the extraction of information occur-ring in temporal sequences. If learning is involved in language acquisition (a point I willreturn to, and argue for, at length below), it is most likely that the former will consistin some kind of encoding of sequential structure. Since language acquisition further-more occurs largely without much conscious eort, it seems reasonable to assume thatsuch learning is implicit in the sense of being \an inductive process whereby knowledgeof a complex environment is acquired and used largely independently of awareness ofeither the process of acquisition or the nature of that which has been learned" (Reber,1992: p. 33). As such, this process may yield abstract information about underlyingstatistical regularities in the input. Notice, however, that simple co-occurrence maynot be sucient to establish learning (although co-occurrence between stimuli mightbe recorded in ways which cannot be detected in the behavior of the organism). In-stead, it seems necessary that \organisms key on the covariations between events and,hence, learn to take advantage of the cuing function that emerges when one event iscontingently associated with other events. So long as some stimuli in the environmentare arranged so that their occurrences cue the occurrences of other stimuli, they willacquire statistical predictive power" (Reber, 1992: p. 45; my emphasis). It is my con-tention that language learning may be construed in terms of such implicit processing|apoint also made by Reber (1992) and Durkin (1989). The simulations presented in theprevious two chapters appear to corroborate this view (which the work by Cleeremans,1993, on connectionist models of sequence processing hints at too).If the learning and processing of sequential information constitutes some of the mostbasic elements of cognition|as I have suggested|then we might expect them to havea long phylogenetic past. Indeed, this idea has been advanced recently by Reber (1990,1992), suggesting that implicit learning processes are evolutionary ancient. Evidencefor this suggestion can be found in the fact that these kind of processes are found inorganisms from all over the animal kingdom. Sequential learning has been observednot only in other primates (e.g., cf. results reported in Greeneld, 1991, on chim-panzees solving hierarchical tasks involving deliberately sequenced behaviors), but alsoin rats (demonstrating that they are able to encode the sequential structure followingsuccessive trials in maze, Capaldi & Miller, 1988). Another indication of the purported
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 136primary status in cognitive behavior can be found in the robustness of sequence pro-cessing in the face of disorders. For example, Abrams & Reber (1988) demonstratedthat a group of brain-damaged psychiatric patients performed signicantly worse thana group of college students on an explicit learning task (memorizing simple letter-to-number rules), whereas both groups had the same level of performance on an articialgrammar learning task. Finally, the obvious fact that children are able to rapidly andeortlessly acquire a vast variety of (implicit) information (linguistic, cultural, social,and otherwise) during their rst years of living despite their shortcomings in explicitlearning tasks, such as conscious memorization, suggests that implicit learning is largelyage-independent (this is further supported by data listed in Reber, 1992). The bottom-line, following these properties of the implicit learning of sequential information, seemsto be that such processes possibly evolved very early in phylogenetic history in orderto become so prevalent in human and animal cognition.From the present viewpoint of language learning we might ask: if this kind of learn-ing is so ubiquitous in nature, why is it the case that no other organism appears tohave developed a communication system comparable with human language in its com-plexity? The answer is related to the larger, more intricate brain of humans comparedwith all other animals:with increasing neurological sophistication, organisms become capable ofdetecting more and more tenuous covariations. Organisms as primitive asAplysia [a marine mollusk which responds to conditioning] require unam-biguous and non-varying pairing of stimuli for learning; humans are capableof the detection of much more subtle statistical covariations involving manystimulus elements and environmental properties. Or, if one prefers otherterminology, humans are capable of learning `rules'. (Reber, 1992: p. 45;my comment)Now, Reber seems to suggest that the sequential learning mechanisms found in dier-ent species are homologues; that is, they all date back to a vital adaptation in a veryearly ancestor of all subsequent organisms capable of sequence processing. However,it is, at least, conceivable that in some species this kind of processing ability aroseindependently|as analogues|simply because these organisms were submitted to es-sentially the same environmentally pressures, leading to the same solutions (but per-haps implemented in dierent ways). It does not matter for the purpose of the presentargument whether the capacity for sequential learning is subserved by phylogeneticallyhomologue or analogue structures. What is important, however, is that selectionalpressures have forced the evolution of sequential learning mechanisms in a multitudeof dierent organisms. This will set the stage|in terms of learning mechanisms|formy account of the origin and evolution of language.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 1375.2.1 The Birth of LanguageThe rst step towards language in humans might have been, as we shall see, a byproductof bipedalism12 . When the hominids split from the apes somewhere between 4 and 8million years before present, the dening characteristics of the rst known hominid,Australopithecus afarensis was bipedalism (although it probably often still used itshands in locomotion). Notice that bipedalism not only minimized energy loss duringthe hottest hours of the day (because less body surface is exposed to the sun whenwalking upright), but it also freed the hands and arms from participation in locomotion.This hominid later evolved into two distinct lineages known as robust and gracile. Theformer lineage eventually became extinct, whereas it is believed that the latter evolvedinto the Homo lineage about 2 million years before present. Homo habilis is the earliestknown Homo, appearing between 2.2 and 1.6 million years ago in Africa. Followingthis hominid we nd the larger H. erectus|which spread out of Africa to most of theOld World|and appears to have evolved into archaic H. sapiens. Between 200,000and 150,000 years ago, the anatomically modern form of humans, H. sapiens sapiensemerged in Africa. These early humans migrated to the Old World about 100,000before present, where they gradually replaced the hominids that had migrated earlier.Some 35,000 years before present the last of the early migrants, the Neanderthals,disappeared, leaving H. sapiens sapiens behind as the only living hominid.But when did language evolve? It is likely that the evolution of language startedwith (or, at least, did not `take o' until) the emergence of the Homo lineage. Endocastsof H. habilis seem to indicate the presence of brain structures homologous to purportedlanguage areas in modern day human brains, such as Broca's area. This is importantsince it has recently been suggested that an area located within the left ventral frontalregion of the cortex subserves hierarchically organized sequential behavior. Greeneld(1991) argues that \during the rst two years of life a common neural substrate (roughlyBroca's area) underlies the hierarchical organization of elements in the developmentof speech as well as the capacity to combine objects manually, including tool use"(p. 531). She presents experimental data from early language learning and from atask involving the hierarchical nesting of cups to support her position. Summing upthe results from these experiments, she writes: \from about 9 to 20 months of age,children pass through parallel and quite synchronous stages of hierarchical complexity12The following paragraph briey outlining the descent of humans from the apes is based largely onCorballis (1992). Notice that these matters are the subject of some debate and should therefore not beregarded as denitive. Still, any changes that the future might bring are not likely to be problematic formy account of language origin, since the latter does not rely directly on these, admittedly, controversialhistorical data.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 138in forming spoken words and combining objects" (1991: p. 539).This account receives further support from a reported study of adult aphasics; thatis, individuals with acquired language disorders following lesions in and often closelyaround Broca's area. A large number of such Broca's aphasics suer from agramma-tism. Their speech lacks the hierarchical organization we associate with syntactic trees,and instead appears to be a collection of single words or simple word combinations.Interestingly, Grossman (1980) found that Broca's aphasics, besides their noticeableagrammatism, also had an additional decit in reconstructing hierarchical tree struc-ture models from memory. He took this as suggesting that Broca's area subserves notonly syntactic speech production, but also functions as a locus for supramodal process-ing of hierarchically structured behavior. It is, however, possible that the supramodaldecit following lesions to Broca's area might be a result of damage to two distinctsets of cortical pathways, emanating in close proximity from this area of the brain.Indeed, Greeneld (1991) has hypothesized (based on neurobiological and behavioraldata) that starting at the age of two a cortical dierentiation of Broca's area begins,leading to distinct capacities for linguistic processing and more complex object combi-nation. Whether this hypothesis is true is a matter of some debate (see the commentsto Greeneld, 1991, for instance, Jacobs, 1991), but it suces for the present accountthat Broca's area appears to be \a multifunction organ adapted to the regulation ofsequential activity in several dierent domains" (Lieberman, 1991: p. 567).Returning to H. habilis, and the rst indication of the existence of Broca's areain hominids, we can plausibly endow this hominid with the prerequisites for somekind of language, based on an ability to deal with sequential information13. Languagemight therefore have originated with this hominid as a kind of systematic set of man-ual gestures (hence the importance of the freeing of the hands following bipedalismcf. Corballis, 1992). However, I contend that this kind of manual language is closerrelated to presentday sign language than to the gestures we sometimes still use whencommunicating. The reason for this is that the neurological seat of the production ofthese early hominid gestures are likely to have been Broca's area in the left hemisphereof the brain (following the discussion above). Moreover, neurological studies of congen-itally deaf people have shown that their production of sign language|as in the case ofspeech in hearing people|can be located to Broca's area, whereas gesturing generally13At this point, it is worth noting that purported homologues to Broca's area have been found inmacaque and squirrel monkeys, but that lesioning that area does not signicantly impair the monkeys'vocal utterances (cf. Hauser, 1991). Thus, even though these monkeys appear to have homologues toBroca's area they do not seem to use it for vocalization. As Pinker (1994) adds, this could also havebeen the case for the early hominids, such as H. habilis . However, this point only eects the timing oflanguage's rst appearance, not the chronological order of its evolution.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 139is located in the right hemisphere (Neville, 1993). I therefore propose that the functionof Broca's area in this early period of hominid evolution was biased towards relativelysimple, sequential manual combination (perhaps only slightly more complex than thesequential behavior observed in presentday chimps by, e.g., Matsuzawa, 1991).As a means of communication, the early hominid manual language had some ob-vious limitations. For communication to take place at all, the hominids would havehad to face each other; for example, making it dicult to communicate during thelocomotion of a hunt. Instruction in various manual tasks would also have been di-cult. Consequently, it seems plausible to assume that over evolutionary time, besidesincreasing in complexity, gestural language eventually became augmented with verbalsounds. This was partly subserved by a signicant increase in brain size (in fact, adoubling of the brain size took place in the time between H. habilis and late specimensof H. sapiens, cf. Corballis, 1992). However, the conguration of the vocal apparatus inmost of the Homo lineage might have constituted an obstacle for the further evolutionof language towards its present (predominately) vocal form.A gradual change of the supralaryngeal vocal tract started some 250,000 years be-fore present|eventually leading to the unique vocal tract of modern humans|withthe Broken Hill fossil skulls of H. sapiens sapiens dating from 150,000 years ago in-dicating an intermediate form (Lieberman, 1973). During this period of change, thelarynx descended into the pharynx, creating an upside-down L-shaped tract in whichthe tongue moved backwards in the oral cavity. This permitted modern humans togenerate a variety of vocal tract congurations, some of which produced a number ofnew sounds, such as, vowels like [a], [i], and [u] as well as velar consonants like [g] and[k]. The novel vowels, in particular, have been shown to be extremely valuable in verbalcommunication since \a normal human speaker can produce the acoustic signals thatspecify these sounds without being very precise as he maneuvers his tongue" (Lieber-man, 1976: p. 668). As a result of the evolution of the supralaryngeal vocal tract,H. sapiens sapiens was not only likely to have had a larger phonetic vocabulary thanprevious hominids, but its vocal utterances also had a much higher degree of acousticstability, which, in turn, allowed more intelligible speech14. Together, these propertiesof the modern human vocal tract may have paved the way for the transition from a14H. sapiens neanderthalensis provides an interesting example of a Homo lineage who did not evolvethe modern human vocal tract. In fact, their vocal tract is very similar to that of presentday chim-panzees (and of newborn human infants up to an age of about 6 months). Computer simulations re-ported in Lieberman (1973) suggest that both Neanderthals and chimps would not be able to producethe vowels [a], [i], and [u]. Nevertheless, the former presumably had some kind of vocal language|albeit a language with phonetic decits relative to that of H. sapiens sapiens|perhaps still combinedwith extensive use of manual gestures.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 140language system primarily relying on manual gestures to one predominately based onvocal utterances15.5.2.2 The Baldwin Eect RevisitedSo far, I have argued that language may originate early in the Homo lineage, arguablysubserved by neurological structures (in the vicinity of Broca's area) adapted to thelearning and processing of sequential information. As argued in the start of the presentsection, these processes are likely to be evolutionary ancient, but have evolved to dealwith highly complex hierarchically organized input (such as, natural languages) throughhuman evolution. At this point, it might be possible to (more or less) accept the aboveevolutionary scenario concerning the origin of language, but then argue that furtherevolution has worked to make language innate as hypothesized by the theory of UG.For example, although Pinker & Bloom (1990) acknowledge that some kind of learningmechanism not specic to language may have been underlying the origin of language,the (earlier mentioned) Baldwin eect (Baldwin, 1896) would gradually have causedthe language acquisition process to become entirely language specic.To support this contention, Pinker & Bloom rely on a simulation reported by Hin-ton & Nowlan (1987) and discussed in Maynard-Smith (1987). Recall that the ideaof the Baldwin eect is to allow phenotypical learning to inuence the genotype (in anonLamarkian way) and thereby accelerate evolution. In their simulation of the Bald-win eect, Hinton & Nowlan (1987) investigate the evolution of a very simple organismconsisting of a neural net with 20 possible connections. A 20 bit vector designates theorganism's genotype in which each bit corresponds to a gene containing one of threedierent alleles: 1, 0, or ? (the rst, specifying the presence of a connection; the next,the absence of one; and the last, an open/close switch to be set via learning). For theorganism to increase its adaptive tness, all connections must be set correctly. Hence,it is no more advantageous to have 19 correctly set connections than just 1. The geno-types of the rst 1,000 organisms, which made up the initial population, had on average10 alleles specifying learnable switches (?) and 5 of each of the two remaining alleles for,respectively, the presence (1) or absence (0) of connections. Each organism is allowed1,000 learning trials (each a random setting of the switches) in its lifetime. When anorganism hits on a switch combination, which, together with the right settings of thegenetically specied connections, is identical with the unique adaptive conguration,15Incidentally, Corballis (1992) has suggested that this `second freeing of the hands' lead to theexplosion of cultural artifacts about 35,000 years ago. \That is, manufacture and language would nolonger be competing for the same medium, and both could then develop without mutual interference"(p. 214).
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 141learning stops. Notice that only if the all genetically specied genes have the correctalleles, is it possible for an organism to increase its tness through a correct settingof the switches. Procreation involves 1,000 (crossover) matings between two parents,each selected according to their Darwinian tness (which is determined as a probabilityproportional to the number of learning trials (n) remaining after the right congurationhas been attained: 1 + 19n=1000). In this way, the sooner an organism reaches theadaptive conguration, the more likely it is to be chosen as a parent (i.e., the betterreproductive tness).During the rst 10 generations, selection did not seem to have much impact, butthis changed within the next 10 generations. After 20 generations, the incorrect alleleshave all but disappeared from the genotype, leaving all genetically specied alleles asbeing correct. Hence, it can therefore be said that learning has guided the evolution ofthis organism (just as the Baldwin eect suggests). Unfortunately, Hinton & Nowlanmake a too strong remark regarding the amount of genetic hardwiring obtained in thesimulation: \there is very little selective pressure in favor of genetically specifying thelast few potential connections, because a few learning trials is almost always sucientto learn the correct settings of just a few switches" (1987: p. 497; my emphasis). Infact, the last `few' connections that needs to be learned amount to about 45% of thetotal number of alleles, whereas the remaining 55% of these are specied genetically (anabsolute dierence of 2 alleles). It is clear that the approximately 25% incorrect allelesthat an organism starts out with, disappear; and that the number of correct alleles, onthe other hand, more than double from about 25% to 55%. It seems to be the case thatwhen an organism has a certain learning capacity, the latter might allow the former tochange maladapted parts of the genotype towards a better evolutionary t, while stillmaintaining much of the original learning ability. This point is corroborated by recentsimulations by French & Messinger (1994), showing that if the phenotypical plasticityof a given trait is high (i.e., most individuals are able to acquire it), then it is less likelyto become innate (via the Baldwin eect).Now, what the simulations by Hinton & Nowlan (1987) and French & Messinger(1994) suggest is that when an organism brings powerful learning mechanisms to bearon the acquisition of a particular task, the Baldwin eect might, perhaps, lead to some-what more biased learning mechanisms, but not to the high degree of task specicityassociated with innately specied acquisition processes. From its origin, as we have seenearlier, language has been subserved by sequential learning mechanisms of considerablepower, suggesting that the Baldwin eect might be an unlikely explanation of how thepurported UG became innate. An additional argument in support of this suggestioncan be found by looking closer at one of the assumptions underlying the Baldwin eect:
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 142\In a xed environment, when the best thing to learn remains constant, this can lead tothe genetic determination of a character that, in earlier generations, had to be acquiredafresh each generation (Maynard-Smith, 1987: p. 761; my emphasis). But given thepresent perspective on language as a nonobligate symbiant, whose rate of evolutionarychange is much higher than that of its hominid hosts, it is clear that `best thing tolearn' does not remain constant. That is, the hominid learning mechanisms involved inlanguage learning are `chasing' a continuously moving target. Of course, it is possibleto object that some properties of language will be stable across linguistic change, andthat these properties could eventually become innate via the Baldwin eect. However,if the present account of language evolution is correct, then whatever stable (or uni-versal) properties we might nd, they are going to be|rst and foremost|byproductsof the learning and processing of language. As such, language has adapted to the id-iosyncrasies of the hominid learning and processing mechanisms subserving language.The subsequent universal properties have therefore been a `part' of, or rather, artifactsof the hominid genotype from the very beginning of language evolution. The upshotseems to be that the Baldwin eect cannot do the job of producing the massive innatelanguage endowment assumed by UG (pace Pinker & Bloom, 1990), leaving much roomfor genuine language learning in modern humans (a case for which I present additionaldevelopmental arguments in section 5.3).165.2.3 Linguistic ChangeHaving provided an evolutionary account of the development of the ecological nichewithin which language has evolved|its hominid hosts|we can now turn to the evolu-tion of language itself as evidenced through linguistic change. In unison with Corballis(1992), I contend that early vocal language started out in a very primitive form, perhapsinvolving only a single vowel. The changes in the supralaryngeal vocal tract follow-ing the emergence of H. sapiens sapiens some 150,000-200,000 years before present,allowed the development of more sophisticated forms, with vowel dierentiation andbetter articulation of consonants. I propose that some very rudimentary syntax mighthave been the next evolutionary step, permitting the description of actions involvinga subject and perhaps an object. This kind of early language presumably did not in-volve a morphological system; rather, single and plural instances of a particular thing16This leaves Pinker & Bloom (1990) and Pinker (1994) with a problem in their evolutionary expla-nation of UG. Either they have to bite the bullet and admit that an innate, language specic system,such as UG, could not have evolved through natural selection augmented by the Baldwin eect (and,subsequently, that much learning still takes place in language acquisition); or, they would have to comeup with a dierent evolutionary story explaining how language eventually became innate.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 143(or event) were simply referred to by dierent words (perhaps with some minor, butunsystematic, phonological similarities).Up until about 35,000 years before present, I hypothesize that the evolution oflanguage was quite slow, perhaps only involving the addition of relatively few vocab-ulary items, but following the explosion of cultural artifacts from this point in humanevolutionary history, we would have seen a dramatic growth in the number of words(referring to the multitude of new artifacts and other aspects of the rapidly evolv-ing culture), and perhaps, a more complex syntax allowing for the expression of morecomplex situations and events. The key to understanding the subsequent evolutionof language, I submit, is vocabulary growth within a system of limited learning andprocessing capacity. To accommodate the spurt in vocabulary growth, language hadto develop morphological systems in order not to exceed the learning and processingcapacities of its human hosts17. At rst, these early morphological systems would havebeen quite complex, but later developments would have simplied them gradually, soas to incorporate an ever growing vocabulary within the limits of human memory. Itis likely that syntax would have become more complex as the morphology became sim-pler. Wang (1976), in a discussion of a study of relative clause formation in Englishover the past 1,000 years, writes that \the simplication of morphology : : :although itmakes the language easier to learn, has the adverse eect of leaving too many sentencesunmarked at their clause boundaries. In order to reduce ambiguities for the listener,relative clauses become better and better marked" (p. 65). This explains the appear-ance of generally stronger restrictions on relative clause markers and the disappearanceof inections rst in nouns and, subsequently, in verbs18.The proposed eects of human learning and processing constraints on linguisticchange is further substantiated by recent simulations by Hare & Elman (1994), investi-gating the changes in English verb inection over the last 1,100 years. The morpholog-ical system of Old English (ca. 870) was quite complex involving at least 10 dierentclasses of verb inection (with a minimum of six of these being `strong'). The simula-tions involved several `generations' of neural networks, each of which received as inputthe output generated by a trained net from the previous generation. The rst net was17This development is somewhat similar to the shift from rote-learning to system building evidencedin the acquisition of vocabulary items in early childhood and, importantly, also observed in a connec-tionist model of this acquisition process (Plunkett & Marchman, 1993).18Here it should be noted that|as pointed out by Kiparsky, 1976|there appears to be cases wherea language has changed towards a more complex morphology (presumably with no signicant changein syntax). Such changes often occurs in relatively isolated cultures where the inux of new words islow and overall vocabulary growth may be rather slow. These cases therefore do not pose a problemfor my account, since it focuses on vocabulary growth, but also can allow for the possibility that lackof vocabulary growth can lead to an increase in morphological complexity over time.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 144trained on data representative of the verb classes from Old English. However, trainingwas stopped before learning had reached optimal performance. This is meant to reecta diculty in learning the inected forms to perfection. In the present framework, wecan construe this diculty as a consequence of a vocabulary whose requirements, interms of memory processing, is close to the limits of its human hosts. The imperfectoutput of the rst net is used as input for a second generation net, for which trainingis also halted before learning reaches asymptote. Output from the second net is thengiven as input to a third net, and so on, until a total of seven generations has beentrained. This training regime leads to a gradual change in the morphological systembeing learned; a change following imperfect learning of the inection of verbs that eitherhave a low frequency of occurrence in the training set, or have little internal phonologi-cal consistency (i.e., verbs placed far in phonological space from any prototype). Theirresults show that \verbs which either belong to small classes, lack consistent deningcharacteristics, or are low in frequency should change most rapidly; change in otherverbs will depend on the precise extent to which they possess the characteristics whichmake them resistant to assimilation" (Hare & Elman, 1994: p. 31). The change takingplace in the verb inection system being transferred between generations closely re-sembles, in considerable detail, the historical change in English verb inection leadingfrom the highly complex past tense system of Old English to the modern English incor-porating one dominating class of `regular' inected verbs and a small set of `irregular'verbs.In this section, I have provided an account of the origin and evolution of language,pointing to sequential learning processes as possible mechanisms for language learn-ing and their possible underlying neurological substrate; presenting arguments againstlanguage becoming innate via the Baldwin eect; and, briey outlining a scenariodescribing the emergence and subsequent linguistic evolution of vocal language (frommanual language). Notice that both the exaptationist (e.g., Chomsky, 1972, 1982, 1988,1993; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989) and the adaptationist (Pinker, 1994; Pinker & Bloom,1990) UG positions (mentioned in the previous section) seem to be hard pressed whenit comes to explanations of language change, whereas the present account of languageevolution, as we have seen, lends itself easily to such explanations (perhaps, but notnecessarily, couched within a connectionists framework). For example, Pinker (1991)has put forward a dual-route model of modern English noun/verb morphology, sug-gesting that irregular forms are stored in a neural net-like fashion, whereas regularinection is produced via a rule component adding the prex `-ed'. However, this kindof model is faced with the problem of providing an account \for the qualitative shiftfrom a system with many verb classes of roughly equal status to one with a single
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 145rule and scattered exceptions, in order to explain how the current regular/irregularsystem developed" (Hare & Elman, 1994: p. 34{35). The model furthermore suersfrom an ontogenetic version of this problem which has to do with the explanation ofhow the rule component develops in early language acquisition. On the other hand,Plunkett & Marchman (1993) have presented a connectionist account in which a singlemechanism explains the qualitative shift from rote-learning to system building in theearly acquisition of vocabulary items. On this developmental note, I will now turnto the ontogenetic development of language as reected by the above account of itsphylogenetic history.5.3 Language Learning, Maturation, and InnatenessAs should be clear, the account of the origin and evolution of language presented inthe previous sections favors a learning based view of language acquisition|a view-point which is signicantly dierent from present UG inspired perspectives. However,it would seem that such an account would be impossible given the apparent poverty ofthe stimulus (for instance, cf. Chomsky, 1986, 1993; Crain, 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini,1989, 1994; Pinker, 1994; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). The primary linguistic input, whichis available to a child acquiring language, appear to be so noisy and provide such apoor generalization basis that learning seems almost inconceivable. This leads to thefollowing language learning paradox: On the one hand, learning a language involves de-riving a complex model of language structure, given noisy and partial input, apparentlywithout the benet of usable feedback from others, making this an extraordinarily hardtask. Children, on the other hand, are capable of acquiring language rapidly and rou-tinely at a time when their remaining cognitive abilities are quite limited. A possiblesolution to this paradox, is to suggest that \in certain fundamental respects we do notreally learn language; rather, language grows in mind" where `learning' is understoodas being processes of \association, induction, conditioning, hypothesis-formation andconrmation, abstraction and generalization, and so on" (Chomsky, 1980: p. 134{135).In this section, I will present an processing based account of language learning in whicha reappraisal of the poverty of the stimulus argument will pave the way for a solutionto the language learning paradox.Based on evidence from studies of both rst and second language learners, New-port (1990) has proposed a \Less is More" hypothesis which suggests \paradoxically,that the more limited abilities of children may provide an advantage for tasks (likelanguage learning) which involve componential analysis" (p. 24). Maturationally im-posed limitations in perception and memory forces children to focus on certain parts
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 146of language, depending on their stage of development. Interestingly, it turns out thatthese limitations make the learning task easier because they help the children acquirethe building blocks necessary for further language learning. In contrast, the superiorprocessing abilities of adults prevent them from picking up the building blocks directly;rather, they have to be found using complex computations, making language learningmore dicult (hence, the notion of a crucial period in language learning, a point weshall return to). This means that \because of age dierences in perceptual and memo-rial [sic] abilities, young children and adults exposed to similar linguistic environmentsmay nevertheless have very dierent internal data bases on which to perform linguisticanalysis" (Newport, 1990: p. 26).In relation to morphology, Newport discusses whether a learner necessarily needs apriori knowledge akin to UG in order to segment language into the right units corre-sponding to morphemes. She nds that this is not the case; rather, segmentation may,indeed, be possible \even without advance knowledge of the morphology, if the unitsof perceptual segmentation are (at least sometimes) the morphemes which natural lan-guage have developed" (1990: p. 25). More recently, Goldowsky & Newport (1993)have corroborated this point via a computer simulation of the acquisition of a simplearticial system of morphology. When comparing a system receiving unrestricted in-put with a system equipped with a restrictive input lter|whose constraints on theinput was gradually loosened over time (to simulate maturation)|they found that theformer fails to learn an ecient representation of the data, whereas the latter is ableto acquire an optimal solution to the morphological mapping task. These simulationresults therefore lend further support to Newport's (1990) less-is-more hypothesis.The less-is-more hypothesis has a natural interpretation within the present frame-work. As mentioned earlier, language|being a nonobligate symbiant|confers selectiveadvantage onto its hominid hosts through its function as a means of communication.To reap the full advantage of language, it is important for the hominids to acquire lan-guage as early as possible in their life time (so as to have the increased tness for thelongest time possible). This means that for language to be the most useful to its hostsit must adapt itself in such a way that it is learnable by children despite their limitedmemory and perception capacities. Importantly, this imposes strong constraints onwhat language can look like, since languages that are not learnable by children willdisappear. That is, languages have evolved to be learnable primarily by children whichexplains why acquiring a language as an adult can be quite dicult. The critical periodcan therefore be viewed as a spandrel with no particular adaptive properties, emergingas a by-product of language adapting to the learning and processing capacities of infanthominids.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 1475.3.1 The Critical PeriodHurford (1991) also nds the critical period to be a spandrel; albeit, he arrives at thisconclusion coming from a signicantly dierent direction. In a computer simulationof some complexity, Hurford demonstrated that natural selection in a period of 1,000generations would push a population of individuals from having no knowledge of lan-guage at all to one with an ability for the acquisition language early in life. Notice thatin this framework, the critical period implies the ability to acquire language ceasesto be an advantage at later life stages. Hurford suggests that \thinking at the endof the critical period as `switching o', like the deliberate switching o of a light, isless appropriate than thinking of it as a point where the `energy' in the system, theselection pressure in favor of positive alleles, is dissipated, and the `light' goes out forlack of pressure to keep it `on' " (1991: p. 193). However, it is worth noting that eachgene in the simulation can have either an allele which inhibits language acquisition, orone which facilitates it. Regarding the former, Hurford argues that the inhibitive genesserves as a kind of trade-o cost, simulating that adaptation for a particular trait mightinhibit other traits, such as, for example, when a sea turtle's adaptation for swimminginhibits its locomotion on land. It is clear that some trade-os have been made in theevolution of language. This appears to be the case with the earlier mentioned changeof the supralaryngeal vocal tract which, in its modern adult form, signicantly inhibitsrespiration, decreases our sense of smell, and increases the possibility of choking onfood (Lieberman, 1973, 1991). Nevertheless, I question Hurford's particular implemen-tation of this evolutionary principle insofar as this is arguably the dominating factorleading to the apparent evolutionary disadvantage of language acquisition in later lifestages. It is not clear that the language acquisition `light would go out' if trade-o wasimplemented in a dierent (perhaps more realistic) fashion.More recently, Pinker (1994) has picked up on Hurford's simulation results, suggest-ing to conceive maturational changes in terms of \a machine shop in a thrifty theatercompany to which props and sets and materials periodically returns to be dismantledand reassembled for the next production" (p. 294). Consequently, this picture suggeststhat once language has been acquired the language acquisition machinery should besent back to the machine shop for recycling (since the maintenance of neural tissue isvery resource demanding). Although as an evolutionary point this is perhaps conceiv-able, the theater machine shop metaphor does not make much sense in terms of brainmaturation. What would the recycling of large areas of neural tissue amount to in thedevelopment of the brain? Granted the brain has a high degree of plasticity (see, e.g.,
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 148Ramachandran, 1993; Recanzone & Merzenich, 1993), but it is unlikely that it is ca-pable of the kind of restructuring required by the Pinker's scenario. Furthermore, themetaphor relies, I think mistakenly, on the existence of a language acquisition devicefunctionally separate from whatever machinery is involved in the processing of lan-guage. Such functional separation of the learning and processing of language might bea historical left-over from Chomsky's (1965) idealization of instantaneous acquisition oflanguage, suggesting that the adult language competence can be studied independentlyof how it it is acquired. In any event, if this separation is valid, we would expect tobe able to obtain evidence indicating some kind of dissociation between the ability toacquire and process language; and, to my knowledge, no such data have been reported.Connectionist models, on the other hand, do (as pointed out in chapter 2) not re-quire a separation of learning and processing. Indeed, they seem to suggest that bothmust be subserved by the same underlying mechanisms. Now, it is clear that New-port's (1990; Goldowsky & Newport, 1993) research only addresses the acquisition ofmorphology, but it is clear that on my present account the same kind of explanationswould also apply to the acquisition of syntax. Indeed, my view implies that the most|if not all|of the purported universal syntactic principles of UG may not need to bepostulated as chunks of innate domain-specic knowledge, but are instead proposed tobe mere artifacts of a learning mechanism undergoing maturational development. Suchmaturational changes are, of course, still innately specied, but, importantly, in a pre-dominately domain-general fashion. Evidence that maturational limitations on memorymight facilitate the acquisition of syntax can be found in the simulations presented inchapter 4, extending earlier work by Elman (1991b, 1993). Recall that these simula-tions showed that when a network was undergoing (simulated) maturational changes(in the form of a gradually loosening constraint on memory, as originally proposed byElman), it was possible for it to learn to respond appropriately to sentences derivedfrom a small phrase structure grammar of considerable linguistic complexity. However,without this maturational constraint the nets would fail to learn the task (displayinga behavior which might be somewhat comparable with that of late learners). Thesesimulation results support the idea that maturational constraints (of some sorts) ona learning mechanism may allow it to acquire relatively complex linguistic structurewithout presupposing the existence of innate language specic knowledge19. I nd that19. Still, it might be objected that these connectionist simulations only deal with small articiallygenerated corpora and will therefore not be able to scale up to noisy real world data. This might betrue, but recent research in statistical language learning suggests otherwise. The earlier mentionedresults obtained by Finch & Chater (1993) demonstrated that simple statistics|similar to what theabove networks are sensitive to|can lter out noise and induce lexical categories and constituentphrases from a 40 million word corpus extracted from INTERNET newsgroups.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 149such a maturationally constrained learning mechanism may provide a partial solutionto the language learning paradox, but the question still remains of how to overcomethe apparent poverty of stimulus.5.3.2 The Poverty of the Stimulus ReconsideredThe roots of the poverty of stimulus argument goes back about thirty years to Chomsky(1965), but has been elaborated considerably since (e.g., amongst others, by Chomsky,1986). This argument against language learning, in fact, consists of a several inter-related sub-arguments: Arbitrary universals: A number of the universal linguistic principles that childrenappear to acquire are essentially arbitrary and have no direct reection in theinput. For example, a child knows that the earlier mentioned sentence `Whodoes Anita believe the story that Betty bit' is ungrammatical without ever havingreceived information that this is so. Noisy input: The linguistic information available to a child is considerably noisy,consisting of both grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, but with no addi-tional information about which is which. Innite generalization: Children receiving signicantly dierent sets of input arenontheless capable of converging on the same underlying grammatical regularities(if you wish, grammar), serving as the nite basis from which an innite numberof utterances can be produced. Early emergence: Children are capable of applying a number of complex linguisticprinciples so early in their language development that it seems unlikely thatsucient time have elapsed for learning to be feasible. Inadequacy of learning methods: The (empiricist) general-domain learning meth-ods available in the explanation of language learning do not appear to be adequatefor the purpose of language acquisition.Together, these sub-arguments militate|decisively, according to many researchers (e.g.,Chomsky, 1986, 1993; Crain, 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989; 1994; Pinker, 1994)|against learning based approaches to language acquisition, favoring a UG perspectivecomprising a substantial innate database of linguistic principles and only little, lan-guage specic learning. Nevertheless, as will become evident below, each of these sub-arguments become less convincing vis-a-vis the present account of language evolutionand development.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 150The purported arbitrariness of universal linguistic principles is an intrinsic partof UG approaches to language (e.g., Crain, 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989; Pinker& Bloom, 1990). However, if we adopt the perspective on language as a nonobligatesymbiant (as suggested in section 5.1) and the subsequent evolutionary picture (outlinedin the previous section), then it is not necessary for the child to learn the universalprinciples. Rather, they come for `free' given that they are natural side-eects ofsequential processing and learning in a system with certain memorial and perceptuallimitations (recall the earlier mentioned processing based explanation of the paradigmcase of an arbitrary linguistic principle: subjacency). Notice that on this accountthe universal principles are not language specic chunks of knowledge which have beenstored innately (via the Baldwin eect), but by-products of the processing and learningof language by mechanisms evolved for the more general task of dealing with sequentialstructure in the environment. In other words, the apparent fact that the universallinguistic principles appear to be essentially arbitrary, and, furthermore, cannot reliablybe induced from the primary linguistic input, does not warrant a dismissal of learningbased approaches to language acquisition, if these universals, as I have suggested, canbe shown to be mere by-products of learning and processing in a system with certainresource limitations.It is often noted that the primary linguistic data available to a child is inconsis-tent and full of noise. This is clearly a problem for many classical models of languagelearning, such as, for example, the parser proposed by Berwick & Weinberg, 1984. Inthis model, language learning proceeds by attempting to parse input sentences; whenparsing fails a new rule is added to the grammar so that parsing can continue. It is nothard to imagine the catastrophical consequences following the presentation of incon-sistent input (such as, the ungrammatical sentence `Who does Anita believe the storythat Betty bit'). The model would add rules which would lead to ungrammatical sen-tences. Interestingly, connectionists models do not typically suer from this problem.Indeed, as pointed out by Seidenberg (1994) \it is demonstrably true that networks canlearn to solve problems in the face of inconsistent training : : :analysis of these learningsystems suggests that at least some inconsistencies in feedback or network behaviormight actually facilitate nding the solution to a problem" (p. 392). Even though it ispresently uncertain whether such models can solve the problem of language acquisitionunder conditions corresponding those facing a child, it is clear that the existence ofnoise in the primary linguistic input cannot be used as an a priori argument againstconnectionist models of language learning.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 151The problem of innite generalization given nite input has received considerableattention in the language learning literature (e.g., Elman, 1993; Gold, 1967; MacWhin-ney, 1992; Pinker, 1984, 1989), and is related to the previous problem of noisy inputdata. In a now classic paper, Gold (1967) proved that not even regular languages can belearned in nite time from a nite set of positive examples (i.e., grammatical sentences).This proof combined with the lack of observed negative input found in the primary lin-guistic data (that is, ungrammatical sentences do not come labeled as such, neitherdo adults reliably correct a child's ungrammatical utterances) leads to a predicamentregarding human language learning. Gold therefore suggested that his nding mustlead to at least one of the following three suppositions. Firstly, it is suggested that thelearning mechanism is equipped with information allowing it to constrain the searchspace dramatically. In other words, innate knowledge will impose strong restrictions onexactly what kind of grammars generate the proper projections from the input to (only)human languages. This is the approach which goes under the name of UG. Secondly,Gold proposes that children might receive negative input that we are simply not awareof. This would allow the correct projection to only human languages. However, seePinker (1989) for an extensive discussion and subsequent dismissal of such a proposal(though the prediction task, as applied in the simulations reported in chapter 3 and 4,might be construed as a kind of weak negative feedback). Thirdly, it could be the casethat there are a priori restrictions on the way the training sequences are put together.For instance, the statistical distribution of words and sentence structures in particularlanguage could convey information about which sentences are acceptable and which arenot (as suggested by, for instance, Finch & Chater, 1993). Regarding such an approach,Gold notes that distributional models are not suitable for this purpose because theylack sensitivity to the order of the training sequences.So, it seems that prima facie UG is the only way to get a language acquisition othe ground|even though learning has to take second place to innate domain-specicknowledge. Nevertheless, given our earlier discussions it should be clear that thisconclusion is far from inevitable. The way out of Gold's predicament without buyinginto UG can best be eshed out by taking a closer look at the two basic assumptionswhich the proof is based on:Given any language of the class and given any allowable training sequencefor this language, the language will be identied in the limit [i.e, it is learn-able in nite time from a nite set of examples]." (Gold, 1967: p. 449; myemphasis and comment).First of all, Gold is considering all possible permutations from a nite alphabet(of words) into possible languages constrained by a certain language formalism (e.g.,
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 152context-free or nite-state formalisms). Thus, he stresses that "identiability (learn-ability) is a property of classes of languages, not of individual languages." (Gold, 1967:p.450). This imposes a rather stringent restriction on candidate learning mechanisms,since they would have to able to learn the whole class of languages that can be derivedfrom the combination of an initial vocabulary and a given language formalism. Con-sidering the above discussion of language as a nonobligate symbiant, this seems likean unnecessarily strong requirement to impose on a candidate for the human languagelearning mechanism. In particular, the set of human languages is much smaller thanthe class of possible languages that can be derived given a certain language formalism.So, all we need to require from a candidate learning mechanism is that it can learn all(and only) human languages, not the whole class of possible languages derivable givena certain language formalism.Secondly, Gold's proof presupposes that the nite set of examples from which thegrammatical knowledge is to be induced can be composed in an arbitrary way. How-ever, if the learning mechanism is not xed but is undergoing signicant changes interms of what kind of data it will be sensitive to (as discussed above), then we havea completely dierent scenario. Specically, even though the order of the environmen-tally presented input that a learning mechanism is exposed to might be arbitrary, thecomposition of the eective training set is not. That is, maturational constraints on thelearning mechanism will essentially recongure the input in such a way that the train-ing sequence always will end up having the same eective conguration (and this is,in eect, comparable with Gold's third suggestion). Importantly, this is done withoutimposing any restrictions on the publically available language, i.e., the language thatthe child is exposed to. This point is further corroborated by simulations presentedin chapter 4. There it was found that a network trained while undergoing matura-tional changes was capable of dealing with sentences derived from a context-free phrasestructure grammar; and was furthermore able to produce (strong) generalizations.Having thus `disarmed' the apparent predicament following Gold's learnability proof,we now turn to the fourth sub-argument: the early emergence of linguistic competence.Crain (1991) presents results from a number of psycholinguistic experiments involv-ing children aged between 2 and 5 years, suggesting that they are capable of obeyingvarious complex linguistic constraints at early stages in their language acquisition. Headds that \there has been a steady increase in recent years in the number of empiricaldemonstrations of children's mastery of syntactic facts for which they have little, ifany, corresponding experience" (p. 611). This is then taken as evidence for a scenarioin which children are guided through language acquisition predominately by innate,language specic knowledge largely encoded as universal constraints. Nonetheless, the
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 153present learning and processing based account of language acquisition is fully compati-ble with the same data. In particular, this approach would predict that some universalswould be observable quite early in life because they emerge as side-eects of learningand processing; but it also promises to provide a chronological explanation of the dif-ferences in the time of onset between the various universals. A closer understanding ofhow maturational changes aect learning and processing capabilities is hypothesizedto provide the basis for such an explanation.Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) has in a similar fashion contended the existence of aninnate UG: \The newborn (and even prematurely born) infant displays a highly so-phisticated array of specic linguistic lters allowing for instant discrimination betweenlinguistic and non-linguistic sounds" (p. 27). A closer look at the evidence concerninginfant auditory perception, however, suggests that such linguistic lters are learned,not innate. Cross-language experiments investigating infant auditory perception havedemonstrated that 6-month-old infants in the United States and Sweden display `per-ceptual magnet eects' specic to their native language: \Linguistic experience shrinksthe perceptual distance around a native-language prototype, in relation to a nonpro-totype, causing the prototype to perceptually assimilate similar sounds" (Kuhl et al.,1992: p. 608). This magnet eect facilitates speech processing by permitting lesssalient instances of a phonetic category (characteristic of one's native language) to beperceived as a clear instance of that particular category, thus making speech percep-tion more robust (i.e., less prone to phonetic misclassication). Earlier experimentshave shown that nonhuman animals (e.g., Rhesus monkeys) do not seem to acquireperceptual magnets (Kuhl, 1991). Nevertheless, both nonhuman animals (e.g., chin-chillas and macaques) and human infants have been found to start out with the sameinnate ability to make a number of phonetic dierentiations in auditory perception(Kuhl, 1987). These dierences appear to correspond exactly to the collection of pho-netic units needed to perceive all the world's dierent languages. Given the presentperspective on language evolution, this is not surprising: language must necessarilykeep itself within the boundaries of its ecological niche, part of which is made up bythe basic auditory perceptional capacities of hominids (and other animals). Thus, \in-fants' ability to hear the dierences between phonetic units is innate and attributableto general auditory processing mechanisms. Perceptual boundaries are not argued tobe due to special processing mechanisms that evolved for language in human beings"(Kuhl, 1993: p. 48). That learning is fundamental in speech perception is further sup-ported by experiments showing that 4-day-old infants are able to distinguish utterancesfrom their own native language from those of other languages|even when the speechsamples were passed through a (400 Hz) low-pass lter (Mehler, Jusczyk, Lambertz,
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 154Halsted, Bertoncini & Amiel-Tison, 1988). Pace Piattelli-Palmarini (1989: p. 28; note19), this indicates that learning already starts in the womb (despite distortions broughtabout by the amniotic uid), allowing the infant to become sensitive to the prosody ofhis or her native language.Finally, we can turn to the last sub-argument concerning the general inadequacyof (empiricist) learning. A version of this argument has been presented by Ramsey &Stich (1991) as the `competent scientist gambit'. The idea of this thought experimentis to replace the language learning mechanism(s) with the best empiricist scientistaround. Her task is to come up with the specic grammar underlying a collection ofutterances, making up the primary linguistic input from a language unknown to her.She is allowed to use any empiricist technique available, but she is not permitted tolearn the language herself since that would allow her to use (her own) grammaticalityjudgements to determine the grammar (information that is not available to a childacquiring his or her rst language). It should be apparent that specied in this way,the task is certainly nontrivial, if not impossible. Given the data available there seemsto be no guarantee that she will end up with the right grammar (since there is no wayof proving that the nal grammar will not overgeneralize). Ramsey & Stich show in anumber of renements of this thought experiment that it appears to be necessary toequip the scientist with information akin to an innate UG before we have a reliableprocedure for grammar `learning'. Arguments of this sort are therefore taken to showthat empiricist language learning is impossible even in principle.I think this argument is misguided for, at least, three reasons. First, there seemsto be no reason to expect that whatever structure language might take in our heads(so-to-speak) should be readily available to us by means of introspection. That is,our language acquisition machinery cannot be likened to a homunculus (even if it hasthe qualities of a competent scientist). Instead, if the present account is right, it isgoing to be a statistically based learning device20. This leads to a second caveat con-cerning the kind of learning devices the scientist may employ. For example, as arguedabove, a maturationally constrained learning process might prevent overgeneralizationby `reordering' its eective input. Of course, one could object that Chomsky (1956)demonstrated that statistical approaches to language acquisition are inadequate. Hereit is, as Elman (1993) stresses, \important to distinguish between the use of statis-tics as the driving force for learning, and statistics as the outcome of learning"(p. 87).Chomsky's proofs was only concerned the latter form of learning, whereas connectionist20Indeed, the experimental results presented in Juliano & Tanenhaus (1993) point in this direction(see also Seidenberg, 1994, for a similar view).
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 155models typically rely the former. The nal lacuna in the competent scientist gambitis the assumption that empiricist oriented learning cannot involve signicant, but nev-ertheless non-language specic, innate constraints (or biases) on the learning process.The present account of language learning and evolution challenges that assumptionwithout becoming yet another version of UG. The bottom-line is that the competentscientist gambit intuition pump appear to run out of steam when faced with a statis-tically oriented language learning account constrained by processing and maturationalconsiderations.5.3.3 The Objection from CreolizationIn the remaining part of this chapter, I will briey address a couple of possible ob-jections that prima facie appear to be rather damaging to a learning based account.The rst of these is the creolization of pidgin languages (and other languages with asimilarly inconsistent structure). Originally, creolization was the name of a process inwhich children made a pidgin language their own native tongue, creating a creole. Apidgin is a language which lacks any signicant grammatical structure and in whichcommunicative understanding therefore must rely mostly on constraints provided bylexical semantics, and perhaps intonation. A creole, on the other hand, displays aclear|albeit, from the standpoint of established languages, not perfect|grammaticalstructure. Bickerton (1984) reports a case of creolization in a single generation. At theend of the last century, workers from a variety of countries were brought together onHawaiian sugar plantations. The need for communication soon led to the developmentof a pidgin. Many of the plantation workers' children spent most of their time in sepa-ration from their parents, overseen by a worker speaking pidgin. These children endedup inventing Hawaiian Creole. Another example of (what may be) creolization was re-ported by Singleton & Newport (1993) in a study of a 7 year old congenitally deaf boy.Simon was born to deaf parents who started to learn American Sign Language (ASL)at about 15 years of age. Simon's only source of input was the `approximated ASL' ofhis late-learner parents. In tests comparing Simon's performance on ASL morphologywith that of his parents, it was clear that his performance surpassed theirs. Moreover,Simon's performance was shown to be equal to that of children whose parents werenative speakers of ASL, despite receiving a more inconsistent set of linguistic input.Simon was thus able to become a native speaker of ASL, something his parents neverachieved.Pinker (1994) and Bickerton (1984) take such creolization as strong evidence for aninnate UG, permitting (or rather, forcing) children to impose structure on inconsistent
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 156input, as in Simon's case, or on almost structure-less input, in the case of the childrenon the Hawiian plantations. It is clear that the kind of `classical' learning devices thatare presupposed in the competent scientist gambit will not be able to do the trick.But does creolization therefore make language learning impossible? Some reason foroptimism can be found in Singleton & Newport's (1993) suggestion that \many kindsof devices, not necessarily restricted to language learning, will work like this: sharpen-ing consistent mappings, and ignoring or losing inconsistent ones" (p. 49). One couldfurther hypothesize that if language acquisition is subserved by maturationally con-strained learning mechanisms, acquiring sequentially organized hierarchical structure,then such a process might itself impose structure where none is in the input, or wherethe structure is plagued by inconsistency. Although this account is, admittedly, some-what speculative, it does, at least, rule out the possibility of any in principle argumentsbased on creolization against language learning (while pointing towards a possible sim-ulation experiment which will be described in the section on future directions in thenal chapter).5.3.4 The `Morphology Gene' ObjectionA second, possibly deleterious objection to the present account of language acquisition(and evolution) could, perhaps, be based on Gopnik's (1990a, 1990b) and Gopnik &Crago's (1991) work on individuals with `Specic Language Impairment' (SLI)|alsocalled `dysphasics'|from a three-generation family. Her studies suggest that thesesubjects suer from a selective impairment of their morphological system, while otherparts of their language ability is left intact. The cause for this selective decit ishypothesized to be an abnormality in a dominant gene associated with the learningof abstract morphology. This, in turn, implies the postulation of a separate grammarcomponent for the learning (and processing) of morphology along the lines suggestedin Pinker (1984). Some (e.g., notably Pinker 1991, 1994; Pinker & Bloom, 1990) takeGopnik's results to possibly conrm the existence of an innate UG. Indeed, if the abovehypothesis is true, language learning (as suggested above) would only be able to playa minor role in the explanation of language acquisition.But, other explanations of the impairment data are possible. First, there is con-siderable controversy concerning the interpretation of Gopnik's data and the proposedextent of the decit. Vargha-Khadem & Passingham (1991), who also are studying thesame family, stress that the impaired individuals in addition to their problems withmorphology, suer from a severe developmental speech disorder, as well as having prob-lems with both phonological repetition and aspects of lexical processing. Apart from
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 157the problems with morphology, \the aected members show decits in understandingmany other types of syntactical structure, such as the reversible passive, postmodiedsubject, relative clause and embedded forms" (p. 226). Moreover, a closer reection onthe data presented in Gopnik & Crago (1991) points to an alternative, processing basedreason for the decit. Gopnik notes that dysphasics generally appear to learn inectedwords as whole, unanalyzed lexical items, as if the latter had no internal morphologicalstructure. In addition, they are very late in developing language. Recall that the latelanguage learners of both second and rst language (Newport, 1990) also appear tolearn words as unanalyzed wholes. So, the late onset of learning (for whatever reason)might put these individuals in a similar position to normal late learners, preventingthem from ever acquiring a `native' language ability. Of course, other factors, such as,abnormal constraints on memory and processing, are likely to play a part, too. Recentresults obtained by Blackwell & Bates (1993) complement this picture. They were ableto induce an agrammatic prole of morphological errors in normal adults simply by in-creasing the subjects' processing load via a secondary task. The results \suggest thatthis selective prole does not necessarily indicate the existence of a distinct sub-systemspecialized for the implicated aspects of syntax, but rather may be due to the vulner-ability of these forms in the face of global resource diminution" (p. 2). Hence, it seemsthat a processing based explanation of Gopnik's results (also hinted at by Fletcher,1990) is possible, which, in turn, takes the sting out of this second objection21.Having thus presented my account of language evolution and development, I have,as it turns out, to a certain degree followed a recipe put forward by Tooby & Cosmides(1990): \If one proposes that the ability to acquire a human language is a spandrelof general purpose learning mechanisms, one must state exactly what those generalpurpose mechanisms are, show that they exist, demonstrate that they are adaptations,and then demonstrate that these general purpose mechanisms can, in fact, allow oneto learn language (through, for example, a learnability analysis : : : )" (p. 762). Ad-mittedly, the theory outlined in this chapter does not fully meet this challenge. Inparticular, I have not stated exactly what the general learning mechanisms might be.Rather, I have presented a program for how the challenge might be addressed, propos-ing to construe language as a nonobligate symbiant evolved through natural selection.21Of course, data concerning other kinds of developmental language impairments (such as, the casesof `linguistic savants', Smith & Tsimpli, 1991) may serve as the basis for a similar kind of objections.However, space does not allow me to address such possible objections here. I submit my response aboveto Gopnik's results as a possible template for future rebuttals of such objections.
CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 158As such, language may be a spandrel from a hominid perspective, whereas the under-lying learning mechanisms are not. The latter are likely to have evolved to permit theextraction of complex sequential information from the environment. The mechanismssubserving language acquisition may therefore not be language-specic, but neither arethey totally domain-general either. The present theory thus seems to be incompat-ible with the four other positions presented in Figure 5.1, perhaps positioning itselfsomewhere in between them. Of course, there are many details not yet accounted for(as with any other theory). Whether the presented framework will be able to standthe test of time, only future research can tell. The concluding chapter will thereforepresent some suggestions for future work. Nonetheless, I hope to have shown here thata learning and processing based theory of language is, at least, possible.
Chapter 6ConclusionTo many, the theory of an innate UG provides the only viable explanation of the acqui-sition of language in the face of the purported poverty of the stimulus (e.g., Chomsky,1980, 1986; Crain, 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989, 1994; Pinker, 1994). Indeed, UGis often characterized as the `only game in town'. The idealization of this substantialendowment of language-specic knowledge as the basis of an innite linguistic com-petence, to be contrasted with the empirical shortcomings in language performance,has further supported a nativist position. Together, the argument from the povertyof stimulus and the competence/performance distinction have proved to be a majorstumbling block for learning and processing based approaches to language. Indeed, itwould appear thatthe child's language `grows in the mind' as the visual system develops thecapacity for binocular vision, or as the child undergoes puberty at a certainstage of maturation. Language acquisition is something that happens to achild placed in a certain environment, not something that the child does.(Chomsky, 1993: p. 29).In this thesis, I challenge the nativist view of the acquisition and processing oflanguage. Language acquisition involves more than the gradual unfolding of a geneticblue-print given minimal environmental stimuli|it involves learning (in a non-trivialsense of the latter). I have shown that linguistic competence need not be separatedfrom observable language performance within a connectionist framework and that theprimary linguistic stimuli might not be as poor as it rst appears. In short, UG is nolonger the only game in town. Connectionism has paved the way for an alternativeview which eschews the domain-specic nativism of UG, while leaving the door openfor innate constraints that are not specic to language.159
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 160Chapter 2 showed that the competence/performance distinction is an artifact ofconstruing linguistic grammars as sets of recursive rules. Given the innite nature ofsuch recursive grammars, a separation is necessary between the latter as an idealizedcompetence and a limited performance in order to account for observable languagebehavior. Moreover, we saw that the existence of very limited non-iterative recur-sion does not warrant this distinction. I therefore suggested that the distinction beabandoned for methodological as well as empirical reasons. However, this requiresan alternative means of representing the grammatical regularities subserving our lan-guage since couching the latter in terms of (recursive) rules is what created the needfor the distinction in the rst place. It was my contention that we might nd such arepresentational vehicle within connectionism. The simulations reported in chapters 3and 4 support this assertion, demonstrating that recurrent neural networks are able tocapture a limited amount of non-iterative recursion. The graceful degradation of net-work performance appears to follow human behavior on similar non-iterative recursivestructures. In addition, these networks also appear to be capable of the kind of stronggeneralization we would expect from models of human language learning.Having shown that connectionist models seem to have sucient computationalpower to serve as models of human language behavior, the question still remains ofhow to overcome the apparent poverty of the stimulus in its many guises. It is clearthat the linguistic information available to a child involves both grammatical and un-grammatical utterances. Although this kind of noisy input generally is a problem forclassical models of language learning (e.g., Berwick & Weinberg, 1984)|as pointedout in chapter 5|most neural networks models learn the best when faced with suchinconsistent input. Another problem addresses the issue of innite generalization givenonly nite (positive) input. This problem is solvable, I submit, by connectionist (orother) models incorporating maturational changes (as in the simulations in chapter4) implemented as decreasing constraints on processing/memory. In this way, earlylearning may facilitate the acquisition of simple structures which, in turn, can scaoldthe subsequent learning of more complex structures. A third problem is the purportedinadequacy of empirical learning methods as presented in thought experiments suchas `the competent scientist gambit' (Ramsey & Stich, 1991). This kind of criticismseems targeted at traditional models of learning using induction, hypothesis generationand testing, and so on. However, when it comes to learning driven by subtle statis-tical contingencies as found in connectionist models, our intuitions fall short, and areeven further confused by the incorporation of changing maturational constraints in thelearning process. Finally, children very early in their language development appear to
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 161master a number of linguistic principles that are essentially arbitrary and have no di-rect reection in the input. It is likely that these particular universals are not learned.Instead, I argue that they are by-products of the learning and processing of languagein human infants. As such, the universals are not innately specied chunks of linguis-tic knowledge, but side-eects of mechanisms that have evolved to learn and processsequential and hierarchical information in general.This leads us to the topic of the origin and evolution of language, a topic whichwas banned by the Societe de Linguistique de Paris in 1866, but which I neverthelessventured to discuss in chapter 5. Many evolutionary accounts of language take UGas the end goal of evolutionary processes (e.g., Chomsky, 1988, 1993; Corballis, 1992;Greeneld, 1991; Hurford, 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989; Pinker, 1994; Pinker &Bloom, 1990). The proponents of exaptationist theories of language evolution proposethat UG emerged as a product of genetic hitch-hiking, random mutations, or as a side-eect of increases in the complexity and size of the human brain (following some, yetunknown, natural laws). In contrast, adaptationist UG approaches typically suggestthat an increasingly complex language ability was selected for because it provides anecient means of communication. However, this position is not as easy to defend asit rst appears given the assumption of UG. The linguistic principles proposed by thetheory of UG manifest themselves as not serving any communicative functions. In fact,they provide arbitrary, idiosyncratic restrictions on the amount of information that canbe exchanged. Thus, it seems that \survival criteria, the need to communicate and planconcerted action, cannot account for our specic linguistic nature" (Piattelli-Palmarini,1989: p. 25).It is dicult to explain how language could have evolved through natural selectionto its present form given that its universals appear to have no functional explanationin purely linguistic terms. How could more progressively complex grammars havebeen selected for when the complex grammatical principles serve no communicativefunction, but often rather impede it? Pinker & Bloom (1990) bravely take on the task ofdefending the adaptationist UG position, arguing that the linguistic universals functionas part of a standardized communication protocol. It therefore does not matter whatthe universals are qua standards as long as everybody in a particular speech communityadopts the same set of standards. Pinker & Bloom furthermore stress that languageshows evidence of design in much the same way as the vertebrate visual system does.Although this points to an adaptationist explanation, there is an important disanalogybetween language and vision. When explaining the evolution of the vertebrate visualsystem we can point to functional aspects of its parts as having adaptive value, suchas, for example, the selective advantage of having an illumination sensitive pupil that
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 162permits the detection of objects given variable light intensity (within certain limits).The universal principles of UG, on the other hand, cannot be explained in the sameway since they serve no communicative function.If UG is assumed to be the end goal of language evolution, then we are forced toentertain either the, presently, rather unsubstantiated (`hopeful monster') position ofthe exaptationists, or the adaptationist counterpart with its problematic explanation oflinguistic universals. But if UG is not an a priori assumption, then we might nd a moresatisfying account of the origin and evolution of language. In chapter 5, I presented analternative evolutionary perspective on language without recourse to UG, construinglanguage as a non-obligate symbiant adapting to the idiosyncrasies of human learningand processing mechanisms. In this picture, mechanisms for the learning and processingof hierarchical, sequential information preceded language (as evidenced by the former'sspread across a vast variety of species). Since one of the main characteristics of languageis its temporal and sequential nature, it is likely that language in its origin was subservedby the evolutionarily more ancient sequential learning mechanisms. Language thengradually evolved from being a somewhat limited manual language of gestures intoa predominately vocal language. Syntactic complexity presumably increased followingdecreases in morphological complexity, the latter being a product of tting of a growingvocabulary within the memory capacities of nite minds.An important remaining question is whether subsequent evolution may have causedthe acquisition of language to become largely innately driven. Pinker & Bloom (1990)suggest that the Baldwin eect (Baldwin, 1896) perhaps allowed such a gradual trans-formation from a largely learning based language ability to one determined by aninnate UG. I have argued that this scenario is not a plausible one given the very natureof language acquisition. One of the premises of the Baldwin eect is that the trait,which is to become innate, should remain constant. This is not true in the case oflanguage acquisition since the rate of linguistic change is considerably faster than therate of evolutionary change in humans, making language a `moving target' vis-a-vis theBaldwin eect. Recall also that on the present account, cross-linguistic universals areby-products of learning and processing, and are therefore prevented from becoming in-nate. Moreover, the simulation experiments by French & Messinger (1994) can be takento indicate that if most hominids were able to learn the early forms of language, thenonly small changes would be seen in terms of innate specication of learning mech-anisms; perhaps, towards faster processing of more complex, sequential information.This, in turn, would permit language to become more complex, and therefore aordbetter communication, producing a pressure on the hominids to be able to learn andprocess even more complex structures, and so on.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 163Summarizing, in this thesis I set out to explain how the ability for innite languagesmight t within nite minds. I have demonstrated that certain kinds of nite-stateautomata|i.e., recurrent neural networks|are likely to have sucient computationalpower and the necessary generalization capability to serve as models for the process-ing and acquisition of language. An evolutionary picture was furthermore provided,suggesting a learning and processing based explanation of the origin and subsequentphylogenetic development of language. This paved the way for an account of languageacquisition, which relies on maturationally constrained learning processes, and chal-lenges the poverty of the stimulus argument. Importantly, my theory of the humanlanguage ability, as sketched in this thesis, cuts across both the dichotomy betweenexaptationist and adaptationist accounts of language evolution and the dichotomy be-tween domain-specic and domain-general language learning. Language has adapteditself to sequential learning and processing mechanisms existing prior to the appearanceof language. These mechanisms presumably also underwent changes after the emer-gence of language, but language was not the only evolutionary pressure causing thischange. Other kinds of hierarchical processing, such as, the need for increasingly com-plex manual combination following tool sophistication, were also contributing to thischange. This means that although the mechanisms subserving language are productsof adaptation, they were not adapted solely for the purpose of language. Instead, theyare products of adaptations for the processing and learning of hierarchically organizedsequential information. Language learning in this picture is therefore neither domain-specic with respect to language, nor is it fully domain-general, rather, it is orientedtowards the domain of sequential structure. As such, my theory of language processing,acquisition, and evolution makes a number of predictions whose investigation might de-termine whether the theory will stand the test of time and further scientic scrutiny. Iwill therefore close this thesis by mentioning a few of these predictions and suggestingways to research them.6.1 Future DirectionsLanguage Universals: X-theoryOne of the remaining and most pressing problems for the theory presented in thisthesis is to account for universal linguistic principles other than subjacency within alearning and processing based framework. This is a nontrivial task which is furthercomplicated by the fact that dierent linguistic theories prescribe dierent universals.Nonetheless, some universals appear to hold across dierent linguistic approaches, and
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 164thus provide suitable starting points for such investigations. For example, the X-theoryof phrase structure (Jackendo, 1977) is used in both GB (e.g., Chomsky, 1981, 1986)and GPSG (Gazdar et al., 1985). Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explainall linguistic universals, I concentrate on the above example and suggest that thispreliminary explanation might serve as a template for the further investigation of otheruniversals.There is a clear statistical tendency across all human languages to conform to aformat in which the head of a phrasal category consistently is placed in the sameposition|either rst or last|with respect to the remaining clause material1. Englishis a head-rst language; meaning that the head is always placed rst in a phrase, aswhen the verb is placed before the object NP in a transitive VP such as `eat licorice'.In contrast, speakers of Hindi would say the equivalent of `licorice eat', because Hindi isa head-last language. More generally, the phrase structure regularities of any languagein most cases have the basic structure of either (1) or (2):(1) [XP X : : : ] (e.g., [VP V : : : ], [NP N : : : ], [PP prep : : : ], etc.)(2) [XP : : : X] (e.g., [VP : : : V], [NP : : : N], [PP : : : post], etc.)In theory of UG, it is argued that knowledge of X-theory is innate (e.g., Chomsky,1986) and all that remains for the child to learn is whether her language is head-rstor head-last.However, I contend that the general tendency for languages to conform to theseordering principles may be a by-product of certain constraints on language learning.In particular, languages may need to have a certain consistency across their dierentgrammatical regularities in order for the former to be learnable by learning deviceswith adapted sensitivity to sequential information. Languages that do not have thiskind of consistency in their grammatical structure are perhaps not learnable, and theywill, furthermore, be dicult to process (cf. Hawkins, 1990). A possible way of demon-strating this point is to train a connectionist network on a language conforming to (1),another on (2), and a third net on a language such as (3), which violates the orderingprinciples of X-theory:(3) [VP : : :V], [NP N : : : ], [NP : : :S N], [PP prep : : : ], etc.We have already seen in chapter 4 that a language with the basic structure of (1)appears to be learnable by recurrent neural networks (even when cross-dependency1It should be noted, however, that pace Pinker(1994) all languages do not conform the orderingconventions of X-theory. For example, Hawkins (1990) mentions that Mandarin Chinese has both VOand OV word order as well as both prepositions and postpositions. This is an exception which Hawkinsattributes to processing.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 165structures are present). It therefore seems very likely that a language structurally con-forming to (2) would also be learnable. In contrast, I predict that a language withthe structure of (3) will not be learnable. Whether the results of such simulations willsupport this prediction, and thus my view of X-theory as an artifact of learning andprocessing constraints, cannot be determined a priori. Interestingly, the grounds forsome optimism regarding this project can be found in Hawkins' (1990) parsing theoryof word order universals, which suggests that constraints on memory and processingmay play a considerable role in determining grammatical structure. Although, he stillleaves room for innate grammatical knowledge, Hawkins also proposes that \the parserhas shaped the grammars of the world's languages, with the result that actual gram-maticality distinctions, and not just acceptability intuitions, performance frequencies,and psycholinguistic experimental results : : : , are ultimately explained by it" (p. 258).And this is precisely what my theory would predict.Simulating CreolizationIn chapter 5, I hinted at another learning based solution to a problem which has beentaken by many (e.g., Bickerton, 1984; Pinker, 1994) to require an innate UG: thecreolization of language. Recall that this process allows children to overcome a consid-erable amount of inconsistency in their linguistic input, as in the case of the creolizationof pidgins (Bickerton, 1984), and in Simon's ability to surpass the performance of hisparents despite only getting their `approximated ASL' as input (Singleton & Newport,1993). Here I focus on the latter, since this study provides a qualitative and more de-tailed description of the eects of creolization. One of the important questions raisedby this research is whether Simon's impressive feat can be explained by processes oflearning without recourse to innate linguistic knowledge. Before answering that ques-tion it is worthwhile looking closer at Singleton & Newport's ndings. They argue thatSimon is responding to the inconsistent input from his parents by way of `frequencyboosting'; that is, he is extracting the most frequent, consistently used forms from theinput provided by his parents and boosting the frequency of these forms in his ownoutput. In this process he is not relying entirely on absolute frequency information,but only boosts those forms which show consistency in terms of correlation betweenform and meaning. These forms, in turn, largely coincide with ASL forms, thus per-mitting Simon to exhibit a signing behavior very close to the ASL of early learners(with consistent input). In eect, he acquires a (near normal) systematic morphologyby statistically ltering out the noise from his parents output.Returning to the question of how this might be explained in terms of learning, I
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 166in unison with Singleton & Newport suggest that maturationally constrained learn-ing mechanisms underlie the process of creolization. The idea is that such learningmechanisms change their own eective input (as mentioned in chapter 5), and maytherefore be able to lter out the noise that hide the grammatical structure. Thereare a number of ways to pursue this idea in terms of simulation experiments. I men-tion three here. First, a recurrent neural network undergoing maturational change,similar to the nets used in chapter 4, could be trained on a corpus from a small ar-ticial pidgin language (perhaps paired with some minimal contextual information).The outcome of this training is predicted to be a creole which has more grammaticalstructure than the pidgin. The second proposed simulation involves the learning ofmorphological structure via a pairing of linguistic form with meaning, extending thesimulations reported in Goldowsky & Newport (1993). In the proposed experiment,a maturationally constrained recurrent network is to be trained on articial data cor-responding in statistical structure to the input available to Simon; i.e., with roughly70% consistent form-meaning pairings, leaving the remaining 30% to reect the typicalinconsistency errors made by his parents. Again, the prediction is that the net maycreolize the input, and, in this case, perhaps exhibit frequency boosting similar to whatSimon evinced. The last simulation elaborates on the previous experiment by startingwith the training of a parent network. However, the parent net will not undergo matu-rational changes, but has the adult memory capacity throughout its period of learningin order to simulate late learning. This net should furthermore be trained on a fullyconsistent corpus of form-meaning pairings, signaling the idealization that the parentslearned ASL from perfect input. Once that net is fully trained, its output will serveas input for a child net. If the present ideas are right, the parent net may display atypical late learner output|such as the input Simon received from his parents. Theseproposed simulation experiments are admittedly somewhat speculative, but they re-ceive some credibility from the results already reported here in chapter 4, in Elman(1993), and in Goldowsky & Newport (1993). Moreover, Singleton & Newport (1993)argue that learning mechanisms not specic to language may be able to account forcreolization as a statistical process of frequency boosting.Testing Incremental Memory Learning ExperimentallyThe role that maturationally constrained learning processes are purported to playin creolization and, more generally, in language acquisition also suggests a possiblepsycholinguistic experiment. If a child's learning mechanisms undergo maturationalchanges resembling those simulated in chapter 4 (and in the work of Elman, 1991b,
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 1671993, and Goldowsky & Newport, 1993), we may expect to be able to induce the eectsof this kind of constrained learning in adults. The motivation is that if we can imposegradually decreasing memory constraints on adult subjects in an articial grammarlearning task, then these subjects may improve their performance on this task com-pared with a control group learning the task without additional memory constraints.That is, initial memory constraints may paradoxically facilitate learning by forcing thesubject to detect simple correlational structures which, in turn, can be used to scaoldthe acquisition of more complex statistical contingencies. In other words, we may beable to induce the eects of Newport's (1990) less-is-more hypothesis in adults.To investigate this prediction, I propose to submit the subjects to an implicit learn-ing task where they are to learn the regularities underlying a simple context-free gram-mar involving center-embeddings. It is known that people are able to learn the iterativerecursive structure of regular grammars (for an overview, see Reber, 1989), but they donot appear to be able to acquire non-iterative recursive constructs from a context-freegrammar (Poletiek, 1994). However, if my prediction is correct, then we may expecta gradually decreasing memory constraint to facilitate the learning of the latter struc-tures. Rather than operationalizing this memory constraint in the form of a secondarydistractor task (such as, keeping a set of numbers in memory), I intend to use a func-tional operationalization of it. In the particular kind of implicit learning task that isrelevant here, the subjects are asked to memorize strings from a small articial gram-mar. The control group in the proposed experiment will be presented with context-freestrings, e.g., `NVcnNVv'. The subjects learning under the memory constraint condi-tion will see the same strings as the control group, but this time divided into randomlyordered chunks, such as `Vv cnN NV'. These chunks correspond functionally tothe eects of looking at the string with a 2-3 word memory window, and will graduallyincrease in size until the subjects are exposed to a number of complete strings in thelast phase of learning. If the constrained memory condition facilitates learning, as pre-dicted, then we have some additional empirical evidence for the less-is-more hypothesis,and thus for the theory of language acquisition outlined in chapter 5.Simulating the Evolution of LanguageMoving to my evolutionary account of language, I argued there that the constancyassumption underlying the Baldwin eect is not likely be met in the case of language,because the latter constitutes a `moving target'. The Baldwin eect may thereforebe an implausible candidate mechanism by which a learning based language abilitybecomes innate in the sense of UG. I would like to provide additional weight to this
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 168argument by way of simulated evolution. The idea is to simulate the evolution of alearning mechanism which has to adapt itself towards becoming a better learner of anever changing language. A recent evolutionary simulation, reported in Batali (1994),is a step in this direction. Batali trained a population of simple recurrent networks ona language from a set of 36 languages with dierent (4 item) vocabularies, but withthe same inherent context-free structure (resembling the counting recursive languagesused in chapter 3). Networks from dierent generations faced languages with dierentvocabularies. Over `evolutionary time' the networks developed an initial set of weightsbiased towards the learning of the whole group of languages, rather than a speciclanguage. In fact, the average performance after 150 generations was better than thebest performance found in a pool of 436 randomly initialized, and subsequently trained,networks. At rst glance, this result seems to suggest that the Baldwin eect may workto make language learning innate. However, a closer analysis points in the oppositedirection. Importantly, the same amount of training is needed to reach asymptoticperformance for both the evolved and the randomly initialized nets. Thus, learningplays the same important role in the acquisition of language in both cases. What theevolutionary process here has endowed the networks with is learning biases, not thekind of innate knowledge presupposed in UG2 (but notice that the set of languages usedin this experiment may have been too simple to require innate knowledge for optimalacquisition).Batali's (1994) experiments do not simulate the evolutionary scenario I sketched inchapter 5. Crucially, language itself did not undergo evolutionary change; instead, thedierence between the languages presented to the nets was merely a dierence in thefunction (or `meaning') of a xed set of vocabulary items, not in language structureper se. I therefore propose to conduct simulations in which both learning mechanismand language are subject to evolutionary change. Just as each initial conguration ofa learning mechanism will be determined by a genome (specifying the initial weightsin a simple recurrent network, size of network, and maturational changes), so will a`genome' specify the layout of each language (in terms of properties such as, head posi-tioning in phrases, the existence of center-embedding or cross-dependency, and degreeof morphological regularization). Allowing both learning mechanism and language toevolve in a dynamical relationship|in which the learning mechanism constrains thelanguage more than vice versa|may show that the Baldwin eect cannot function2In addition, if the present theory of language evolution is correct, then the same sequential learningmechanisms that subserve language may also subserve hierarchical manual combination (as suggestedby Greeneld, 1991). This means that these learning mechanisms cannot adapt themselves specicallyfor language, but must adapt to the more general requirements of sequence learning and processing.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 169when it is `chasing' a moving target (or, only causes very little of this learning processto become innate). Other avenues for experimentation follow from this set-up; hereI mention but one. An evolutionary experiment could be run to test the predictionthat the accommodation of a growing vocabulary within a xed sized network wouldforce an initially morphologically complex language towards a language with a highlyregularized morphology. The results obtained by Hare & Elman (1994) indicate thatwhen a net's memory capacity is over-stretched, we may expect a shift towards a moreregularized morphology. Computational resources permitting, possible changes in syn-tax following such morphological regularization could be studied to see if the latterwould lead to a more complex syntax in order to maintain ease of communication.Further Psycholinguistic ExperimentationA number of other experiments and topics for further theoretical research come to mindand which may provide the basis for further investigations of the theory of languagepresented in this thesis; but time and space do not allow me to treat them in anydetail here. In chapter 2, we saw that empirical data suggested a marked dierencein performance on iterative and non-iterative recursive structures. This dierence wasmirrored in the simulation results in chapter 4, however, the latter also suggested certainlimitations on the processing of iterative recursion. It would be interesting to studyhuman performance on these structures (perhaps in terms of recall, comprehension, orgrammaticality judgement) to see whether it corresponds to the predictions made fromnetwork performance. Another prediction following the discussions in chapter 2, isthat it may be possible to train people to improve their performance on sentences thatare ungrammatical in the same systematic way, just as they via training can improvetheir performance on center-embedded structures. If this prediction was borne outexperimentally, then the arguments against the competence/performance distinctionwould be further strengthened. In addition to these experimental investigations, adetailed study of acquired and developmental language disorders in the light of thepresent theory might provide supplementary support for the latter (or, perhaps, suggestareas in need of revision).In this thesis, I have outlined a theory of the learning, processing, and evolution oflanguage, and suggested how connectionists networks might function as models of ourlanguage ability. For reasons of practicality, I have concentrated on linguistic structure,leaving other aspects of language aside, such as, semantics and pragmatics. In doing so,I have made the idealization that syntax can be treated independently of these other
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 170aspects. However, I am not convinced that such a separation is warranted, or evenuseful in the long run, and in invoking this separation I might have fallen in the incom-mensurability trap. Still, I had to start somewhere, and linguistic structure seems tobe as good as place as any|especially, given the amount of empirical data that havebeen elicited concerning syntactic processing. Moreover, the earlier mentioned simu-lations by Weckerly & Elman (1992) did suggest that (minimal) semantic informationcan readily be incorporated into this kind of model, a point which has been furthercorroborated by St. John & McClelland's (1990) model of the learning and applica-tion of contextual constraints in sentence processing (though they use a slightly morecomplex network conguration). So, despite the omission of semantic and contextualconsiderations, I believe that the present theory permits yet another step towards alearning and processing based explanation of the acquisition and evolution of language.And this may, perhaps, lead us closer to solving the age old question of how niteminds create innite languages.
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